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ABSTRACT
Thanks to continuous technology scaling, intelligent, fast and smaller digital systems are now
available at affordable costs. As a result, digital systems have found use in a wide range of applica-
tion areas that were not even imagined before, including medical (e.g., MRI, remote or post-operative
monitoring devices, etc.), automotive (e.g., adaptive cruise control, anti-lock brakes, etc.), security sys-
tems (e.g., residential security gateways, surveillance devices, etc.), and in- and out-of-body sensing
(e.g., capsule swallowed by patients measuring digestive system pH, heart monitors, etc.). Such com-
puting systems, which are completely embedded within the application, are called embedded systems,
as opposed to general purpose computing systems. In the design of such embedded systems, power
consumption and reliability are indispensable system requirements. In battery operated portable devices,
the battery is the single largest factor contributing to device cost, weight, recharging time, frequency
and ultimately its usability. For example, in the Apple iPhone 4 smart-phone, the battery is 40% of the
device weight, occupies 36% of its volume and allows only 7 hours (over 3G) of talk time. As embed-
ded systems find use in a range of sensitive applications, from bio-medical applications to safety and
security systems, the reliability of the computations performed becomes a crucial factor. At our current
technology-node, portable embedded systems are prone to expect failures due to soft errors at the rate of
once-per-year; but with aggressive technology scaling, the rate is predicted to increase exponentially to
once-per-hour.
Over the years, researchers have been successful in developing techniques, implemented at dif-
ferent layers of the design-spectrum, to improve system power efficiency and reliability. Among the
layers of design abstraction, I observe that the interface between the compiler and processor micro-
architecture possesses a unique potential for efficient design optimizations. A compiler designer is able
to observe and analyze the application software at a finer granularity; while the processor architect an-
alyzes the system output (power, performance, etc.) for each executed instruction. At the compiler
micro-architecture interface, if the system knowledge at the two design layers can be integrated, design
optimizations at the two layers can be modified to efficiently utilize available resources and thereby
achieve appreciable system-level benefits. To this effect, the thesis statement is that, “by merging sys-
tem design information at the compiler and micro-architecture design layers, smart compilers can be
developed, that achieve reliable and power-efficient embedded computing through: i) Pure compiler
techniques, ii) Hybrid compiler micro-architecture techniques, and iii) Compiler-aware architectures”.
In this dissertation demonstrates, through contributions in each of the three compiler-based techniques,
the effectiveness of smart compilers in achieving power-efficiency and reliability in embedded systems.
i
To
Mom and Dad
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“...when you have done the will of God you may receive what is promised.” Heb 10:36. Praise
be to the Lord God Almighty, for His loving hand has guided me over all the hurdles of life, and has
made this dissertation possible.
I remember well the first day I met Prof. Aviral Shrivastava at his office, a week before the first
day of classes in the Fall of 2006. After a very brief discussion on what little I had on my resume, he
proceeded to present research problems and steer me into research. I didn’t then, nor do I now, know
what he really saw in me that led him to believe I would get so far. Prof. Shrivastava has always believed
in me, and overly patient with all the havoc I created. He has taught me all I know about research, and
everything that goes with it. Though I once had no intentions of pursuing a doctoral degree, I believe
now that my decision to do so has been the best ever; and I owe it all to my guide Prof. Shrivastava.
Thank you sir.
Prof. Jongeun Lee, joined our lab as a post doctoral researcher with an abundance of experience
and expertise. I was one of the privileged few to work closely with him on a soft error project, which was
to be an integral part of my thesis. His guidance, and expertise were instrumental in helping us formulate
the Cache Vulnerability Equations. I take this opportunity to thank Prof. Lee for being a good friend and
colleague, during his days at CML.
One of the most inspiring classes I ever had at ASU was Advanced VLSI Design by Prof.
Lawrence T. Clark. His enthusiasm and work that lead to the design of tomorrow’s reliable processors,
has influenced a significant part of my dissertation. I am grateful to Prof. Clark for his support and
guidance, throughout the duration of my tenure at ASU, both as a Masters student and also as a PhD
student.
I would like to thank Prof. Charles Colbourn, for introducing me to “Design Theory” and its
potential to be integrated in different parts of my research work. I again thank Prof. Colbourn for his
guidance in shaping my dissertation.
I thank Prof. Sarma Vrudhula, for his support during my internship at Intel, through the Em-
bedded Systems Consortium. As a grad student on the 4th floor, with a cubicle close to Prof. Vrudhula,
I take pride in being continually motivated by him, to push the limits and strive for higher goals. Thank
you sir for being a fountain of inspiration to us all.
Being a member of the Compiler Microarchitecture Lab (BY407) is a privilege in its own right.
iii
I am lucky to be surrounded by friends, rather than colleagues, who have been a pillar of strength to me,
both on and off the lab. I am but sure that our friendship will not die down after we are hooded, but will
continue and possibly flourish further. I take this opportunity to thank my friends and fellow CMLers:
Yooseong Kim, Ke Bai, Jing Lu, Mahdi Hamzeh, Bryce Holton, Jared Pager, Abhishek Rhisheekesan,
Fei Hong, Jian Cai, Seung Chul Jung, Di Lu, and the many other alumni. From weekly meetings that go
on for hours in technical discussions, to team lunches, and hour long useless discussions in the lab, I am
very proud to have been with this enthusiastic bunch of researchers. Thank you guys for your support.
My brother Leontius Vinod Jeyapaul, has been my friend, philosopher and guide throughout
my life. It was he who directed me to pursue Electronics engineering, and then again exposed me to
graduate studies in the US. His constant support, advice, and love has been my bread and butter through
these years and I am ever grateful. Though we stay miles apart, we are with each other. I owe my PhD
and progress to him.
As I completed higher secondary education, my Mother (Mercy Jeyapaul) and Father(Pushpam
M. F. Jeyapaul) had a dream. They wanted to see the prefix “Dr.” before my name. Today, as I write
these words on my PhD dissertation, I remember them and all the sacrifices they had to endure to make
this possible. My gratitude knows no bounds, but I make one prayer – “that I may utilize what little I
have gained, and make them proud”. Mom and Dad, this is for you.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
CHAPTER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Embedded Processors in Tomorrow’s Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Need for Power-Efficient Embedded Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Need for Reliable Embedded Computing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Role of Compilers in Enabling Reliable and Power-efficient Embedded Systems . . . . . 2
1.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 THESIS STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 Pure Compiler Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2 Hybrid Compiler Micro-architecture Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
For Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
For Power Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3 Compiler Directed Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4 PURE COMPILER TECHNIQUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Cache Behavior: Data Accesses and Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3 Cache Vulnerability: Need For a Smart Compiler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Algorithm Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Compiler Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Data Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Cache Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Cache Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Cache Associativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Cache Block Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
System-level Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Observations and Deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
v
Chapter Page
4.4 Analytical Cache Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Program Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Architecture Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.5 Cache Miss Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.6 Cache Vulnerability and Challenges in Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.7 Cache Vulnerability Equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Access Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Representing Integer Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Multiple Reuse Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Access Type and Cache block State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Post-access Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Implementation and Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.8 CVE Model Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.9 Analytical Optimization of CVE: Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Array Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.10 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.11 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5 HYBRID COMPILER MICRO-ARCHITECTURE TECHNIQUES: FOR RELIABILITY . . 47
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.2 Background: Intermediate Vulnerability Time (IVT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Quantifying the Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.5 Our Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Key Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Smart Cache Cleaning Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Step 1: Smart Reference Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Step 2: Smart Access Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Step 3: Smart Pattern Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Step 4: Program Instrumentation and Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Cache Cleaning on Multiple References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
vi
Chapter Page
5.6 Experiments and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Better Energy-Vulnerability Efficiency With Smart Cache Cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
More Energy Efficient Design Points in SCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Generated K-bit pattern achieves close-to-ideal SCC efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
EVP decreases with increase in references to clean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.7 Software-only Smart Cache Cleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6 HYBRID COMPILER MICRO-ARCHITECTURE TECHNIQUES: FOR POWER-EFFICIENCY 68
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.2 Data-TLB Power Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Compiler based Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Closest Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Use-Last TLB Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Page Switch-Aware Instruction Scheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Solution for Page Switch Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Heuristic for Page Switch Minimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Page-Switch Aware Array Interleaving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Motivational Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Identify the Arrays to Interleave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Interleaving Arrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Impact of Loop Unrolling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Comprehensive Page Switch Reduction (PSR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.3 Instruction-TLB Power Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Hardware Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Software and Hybrid Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
vii
Chapter Page
Software Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Hybrid Approaches for data-TLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Hybrid Approaches for instruction-TLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Page-Switch Reduction by code Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Page-Switches in the Instruction Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Objectives for Page-Switch Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Granularity of Code Placement for Page-Switch Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
The Procedure Placement Problem (PPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Output and Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
PSF : Page-Switches due to Function-calls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
PSL: Page-Switches due to Loop iterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
PSS: Page-Switches due to Sequential Accesses in functions . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Intractability of the Procedure Placement Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Subset of the Problem: PPPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Decision Version of PPPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
The Graph Partitioning Problem (GPP) [32] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
The Reduction: GPP ≤p PPPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Related Code Placement Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
ILP Formulation of a PPP Problem-Subset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Objective function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
B2P2:Bounds Based Procedure Placement Heuristic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Illustration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Heuristic Runtime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Overall Page-Switch Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Program Page-Switches: break-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
viii
Chapter Page
6.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
7 COMPILER-AWARE ARCHITECTURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7.2 Notation and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Loop kernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
CGRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Application Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Path Existence Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Simple Path Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Routing Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Routing PE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Uniqueness of Routing PE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
No Computation on Routing PE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Shared Resource Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Utilized CGRA Rows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.3 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
7.5 ILP Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Boolean Decision Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
7.6 Our Approach : Split-Push Kernel Mapping (SPKM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Column-wise Scattering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
ILP Solution of Matching Cut . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Objective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Routing PE Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Row-wise Scattering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.7 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
SPKM can map more applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
SPKM can generate better mappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
SPKM has no significant mapping-time overhead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
ix
Chapter Page
Real Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
7.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A NEED FOR SOFT ERROR RESEARCH IN MOBILE SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
A.1 Need for Soft Error Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.2 Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B POWER CONSUMPTION OF THE CPU IN A SMART PHONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
B.1 Experimental Deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
B.2 Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
4.1 Vulnerability Results for mmult, N=12 Legend – CV: cache vulnerability, CM: cache miss,
ACV: adjusted CV, RT: runtime, (li): line-iteration, (bc): byte-cycle, and (c): cycle. . . . . . 40
4.2 Vulnerability results for mmult, N=14 Legend – CV: cache vulnerability, CM: cache miss,
ACV: adjusted CV, RT: runtime, (li): line-iteration, (bc): byte-cycle, and (c): cycle. . . . . . 41
4.3 Array placement optimization results for swim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1 Data table derived for statistics on the example program in Figure 5.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.1 Table showing page-switches due to function-calls, loops and sequential-executions, in bench-
mark applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.1 Extrapolated SER of general purpose and embedded processors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1.1 Example program showing compiler analysis on trade-offs: (a) Loop order IJ accesses data
row-first on the array, and requires only one cache-line during the first 4 iterations. This has
reduced number of memory accesses and power, but by causing data to remain in the cache
(exposing them to soft errors) has increased vulnerability. (b) Loop order JI accesses data
column-first on the array, and requires 4 cache-lines during the first 4 iterations and causes a
cache-miss (access to B(4)). This has increased number of memory accesses, cache misses
and power, but reduced vulnerability by reducing time that data is in the cache. . . . . . . . 4
2.1 (a) Traditional Compilers; (b)Pure Compiler Techniques: Compiler optimizations using
detailed micro-architecture description of the processor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 (c)Hybrid Compiler Micro-architecture Techniques: Compiler optimizations are targeted
to efficiently utilize specific architecture blocks; (d)Compiler Directed Architectures: New
power-efficient (or reliable) processors are developed in conjunction with the compiler de-
signed for the specific micro-architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Data Cache Vulnerability (Example): Cache operations on a datum are denoted by labeled
arrows (R-Read,W-Write,E-Eviction) over its timeline in the cache. Below this timeline, the
vulnerable time-regions are marked by solid bars. In the presence of an SEU (denoted by a
lightning-bolt), the following read (R) and/or eviction (E) events operate over incorrect data,
and carry forward the same into the underlying memory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2 Vulnerability - Runtime trade-off analysis across sort algorithms. Total data cache vulner-
ability follows the trend of program runtime, for the same data-set, across algorithms. . . . . 15
4.3 Average Instantaneous vulnerability (AIV) plot across sort algorithms. The number of
vulnerable data-bytes per cycle (or AIV), is a characteristic of the algorithm design; and
does not follow the trend of program runtime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4 Runtime and data cache vulnerability for loop interchange on matmul. A significant varia-
tion in vulnerability (53×) is observed between loop orders JIK and KJI, for only 5% per-
formance variation. Loop order JIK demonstrates lowest total vulnerability among all loop
orders, and is 2× less than that of IJK, with < 1% performance penalty. . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.5 Average Instantaneous vulnerability (AIV) plot for loop interchange on matmul. The AIV
plot for the different loop orders show the same trend as that of total vulnerability, with loop
order JIK being the most economic in vulnerability and performance. . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
xii
Figure Page
4.6 Experiments on matmul, by varying the input data-set size, with constant cache size of
32KB. Increase in the value of N translates to a data-set size increase of 3×N×N. . . . . . 19
4.7 Experiments on sort algorithms, by varying the input data-set size, with constant cache
size of 32KB. The AIV for each sorting algorithm is plotted, when the size of the array to be
sorted is increased. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.8 Experiments varying cache size on the matmul benchmark for two different array sizes N=10
(1KB) and N=100 (120KB). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.9 Experiments on sort benchmarks by varying the cache size over two different data sizes.
AIV plot of sort; N=1000 (4KB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.10 Experiments on sort benchmarks by varying the cache size over two different data sizes.
AIV plot of sort N=10000 (40KB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.11 Experiments increasing the cache associativity on the matmul for two different array sizes. . 22
4.12 AIV plot of sort benchmarks varying cache associativity over two different data size con-
figurations each. [sort N=1000 (4KB)] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.13 AIV plot of sort benchmarks varying cache associativity over two different data size con-
figurations each. [sort N=10000 (40KB)] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.14 Experiments varying cache-block size on the matmul benchmark over two cache sizes, and
three different cache associativity configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.15 Runtime vs. Vulnerability: Opportunities to greatly reduce vulnerability at little performance
cost exist. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.16 Access Space and Access Relations: (a) Ra = a[ j] is a reference, while each instance of
it when the program executes is an access. (b) 16 points in the i× j space denotes the
iteration space, and 2 sets of these points, one for reference Ra and one for Rb constitute the
access space. (c) Accesses (0,1,Ra) and (1,1,Ra) have a reuse relation since they access the
same memory address. (d) Accesses (2,2,Ra), and (3,3,Rb) access the same cache block,
therefore they have a conflict relation, while accesses (1,1,Ra) and (2,2,Ra) are unrelated
since they access different cache blocks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.17 The access space of reference R is represented. Two successive accesses of elements of
reference R ((~j,R) and (~j−~r,R)) are labeled, and the reuse vector (~r) is marked by an arrow.
A cache miss at (~k,S), between data accesses over the reuse vector~r is marked by a star. . . 30
xiii
Figure Page
4.18 The access space of reference R, and the reuse of two data elements ((~j1,a[1]), (~j2,a[2])),
by the same reuse vector, is represented. A cache miss occurs on the access (~j1,a[1]) due
to interference by (~k1,S). In the presence of multiple interfering references (with the same
reuse vector), access (~k2,T ) by reference T causes a cache miss at (~j2,a[2]). The interfering
accesses causing caches misses are marked by stars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.19 Access Vulnerability is the vulnerability from the last accumulated from the last access to
the same data. Cold Miss: The vulnerable duration for the first access is 0. Cache Hit: The
vulnerable duration is the length of the smallest reuse vector. Cache Miss: The vulnerable
duration is the distance from the previous access to the first interfering access. . . . . . . . . 34
4.20 In the case of multiple references accessing the cache-block data, possible cache-misses
can be recognized over multiple interference points over the reuse vector (~k1, ~k2, · · · , ~k∗).
These are represented by the stars over the reuse vector. The first interference point For
vulnerability calculation, we consider the first possible interference point (~k∗), represented
by the larger solid star. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.21 Access nonvulnerability = ANV SR ), is the sum of iterations which are not vulnerable, between
the two successive accesses on the reuse vector. The iterations after a cache-miss at (~k,S),
are not vulnerable and therefore are enclosed within a box. The remainder of the iterations,
not enclosed within a box, between (~j−~r) and (~j) are computed using Equation (4.6). . . . 36
4.22 Calc1 loop from swim (after loop interchange). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.23 Cache vulnerability and runtime reduction through array placement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1 Intermediate Vulnerable Time (IVT) .i.e., the time a data element remains vulnerable in the
cache is defined for two data access patterns (where, W=Write, R=Read, E=Eviction): a data
element once written is vulnerable as long as it remains in the cache across read accesses.
Since the second write (W) operation over-writes the updated data element, any error that
may affect the unused data in the cache, deems the access as not-vulnerable for that time slot. 49
5.2 Demonstrating the need and importance of smart cache cleaning. (a) Two dimensional loop
operating over two data arrays one read-only (B) and the other read-and-written (A). (b) Sum-
mary of array A’s vulnerability in each cache configuration shows the SCC scheme achieves
energy efficient vulnerability reduction. (c) Detailed iteration-level analysis of cache write-
backs, in each configuration, and their impact on the vulnerability of array A’s elements. . . . 50
xiv
Figure Page
5.3 Relative comparison of vulnerability (in byte-cycles) and the number of memory-writes in-
curred during the implementation of write-through cache, and early-writeback on a simple
matrix multiplication program. The vulnerability in the presence of early-writeback varies
with the loop order, which demonstrates the room for smart cache cleaning on programs by
analyzing the data access patterns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.4 Our 4 stage Smart Cache cleaning methodology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5 Smart Cache Cleaning Architecture: The architecture blocks as part of the SCC are shaded.
Every marked store instruction (denoted by csw) is compared and based on the cleaning
decision read by the iterator, Clean EN is signaled triggering targeted cache block cleaning. . 56
5.6 Demonstrating Smart Reference Selection: On the memory profile of a program over its
execution time-line, arrays A and B are accessed by instruction addresses 0x0010 and 0x0020
respectively. The individual IVT values (A1, A2, B1) are labeled and annotated by arrows
that connect their W and R accesses points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
5.7 The graph showing Normalized EVP of the best EWB period (EWB configuration with least
EVP) and the best scc threshold parameter using 1 and 2 scc insn reg registers, demonstrates
higher energy-vulnerability efficiency with the SCC technique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.8 Normalized vulnerability and energy plots for two benchmarks across varying SCC Threshold
values. The plots for 32-bit Pattern SCC closely follow that by Ideal SCC in DSWAP, while
they overlap in DAXPY, demonstrating the accuracy of Algorithm 2. Vulnerability and en-
ergy trade-off is observed for varying threshold values for each benchmark. . . . . . . . . . 63
5.9 The EVP of the application reduces with increase in the number of scc insn reg registers used. 65
5.10 Software-only SCC Overview: Overview of the software-only SCC technique is described. . 66
5.11 Experimental Demonstration: The EVP of the application using SCC implementation on
varying orders of unrolled loops, which correspond to the different k-bit pattern sizes iden-
tified through the SCC Analysis performed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.1 Representative block diagram of the Use-Last TLB Architecture [37] . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.2 Impact of code generation on TLB page switching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.3 DFG and page mapping of compress kernel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
6.4 Problem in greedy solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.5 Impact of Instruction Scheduling on Page Switch Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.6 Array Interleaving through example: (a)Example loop;(b)Array allocation and access pat-
tern; (c)Loop block with interleaved arrays; (d)Array allocation and access pattern of inter-
leaved array . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
xv
Figure Page
6.7 Impact of Array Interleaving and Instruction Scheduling on Page Switch Count . . . . . . . 79
6.8 Impact of Loop Unrolling on Page Switch Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.9 Page Switch Count and Runtime reduction by our Page-Switch Reduction Algorithm . . . . 81
6.10 Function-call Page-Switches:
(i)PSF(F2) is the sum of the function’s caller-to-callee page-switches (FPF(F2.C2)) and
callee-to-caller function-return page-switches(RPSF(F2.C2)).
(ii)PSF(F1) is the number of callee-to-caller function return page-switches(RPSF(F1.C1)). . 89
6.11 Loop-execution Page-Switches for:
(a)PSL(Loop1) is equal to the sum of its forward iteration FPSL = 1003 and loop-return
RPSL = (100)+(1002)+(1003).
(b)PSL(Loop2) is the sum of FPSL = 100 and RPSL = 100. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6.12 Original DCFG of dijkstra program with page demarcations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.13 Optimized DCFG of dijkstra program with page demarcations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
6.14 Impact of Code Placement on Page Switch Count. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
7.1 Example of ILP formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7.2 Split & Push Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
7.3 Formation of fork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
7.4 Mapping process example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
7.5 Fork minimization algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.6 Number of applications mapped on CGRA validly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.7 Percentage of better mapping for SPKM and AHN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.8 Percentage of better mapping for SPKM and ILP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.9 Total mapping time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7.10 Number of rows for real benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
xvi
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Embedded Processors in Tomorrow’s Devices
Thanks to continuous technology scaling, intelligent, fast and smaller digital systems are now available at
affordable costs. As a result, digital systems have found use in a wide range of application areas that were
not even imagined before, including medical (e.g., MRI, remote or post-operative monitoring devices,
etc.), automotive (e.g., adaptive cruise control, anti-lock brakes, etc.), security systems (e.g., residential
security gateways, surveillance devices, etc.), and in- and out-of-body sensing (e.g., capsule swallowed
by patients measuring digestive system pH, heart monitors, etc.). These are applications which work
on batteries intended to last long, and with a level of reliability that is considered a critical factor in
its design. In addition, because of the superior power-efficiency observed in embedded technology,
several high-end data servers are now being designed using embedded processors. For example, Silicon
Graphics and SeaMicro have developed high-end servers using Intel Atom low power processors (SGI
Molecule with 10,000 cores and the SM10000 with 512 cores). The applications of embedded processor
technology in such a wide and growing array of applications shines light on the importance of green
computing, where the computation and system are considered reliable.
1.2 Need for Power-Efficient Embedded Systems
Power-efficiency has been of paramount importance for embedded systems. This is because most em-
bedded systems are mobile and therefore battery-operated, and the battery is the single most important
factor that directs device cost, weight, recharging time/frequency and ultimately the usability of the sys-
tem. For example, in the Apple iPhone 4 smart-phone, the battery is 40% of device weight, occupies
36% of its volume and allows around 7 hours (over 3G) of talk time. In every generation of the iPhone
production line, battery-life has been the most criticized feature despite of the increase in computation
capabilities or applications made possible. In Appendix B, we present experimental deductions to sub-
stantiate our claim of battery life being affected by the power consumption of the CPU in a hand-held
device (e.g., smartphone). A larger battery could increase the talk time (or device usage time), but would
affect the device weight and thus its handling and consequentially the cost. The trade-off in such system
designs typically is between the recharge frequency and system weight. Mobile devices such as these
have now become a requirement rather than a luxury, to empower the fast pacing economy. Efficient
embedded systems thus have to be developed, that meet the high processing requirements of such mo-
bile devices, at low power to meet their battery specifications. Intel’s Core 2 Mobile processor [47] and
soon-to-be-released mobile processors like Texas Instruments’ OMAP 5 dual-core processor, Nvidia’s
Kal-El quad-core processor, and Qualcomm’s snapdragon 2.5GHz quad-core processor are examples,
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from the industry, that show the trend of increasing processor speeds together with the number of cores
in embedded processors. It is thus evident that there is an immediate need for high-performance but
power-efficient embedded processors.
1.3 Need for Reliable Embedded Computing
Another system metric that is becoming increasingly important in embedded systems, as an effect of
technology scaling, is reliability. As embedded systems find use in safety-critical applications, including
medical, missile navigation controls, adaptive driver assistance, and financial systems, reliability be-
comes a crucial system-design parameter. Soft errors are becoming the most important threat to system
reliability. Soft errors are transient faults that can happen due to several reasons, including electrical
noise, external interferences, cross-talk. However, majority of soft errors in the system happen due to
high-energy or charge-carrying particle strikes on the digital device that toggle its logical value. Charge
carrying particles like alpha particles and high energy neutrons (100KeV - 1GeV from the cosmic back-
ground) have been known to cause soft errors for a long time. With technology scaling, even low energy
neutron particles (10meV - 1eV) cause soft errors in sub 45nm SRAM memory cells [96]. This effect
is multiplied with the fact that there are many more low-energy particles, than those at higher ener-
gies [46]. In Appendix A, we extrapolate the SER of current mobile and general purpose processors, for
future technology dimensions, and justify the urgent need for soft error research in embedded systems.
At our current technology, high-end mobile systems e.g., smart-phones, are prone to experience a soft
error at the rate of about once-per-year. With drastic technology scaling (when devices are fabricated
in dimensions smaller than the wavelength of light used to produce them), and even faster increase in
processor computing requirements, this rate is only expected to increase exponentially [54].
1.4 Role of Compilers in Enabling Reliable and Power-efficient Embedded Systems
Power-efficiency and reliability are well recognized concerns, and techniques to improve them have been
developed at several levels of the processor design abstraction, e.g., at the manufacturing and materials
(e.g., use of high-K dielectric [90], etc.), transistor level (e.g., gate sizing [28]), circuit design (e.g.,
multiple-threshold circuits [103]), micro-architecture design and implementation (e.g., improving branch
predictor [80]), software library [84], and system level (operating system level Dynamic Voltage and
Frequency Scaling (DVFS)[56] and Dynamic Thermal Management (DTM)[13]).
These design layers can be coarsely divided into hardware and software levels. Techniques at
hardware level are very useful since they affect the entire chip, and do not require any change in the soft-
ware stack, and consequently are very popular. For example, using high-K dielectric reduces the leakage
of the whole chip, and does not require any software change. The forte of hardware techniques is in
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optimizing the hardware for use in a given functionality. However, optimization techniques that apply
to only parts of the application functionality are challenging to implement in hardware. This is because
applying such hardware schemes requires building some intelligence in hardware to detect the applica-
tion pattern to decide when to selectively apply the technique; and this extra hardware could outshine
the benefits of the optimization technique. For example, if we want to reduce the power consumption by
power-gating some parts of the processor when the ILP is low, then the circuitry needed to determine the
ILP will execute all the time, and that may annul the benefits.
Cases when the optimization technique must be applied selectively on some parts of the ap-
plication are best dealt at the software level, where there is more control over the application and its
specification. Given the hardware architecture of a processor, the software specification and the way
it is executed on the hardware can be tuned to optimize power and reliability. For example, the power
and performance of an application executing on a processor with caches depends heavily on the number
of misses in the cache. By changing the way cache is accessed while preserving the functionality, the
power and performance of the application can be optimized. Such an optimization can be done by the
application programmer. However the programmer is already burdened with the exponentially increas-
ing functionality of the application, and debugging needs, so that adding more burden of application
optimization (for power, reliability, etc.) on the application programmer is not advisable or desirable.
The compiler sits at the hardware software interface, between the processor micro-architecture
and software layers. The input of a compiler is the application specification in a programming language,
e.g., C, C++, python etc. and the output is machine instructions that are directly executed on the processor
hardware. Ultimately, the compiler decides the way an application uses the processor micro-architecture,
and therefore can very significantly affect the power, performance and reliability of application execution
on the processor. The power of the compiler in achieving a balanced and favorable trade-off, between the
various system metrics that are affected by the application, can be explained with the help of an example
in Figure 1.1. Two different loop orders (IJ and JI) of a simple program have been shown executing
over a fully-associative cache (LRU replacement policy) of size equal to 4 cache lines. Analysis of the
program’s behavior over the cache, show that though they implement the same functionality, there exists
a distinct difference in their power and reliability metrics.
• In the loop order IJ (Figure 1.1(a)), for the first four iterations, the array A’s data is accessed row-
first and only one cache-line is being accessed. This use of the temporal-locality of the data-cache
reduces the runtime of the program and also reduces power consumption by reducing the number
of memory accesses. On the other hand, we observe here that the data elements of array A accessed
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Figure 1.1: Example program showing compiler analysis on trade-offs: (a) Loop order IJ accesses data
row-first on the array, and requires only one cache-line during the first 4 iterations. This has reduced
number of memory accesses and power, but by causing data to remain in the cache (exposing them to
soft errors) has increased vulnerability. (b) Loop order JI accesses data column-first on the array, and
requires 4 cache-lines during the first 4 iterations and causes a cache-miss (access to B(4)). This has
increased number of memory accesses, cache misses and power, but reduced vulnerability by reducing
time that data is in the cache.
during the first four iterations remain in the cache till the end of the program, even if they are no
longer required for program execution. The increased exposure (to soft errors) of the data-cache
elements, increases the probability of soft errors and thereby reduces the reliability of the program.
This configuration thus has high power-efficiency but low reliability.
• In the loop order JI (Figure 1.1(b)), for the first four iterations, array A’s data is accessed column-
first, where the memory arrangement is such that the elements of each column occupy separate
cache-lines. For the first three iterations, three cache-lines are loaded into the cache (accessing
columns 1,2, and 3). On the fourth iteration, since the cache is of limited size, when the fourth
array element on column 4 is to be accessed, the cache-line containing elements of array B has to
be evicted. In addition, during the same iteration an access to B(4) requires that the first cache-
line that contained row 1 of array A, be evicted based on the LRU replacement policy. During
the first 4 iterations of the program, this configuration incurs a total of 4 memory accesses and
one cache-miss which leads to an overall increase in the number of memory accesses and energy
consumption. On the other hand in this loop order, the accessed cache-lines are quickly replaced by
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a new cache-line thereby reducing the time cache data is exposed to soft errors. This configuration
thus has high reliability but low power-efficiency.
In terms of optimization, the compiler has the advantage that the whole application code is
available to it, and there is time (since compilation is usually off-line) for deep analysis (as seen in
the example above). This marks the larger set of resources (application software and system hardware
knowledge) available to the compiler, which is one of the primary considerations to choose this layer
of abstraction. One important manifestation of this is that while hardware techniques can only have
information of the recent past, a compiler can get an idea of the future, i.e., what kind of computation is
coming next, and prepare the micro-architecture for the same. For example, if the ILP in the computation
coming next is low, it can issue instructions to power-gate some of the circuits that are not going to be
used. Finally, looking bottom up from hardware, the compiler is the last layer at which the effects of
hardware changes can be absorbed, so as not to affect the software stack. Consequently, it is also a place
where new hardware modifications can be exploited automatically.
1.5 Summary
In summary, embedded processors are finding use over a wide spectrum of applications with an increas-
ing trend in the processor requirements. Improving the power-efficiency and reliability of tomorrow’s
embedded systems are some of the most important challenges in their successful designs. Among the
different abstraction layers in system design, the compiler is poised at a unique position between the
application and the micro-architecture. It has, i) the knowledge of the application code (at a finer gran-
ularity), and ii) can analyze the effect of code on the processor micro-architecture. The compiler, with
such a unique perspective, is key to the development of smart techniques to improve the power-efficiency
and reliability of current and future embedded systems.
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Chapter 2
THESIS STATEMENT
My thesis is that, “by merging system deign information at the compiler and micro-architecture
design layers levels, smart compilers can be developed; that achieve reliable and power-
efficient embedded computing through: i) Pure compiler techniques, ii) Hybrid compiler
micro-architecture techniques, and iii) Compiler-aware architectures.”
Figure 2.1: (a) Traditional Compilers; (b)Pure Compiler Techniques: Compiler optimizations using
detailed micro-architecture description of the processor.
Traditionally, the role of the compiler is to translate the code of a given application (in a high-
level language like “C, C++ or JAVA”) to low-level machine instructions (like load, store, mov,
add, etc.) as per the processor ISA (Instruction Set Architecture), which is represented by Figure 2.1(a).
In this case, the compiler optimizations (if any) are machine-independent and are targeted to improve the
overall performance of the application or reduce code-size.
Advanced code-level optimizations can be developed to affect certain specific system metrics
like power and/or reliability. Using the micro-architecture level description of the underlying proces-
sor, a given application can be analyzed for its impact on the system metrics and optimized thereof.
Such techniques, that aim to improve the power-efficiency and reliability of a system, using only com-
piler optimizations on the application code, are called Pure Compiler Techniques and represented by
Figure 2.1(b).
Some hardware techniques use specialized circuitry, or modified architecture blocks, to reduce
the power consumption or increase the reliability of the system. Details on the behavior of such hardware
blocks can be used by the compiler to develop code-level optimizations, which enable efficient utilization
of these modified architecture blocks. Such combined software-hardware techniques used, to improve the
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Figure 2.2: (c)Hybrid Compiler Micro-architecture Techniques: Compiler optimizations are targeted
to efficiently utilize specific architecture blocks; (d)Compiler Directed Architectures: New power-
efficient (or reliable) processors are developed in conjunction with the compiler designed for the specific
micro-architecture.
power-efficiency or reliability achieved (by the hardware technique alone), are called Hybrid Compiler
Micro-architecture Techniques and represented by Figure 2.2(c).
To reduce the power consumption or increase reliability in the processor, the core architecture
can be greatly modified (for e.g., the use of many-core architectures for power and performance). How-
ever, the use of such architecture depends on the specific compiler capabilities that can compile (and/or
optimize) a given application for that processor. The key idea is that, by reducing processor hardware
and complexity power consumption is reduced, while the task of intelligently executing code on the
simplified architecture is shifted to the compiler. For example, to run an application on the low-power
IBM CELL processor an architecture specific compiler is required and to improve performance at low
power requirements, specific optimizations have to be employed. Such processor architectures designed
in conjunction with the compiler, by allowing migration of the processing complexity to the compiler,
are called Compiler Directed Architectures and represented by Figure 2.2(d).
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Chapter 3
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION
Our1 contributions listed here demonstrate the application of the proposed thesis to current and future
embedded system design.
3.1 Pure Compiler Techniques
In the compiler, in addition to the processor ISA, details on the behavior of certain architecture blocks
(like the cache, branch target buffer, register file, re-order buffer, etc.) are required for developing com-
piler optimizations to improve the power-efficiency and reliability of the system. For example, by know-
ing the cache size, associativity and replacement policy, the program data access patterns can be mod-
ified to reduce cache-misses (memory accesses) and thereby increase performance and reduce power
consumption. Similarly, exposure of data cache contents to soft errors can be analyzed through compiler
techniques and accordingly the reliability of the system can be optimized. In this dissertation,
• we develop a static analysis technique: Cache Vulnerability Equations, that can estimate the vul-
nerability (extent of soft error exposure) of a given program, and help choose the right code trans-
formations that improve the program’s reliability.
3.2 Hybrid Compiler Micro-architecture Techniques
For Reliability
During program execution, updated data elements (dirty cache lines) as they reside on the cache are ex-
posed to soft errors and therefore have an increased probability of data corruption. A micro-architecture
technique, Cache Scrubbing [76] proposes to periodically visit data elements in the cache and write
copies of the same into the memory. This approach helps to reduce the lifetime of updated data in
the cache, and thereby increases system reliability. However with an increase in the number of cache
write-backs, power is consumed in the memory and therefore a trade-off exists between reliability and
power.
• In the compiler, by analyzing the memory profile of the application, we identify specific instances
to perform reduced number of cache write-backs and thereby reduce power consumption but still
achieve the intended system reliability.
For Power Efficiency
Among the architecture blocks in a processor, the TLB (Translation Lookaside Buffer) is one of the
most prominent power consuming components. The reasons for such a behavior are: i) for every cache
1In order give due credit to my collaborators in the work that contributed to this dissertation, I present the work in the collective.
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access, the TLB is accessed for page translation, ii) the TLB resides on the cache-access critical path,
and iii) the TLB is composed of dynamic (highly power consuming) circuitry. One very efficient micro-
architecture technique that achieves significant power reduction (as a standalone technique) in the TLB
is the Use-Last TLB architecture[37].
• We develop instruction scheduling and code transformations to modify the data access patterns to
ensure improved power savings in the data-TLB, over that achieved by the Use-Last TLB archi-
tecture.
• We again develop code placement techniques implemented post-pass, to reduce power consump-
tion of the instruction-TLB using the Use-Last TLB architecture.
3.3 Compiler Directed Architectures
To reduce power consumption, but still improve on the performance of a system, one popular methodol-
ogy used by processor manufacturers is to reduce the size and complexity of a single core and increase
the total number of such cores within the processor. Therefore, the overall throughput of the system is
increased while each core runs at a slower speed and lower power rating. The key idea behind such an
architecture is that by reducing the hardware complexity and power consuming architecture blocks, the
system power is reduced. One such low power but high performance, many-core architecture is CGRA
(Course Grained Re-configurable Architecture). The problem in using such an architecture is that a
given application has to be statically scheduled in time and space to execute over the processor’s array
structure.
• We develop a dynamic scheduling technique that enables the CGRA to be used as an accelerator to
a multi-threaded processor. Our technique allows components of multiple threads to be accelerated
simultaneously by the CGRA, thus enabling multi-threading in the CGRA processor.
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Chapter 4
PURE COMPILER TECHNIQUES
“Through optimizations in the compiler, researchers have developed techniques to combat power ef-
ficiency [42, 98] and reliability [57, 60] issues in embedded microprocessors. These techniques are
implemented in the software design layer, and are exposed to the application and only an abstracted
perspective of the processor architecture. The reason for such an abstraction is to increase the portability
of the designed software across a wide range of processor micro-architectures. In doing so, we observe
that the lack of micro-architecture level information reduces the efficiency of the developed technique
and thereby achieved benefits. In this chapter, we highlight such trade-offs between portability and over-
all efficiency, and propose micro-architecture specific pure-compiler optimizations for increased system
reliability.”
In this work, we perform a series of design space experiments to demonstrate the need for
compiler directed techniques armed with micro-architecture knowledge, to improve system reliability.
Through these experiments and analysis, we deduce that in the development of such micr-architecture
specific pure-compiler optimizations, estimation becomes the key requirement. To this effect, we de-
velop an efficient and accurate static estimation technique to measure the reliability of the system (in
specific the data cache), for any given micro-architecture configuration. This enables the compiler to ex-
ploit the performance-vulnerability trade-offs in embedded applications at compile-time; and introduce
specialized code transformations to efficiently improve program reliability.
4.1 Introduction
Inside a processor, memory elements are most susceptible to soft errors, not only because they are
typically the largest structures by area and transistor count, but also because there is no logical and
temporal masking of soft errors in memories, and they operate on lower voltage swings [15, 31, 64, 92].
In addition, owing to the operating conditions and technology dependent design of caches (at subnano
dimensions), the critical charge (Qcrit ) required to flip the data stored in a bit is also reduced [77]. In
fact, according to [73], more than 50% of soft errors happen in memories. Lower levels of memories
(farther from the processor) can be relatively easily be protected using ECC (Error Correcting Code)
based techniques, but protecting memories closer to the core (i.e., L1 caches) results in high overheads.
Previous research [62, 85] has shown that implementing SEC-DED (Singe-Error Correction and Double-
Error Detection) can increase the L1 cache access latency by up to 95%, power consumption by up
to 22%, and chip-area increase by up to 18%. Even if the performance overhead could be hidden,
the power and area overheads cannot. Moreover, due to the impact of process variations at sub-nano
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device dimensions, SEC-DED in caches is increasingly being used to cover up hard errors in the cache,
leaving only parity checking available for runtime error detection in most cache blocks. The other option
of implementing double-bit error correction has extremely high overheads [1, 78]. Another popular
approach is to use write-through L1 caches. Write-through L1 caches ensure at least two copies of the
latest data, therefore they drastically reduce the vulnerability of data in caches, but this greatly increases
the memory traffic between the processor and the lower levels of memory. Consequently, they are not a
desirable and scalable solution for multi-core and multi-processor systems [44].
A soft error manifests in the cache when a random extraneous charge disrupts the data stored
in a bit, thereby causing data corruption in the memory. A datum in the memory is vulnerable to SDC, if
the corrupted data value is the only updated copy, and is likely to propagate through the system causing
failure (system crash or erroneous output). Data cache vulnerability is thus defined as the time for which
such vulnerable data bytes remain exposed to soft errors in the cache; which in turn translates into the
probability of soft error induced failures in the system. At different stages of system design, various
decisions and parameters affect the data cache vulnerability realized, like:
1. Software Design – Given a functionality, the choice of the right algorithm, its implementation and
appropriate compiler optimizations, are some of the key factors associated with software design.
(a) We explore the impact of “algorithm choice and implementation” on data cache vul-
nerability. In a broader sense, the runtime of an algorithm is proportional to the time that data
remains in the cache. However, our experimental analysis shows that, owing to the variations
in implementation (read write pattern), the vulnerability of the program does not exactly follow
the same trend as that of runtime; thus demonstrating a more complex relationship that requires
accurate estimation to assist in decision making.
(b) An implemented program is generally compiled to machine code by the compiler. Through
the use of “compiler optimizations”, various code transformation tools may be used to optimize
the code for performance. Code transformations change the read/write access pattern of the pro-
gram variables, and therefore effect the data cache vulnerability; with or without an impact on
performance. However choosing the right code transformation at compile-time is an open prob-
lem, which requires extensive analysis of both program and cache architecture, and also accurate
estimation.
2. Hardware Design – Through modifications to the cache microarchitecture, parameters like “cache
size, set associativity, and block size”, can be changed; which directly impact the data cache vul-
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nerability of the executed program. However, no single cache configuration can be said to have
the same effect on different applications or the varying application parameters. A mechanism,
to integrate the software and hardware characteristics, is required to accurately analyze and also
estimate the vulnerability of the system designed.
3. System I/O – The size of the data used during the execution of an application is an end-user
specific parameter, and is generally not considered during system design. In this paper, for the
first time (to the best of our knowledge), we perform design space exploration over varying data-
set sizes, across different cache configurations. The interesting relationships that are formed be-
tween system input-sizes and data cache vulnerability, thus lead us to the conclusion that, with the
knowledge of the average range of data-sizes that an application is to be executed over, accurate
vulnerability estimation techniques can assist in the right choice of cache architecture parameters
and also in software design decisions.
In this chapter, we perform exploratory experiments on benchmark applications, to study the
impact of the various system design parameters on data cache vulnerability. Our analysis of the re-
sults indicate that these design parameters have a strong inter-dependence affecting vulnerability of the
system. We perform a range of consolidated experiments where appropriate design choices are made
for a given embedded application, and the compiler directed code transformations that can be imple-
mented are changed. In this, we study the maximum possible vulnerability variation achievable and
their corresponding performance trade-offs, for each benchmark. We observe that, to be able to find de-
sign/execution points which are good both in terms of runtime and vulnerability (thereby exploiting the
available trade-offs) is difficult. For this, we need a method to estimate the vulnerability of data in caches
accurately, including the inter-dependency between the application’s data access pattern, and the under-
lying cache microarchitecture. Only cycle-accurate simulation based techniques are known to estimate
cache vulnerability accurately. While they can certainly be used (e.g. in our exploratory experiments in)
to explore some code transformations, and optimize for vulnerability and runtime, they are limited by
the overall time taken to analyze the entire code-transformation design space. Thus there is a need for
efficient techniques to estimate cache vulnerability of programs. To this end, in this paper, we develop
analytical techniques to estimate data cache vulnerability in caches. In spite of analytic techniques being
efficient, they provide insights which can be used to develop simpler techniques to approximate the data
cache vulnerability.
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Figure 4.1: Data Cache Vulnerability (Example): Cache operations on a datum are denoted by labeled
arrows (R-Read,W-Write,E-Eviction) over its timeline in the cache. Below this timeline, the vulnerable
time-regions are marked by solid bars. In the presence of an SEU (denoted by a lightning-bolt), the
following read (R) and/or eviction (E) events operate over incorrect data, and carry forward the same
into the underlying memory.
4.2 Cache Behavior: Data Accesses and Vulnerability
Based on analysis by Mukherjee et al. [76], we observe that the probability of double-bit errors is neg-
ligible (typically 3 orders of magnitude lesser), in comparison to single-bit errors. In such a case, we
may assume that simple hardware techniques (most likely implemented in current processor implemen-
tations) like cache-line bit-interleaving can reduce the onset of multi-bit errors in caches. As in the case
of popular processor architectures like Intel Xscaler [48], Intel IA-32r [49], AMD Athlonr [3], etc.,
we assume that the L1 cache is enabled with parity-based error detection hardware [38]. In this example,
and the remainder of the analysis and experiments in this paper, we adhere to the above assumptions.
In the presence of parity-based 1-bit error detection in the L1 cache, data corrupted during its
time in the cache can be detected when read/accessed. If the data was only read, it can be corrected by
reloading from the memory. However, if the data in the cache was written (dirty), it becomes the only
correct copy of the value updated by the program. In Figure 4.1, the vulnerable time-periods on the time-
line are highlighted. If an SEU corrupts the data during this vulnerable time-period (shown by a “bolt”
on the timeline, in Figure 4.1), the program accesses and/or updates the memory with the incorrect data
(which has been corrupted by a SEU) from the cache. This action may lead to system failure, or at the
least cause incorrect data output from the application.
The total time that each datum remains vulnerable in the cache, is its vulnerability. The sum of
the vulnerability values of each data element in the cache (accessed by the program), is the data cache
vulnerability of the program. The vulnerability metric that measures the reliability of a system, may
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be visualized (in an orthogonal perspective) as: the probability of a soft error corrupted data causing
system failure (or data corruption); which is directly proportional to the vulnerability (in time) of the
data in the cache.
In our analysis, we estimate the total vulnerability (in byte-cycles) and runtime (cycles) of the
program. We then calculate the Average Instantaneous Vulnerability(AIV) of the program (measured in
bytes), which is given by Equation (4.1). In other words, AIV is equal to the total number of data bytes
that are vulnerable, in the cache, per cycle; which is averaged over the total runtime of the program.
Average Instantaneous Vulnerability(AIV ) =
Total Vulnerability(byte− cycles)
Application Runtime(Cycles)
(4.1)
4.3 Cache Vulnerability: Need For a Smart Compiler
The reliability of a program is related to its data cache vulnerability, which in turn is dependent on the
time that the program’s data spends in the cache. Various factors, at different stages of design abstraction
like: i)software (algorithm choice, compiler optimization), ii)hardware (cache architecture parameters),
and iii)system input data-set sizes, affect the time and/or quantity of data that is accessed within the
cache. In this section, we attempt to study, with the help of exploratory experiments, the effects of the
various “controllable or modifiable” factors that affect the data cache vulnerability of a program. In addi-
tion, we also study the means to “control or modify” the said parameters and achieve vulnerability reduc-
tion. Our analysis of the results show that significant vulnerability reduction can be achieved by varying
some combination of the influencing parameters; however, no single and generalized cache/program
configuration can be confirmed to guarantee similar vulnerability results for all applications. In order to
reliable systems through system design choices, an accurate estimation methodology is required which
incorporates the inter-dependencies of the “controllable or modifiable” of the system.
Experimental Setup
For our explorative experiments, we model a system with a RISC processor, an on-chip L1 cache
(size=32KB) and off-chip SDRAM memory. The SimpleScalar [14] sim-outorder cycle-accurate sim-
ulator is configured to model the Intel XScale [48] processor architecture, with a 4-way set associative
L1 cache. Unless otherwise stated, we use these cache parameters to be that of the baseline cache archi-
tecture. The simulator is instrumented with code to accurately evaluate vulnerability of data used in the
program (in byte-cycles). Based on analysis by Mukherjee et al. [76], we observe that the probability of
double-bit errors is negligible (typically 3 orders of magnitude lesser), in comparison to single-bit errors.
In our experiments, we assume the occurrence of 1-bit soft errors per cache-block (based on discussion in
Section 4.2). In each set of experiments, one parameter is varied while maintaining the others constant,
to analyze their independent effects on the data cache vulnerability.
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Algorithm Choice
Figure 4.2: Vulnerability - Runtime trade-off analysis across sort algorithms. Total data cache vulner-
ability follows the trend of program runtime, for the same data-set, across algorithms.
In software design, one of the first design decisions would be the choice of an appropriate al-
gorithm for the application. This choice affects the mechanism of application-data accesses and thereby
impacts the data cache vulnerability of the program; and plot the results. We explore this impact at a
more finer granularity through experiments over seven sort algorithms. In this, all the seven programs
operate over the same random data-set, and the application is executed stand-alone on the baseline pro-
cessor configuration. Figure 4.2 plots the total vulnerability and runtime of the algorithms; while the
runtime complexities are labeled on each data point. We see here that the total vulnerability of the pro-
gram follows a trend similar to that of the program runtime. On the other hand, Figure 4.3 plots the
instantaneous cache vulnerability of the cache, averaged over the program runtime. We see here that
for algorithms arranged in increasing runtime, the instantaneous vulnerability does not follow the same
trend.
For a program that executes longer, the data utilized by the program is loaded and accessed
within the cache longer; and is therefore more vulnerable. This reasoning governs the cache vulnerability
plots in Figure 4.2. At any given cycle, the number of data-bytes that remain vulnerable in the cache is
governed by the program’s data access pattern that utilizes the data in the cache at each cycle. Therefore,
as shown in Figure 4.3, the individual algorithms and their implementations, govern their respective
instantaneous vulnerabilities. In other words, for two or more algorithms with comparable runtimes,
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Figure 4.3: Average Instantaneous vulnerability (AIV) plot across sort algorithms. The number of
vulnerable data-bytes per cycle (or AIV), is a characteristic of the algorithm design; and does not follow
the trend of program runtime.
a measure of the average number of bytes that remain vulnerable at each cycle, gives a mechanism to
distinguish between them based on reliability. The measured AIV of a program helps to analyze the
intricate relationship between the data access patterns of the program, and the data cache vulnerability
initiated by the same. Therefore, data cache vulnerability (or reliability) of a given system, cannot be
affected by an algorithm choice based on runtime alone; but only by a intricate and accurate mechanism
that measures vulnerability, while also considering the relationship between the applications data access
pattern and cache usage.
Compiler Optimizations
Having chosen a program implementation to be used in the system, the same can be optimized for per-
formance, code size, etc., at the compiler using optimization switches. In this, static analysis on the code
evaluates the performance of the program for a given ISA, and code transformations are implemented.
The code transformations like: loop interchange, loop fusion, and data layout transformations like array
interleaving, and array placement, can change the read/write pattern of program variables in the cache.
When calibrated correctly, these transformations can have a significant effect on the vulnerability of
data in the cache; with or without performance penalty. In this section, we consider one of these code
transformations – loop interchange, and study its effect on data cache vulnerability for a program. Loop
interchange is when the loop orders of a nested loop are modified to vary the order of data accesses by
the program; without any change to the program functionality. For example, in the matmul – matrix mul-
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tiplication program, the three loop dimensions can be interchanged in six different ways, and each have
an impact on the data access pattern. In this, the application involves three 2D arrays of 32×32 words
each (total data-set size = 12KB), and 4-way set associative cache of size 4KB size (baseline cache con-
figuration). L1 data cache vulnerability is measured using cycle-accurate simulation. Figure 4.4 shows
the vulnerability and runtime results for all six loop orders.
Figure 4.4: Runtime and data cache vulnerability for loop interchange on matmul. A significant variation
in vulnerability (53×) is observed between loop orders JIK and KJI, for only 5% performance variation.
Loop order JIK demonstrates lowest total vulnerability among all loop orders, and is 2× less than that
of IJK, with < 1% performance penalty.
The first observation from the graph is that there is a much greater variation in vulnerability
(53×, from JKI to KIJ) than in runtime (11%, from KIJ to KJI). This shows that there is an interesting
trade-off between vulnerability and runtime – in the sense that vulnerability can be significantly reduced
at low runtime overhead.
The second observation we make from this graph is that the JIK loop order has relatively
low runtime, and also low vulnerability. In fact as compared to the least runtime loop order IKJ, we
increase runtime by around 5%, while reducing the data-cache vulnerability by more than 4×. This
motivates for the need of finding such design/execution points, which simultaneously optimize runtime
and vulnerability.
Our final observation from the graph is that the trend of runtime and vulnerability is not de-
pendent, and cannot be derived from one another. This is a little counter-intuitive since to a first order of
approximation, increase in runtime should imply an increase in the vulnerability, since the data spends
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more time in the cache. However, vulnerability depends on many other factors including program’s data
access pattern, cache parameters, and data placement. This alternate perspective can be further analyzed
by observing the plot of AIV in Figure 4.5, for the same six matmul loop orders. The trend of AIV does
not follow that of runtime, nor does it adhere to that of total vulnerability as observed in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.5: Average Instantaneous vulnerability (AIV) plot for loop interchange on matmul. The AIV
plot for the different loop orders show the same trend as that of total vulnerability, with loop order JIK
being the most economic in vulnerability and performance.
Data Size
Given an application, by varying the size of the input data-set operated on, the trend for variation in total
data cache vulnerability is but obvious. However, the AIV realized by such variations in data-set size
follows a non-intuitive trend. Here we plot the AIV of the matmul and seven sort algorithms while
varying the data-set sizes in each.
In the case of the matmul benchmark (Figure 4.6), operated over a constant cache of size 32KB,
we observe that,
• as the size of the operated data-set increases from N = 10 (1KB) to N = 60 (42KB), we observe
a rising trend in the AIV. As long as there is enough place in the cache to retain all the data
required by the program, the number of vulnerable data-bytes that are allowed to remain in the
cache increases with data size.
• for data-set sizes increases beyond N = 60 (42KB), cache replacements come into action and
therefore reduce the number of vulnerable data-bytes that are allowed to remain in the cache.
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Figure 4.6: Experiments on matmul, by varying the input data-set size, with constant cache size of
32KB. Increase in the value of N translates to a data-set size increase of 3×N×N.
This reduces with increase in data-set size as the number of cache-replacements also increases
accordingly.
• for data-set sizes beyond N = 100 (120KB), cache replacements occur almost every cycle and
remove vulnerable data from the cache. Therefore, for data-set sizes beyond this point we observe
a saturated and low AIV for the application. It should be noted here that, this configuration does
suffer from very high cache-replacements thus affecting the overall performance of the system.
In the case of the sort algorithms (Figure 4.7), operated over a constant cache of size 32KB :
• with increase in data-set sizes from N = 100 (0.4KB) to N = 8000 (32KB), we observe an increas-
ing trend in the AIV; similar to that of matmul.
• in the range of data-set size increases, from N = 8000 (32KB) to N = 9000 (40KB), we observe
that different benchmarks reach their respective saturation points of AIV. This difference in their
saturation bounds is completely dependent on their respective data access patterns and on the
amount of array data repeatedly accessed (read, written, etc.).
• for data-set size increases beyond the saturation points, all but one algorithm follows a relatively
steady AIV trend. The data access pattern of the selection-sort algorithm is such that, it
writes into a sorted array position only once, and performs read operations only on monotonically
increasing indices of the unsorted array. This behavior poses an interesting data access pattern and
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Figure 4.7: Experiments on sort algorithms, by varying the input data-set size, with constant cache
size of 32KB. The AIV for each sorting algorithm is plotted, when the size of the array to be sorted is
increased.
irrespective of its increased runtime, it demonstrates comparatively lower vulnerability for larger
data-sets.
From the above experiments it is evident that, for a given cache architecture, and for varying
data-set sizes, the vulnerability realized by the system cannot be predicted. In addition, given an applica-
tion and cache architecture, a definitive range of data-set sizes cannot be defined to guarantee a particular
vulnerability trend (e.g., the anomalous behavior of selection-sort disrupts any trend graph drawn
over the sort algorithms). Since the data access behavior of the application has a strong dependency on
the data cache vulnerability, more accurate and perceptive (of data-size variations) means to measure the
vulnerability is required; which can thereby affect system reliability.
Cache Parameters
In this section, we analyze the variation in vulnerability with respect to the cache architecture parameters
like: i) cache size, ii) set associativity, and iii) cache-block size. In each, we perform experiments varying
one of the cache parameters while maintaining the others constant, so as to study their independent
effects.
Cache Size
The behavior of the cache in response to increasing cache sizes is very similar to that of reducing data-set
sizes, for a constant cache size. Given an application operating over a constant data-set size, by increas-
ing the cache-size of the processor, more cache space is made available to retain data longer; which
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Figure 4.8: Experiments varying cache size on the matmul benchmark for two different array sizes N=10
(1KB) and N=100 (120KB).
Figure 4.9: Experiments on sort benchmarks by varying the cache size over two different data sizes.
AIV plot of sort; N=1000 (4KB)
thereby contributes to increased data cache vulnerability. Figure 4.8 plots the instantaneous vulnerabil-
ity behavior of the matmul application for increasing cache sizes. We observe here that similar to that of
the data size experiments, when the cache is large enough to retain all the required data by the program,
the AIV saturates and follows the same trend. Similarly, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.3 plot the AIV, for
varying cache sizes, on the seven sorting algorithms. We again observe here a similar trend of peak
AIV beyond the saturation design point (when all the data required by the program can be retained in
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Figure 4.10: Experiments on sort benchmarks by varying the cache size over two different data sizes.
AIV plot of sort N=10000 (40KB)
the cache). As in the case of data-size experiments, we see that the selection-sort algorithm has a
slightly varied behavior, with a dip in saturated AIV, when cache size is >> data-set size. This behav-
ior and the AIV saturations can be attributed to the dependency of the program’s data access pattern,
program parameters, and cache size.
Cache Associativity
Figure 4.11: Experiments increasing the cache associativity on the matmul for two different array sizes.
For a given cache size and program data-set size, the instantaneous vulnerability of the program
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Figure 4.12: AIV plot of sort benchmarks varying cache associativity over two different data size
configurations each. [sort N=1000 (4KB)]
Figure 4.13: AIV plot of sort benchmarks varying cache associativity over two different data size
configurations each. [sort N=10000 (40KB)]
increases with increase in set associativity. Figure 4.11, Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.3 plot the results of our
cache set associativity experiments over matmul and sort benchmarks respectively. With an increase
in the set associativity the number of available cache-blocks available to retain the accessed data, is
increased. Though this improves on the locality of the cache, the number of vulnerable data blocks
retained in the cache increases; thereby adding to the instantaneous vulnerability realized. However,
this behavior cannot be generalized as the data access patterns of the application govern the intricate
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use of such available cache-blocks. The vulnerability decrease of selection-sort with increase in set
associativity (in Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.3) for cache size 32KB is an example of application data access
pattern affecting cache vulnerability in conjunction with the change in set associativity.
Cache Block Size
Figure 4.14: Experiments varying cache-block size on the matmul benchmark over two cache sizes, and
three different cache associativity configurations.
For a given cache size and set associativity, if the cache-block size is increased, the number
of data bytes spatially co-located to each data element is increased. With this, if one word of a cache-
block is written (updated), the entire cache-block is deemed dirty and therefore all the neighboring data
in the cache-block is also vulnerable. In addition, when successive data access patterns span beyond
cache-block boundaries, the number of cache-blocks brought into the cache increases, thereby adding to
the number of vulnerable data-bytes in the cache. Figure 4.14 plots the results of varying cache-block
sizes for a given cache size, set associativity and data-set parameters. Though a trend holds good for
various cache sizes and cache associativity parameters, there exist cases when the vulnerability of both
16B and 8B cache-blocks are the same. No clear and distinctive cache parameter can be derived here, as
the overall impact is governed by the underlying application implementation and data access pattern.
System-level Experiments
Having analyzed each of the influential factors independently, for their effect on data cache vulnerability,
in this section, we demonstrate through simulation, that interesting trade-off exists between vulnerability
and runtime of applications. In this, a set of benchmark applications (important loop kernels from the
SPEC 2000 and multimedia benchmark suites) are taken, and executed over a fixed cache microarchi-
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tecture configuration. The benchmarks are compiled with gcc(version 2.95.3) using the ’-O’ option to
ensure that the compiler does reschedule the loops. We consider here a L1 data cache of size 32KB,
direct mapped, with 32B cache block size; which is based on a conservative selection of cache parame-
ters, that achieve low data cache vulnerability, based on the exploratory experiments performed above.
While the coupled direct relationship between runtime and vulnerability is true in general, there is a very
significant impact of the data access pattern on the cache behavior; significantly changing the amount of
vulnerable data is present in the cache, and therefore this direct coupling may not be realized.
Figure 4.15: Runtime vs. Vulnerability: Opportunities to greatly reduce vulnerability at little perfor-
mance cost exist.
Figure 4.15 plots the variation in the runtime and vulnerability of the L1 data cache for three
popular loop and data transformations, loop interchange, loop fusion, and array interleaving. For each
transformation, we find the setting that results in the minimum vulnerability and the setting that results
in the maximum vulnerability. The vulnerability variation is then computed as difference in the vulner-
abilities of these configuration divided by the vulnerability in the maximum vulnerability setting. The
runtime variation is also computed using the minimum and maximum vulnerability settings. For exam-
ple, for loop interchange on matrix multiplication, Figure 4.4 shows, that the maximum vulnerability
loop order is KJI, and the minimum vulnerability loop order is JIK. The runtime and vulnerability vari-
ations are computed for these configurations. For loop fission there are only two setting, either the loops
are fused, or they are separate (fission). Similarly there are two settings for the array interleaving case,
either all the arrays are separate, or all the arrays in the loop are interleaved.
Next to the application names the letter, T or W, in parentheses indicates the direction of vari-
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ation; vulnerability and runtime move in the opposite directions (trade-off or T) or in the same direction
(win-win or W). In about half the applications (particularly for loop interchange), we observe trade-off
relationship between vulnerability and runtime, typically with much less variation in runtime (46% vul-
nerability variation vs. 16% runtime variation, on average). This means that for some applications we
can greatly reduce vulnerability while affecting performance very little, reconfirming our motivation for
cost-effective soft error approaches by compilers. In a win-win situation, on the other hand, we can get
automatic vulnerability reduction by choosing performance-optimal loop transformations.
Clearly the percentage variation in runtime and vulnerability is sensitive on the relative size of
the application data and cache size and other cache and memory parameters. For example, if the cache
is extremely small, and all accesses miss, then will be little impact of loop orders on either cache misses,
or the vulnerability. Similarly, if the cache is quite large, and there are only capacity misses, then again
there will be no variation in the runtime and vulnerability of the loops. However, in general, we expect
the variation in vulnerability to be much more magnified than the variation in the runtime, due to the
multiplicative effect of misses in vulnerability computation. To exploit vulnerability-runtime trade-offs,
techniques to estimate vulnerability are required, and efficient techniques will be needed if we want the
compiler to make these trade-offs automatically.
Observations and Deductions
We observe the following, based on our design space explorations over the various factors affecting data
cache vulnerability:
1. An algorithm choice can be confirmed to have a better performance than another, based on runtime
analysis; but one algorithm cannot be definitely concluded to have better reliability than another.
2. Code transformations on an algorithm implementation has an extensive scope for performance
efficient vulnerability reduction.
3. Increase in the size of the data-set operated by an application, affects the data cache vulnerability;
but does not always follow an intuitive trend. In some cases, for a known data-set range, the cache
parameters and algorithm choice for least vulnerability-performance trade-off varies.
4. Increase in the size of the cache increases the available cache-blocks to retain vulnerable data
and thereby increase vulnerability; but the application’s data access pattern may under-use the
available cache and reduce vulnerability.
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5. Increasing the cache associativity expands the cache availability, improves locality and thereby
allows for increased number of vulnerable cache-blocks to be retained; but the exact memory
locations accessed by the program govern the use of cache-blocks within a set, and therefore can
vary the vulnerability realized by the program.
6. By reducing the cache-block size, the number of data elements deemed vulnerable, when one of the
elements is updated, decreases and thereby reduces vulnerability; but a program which efficiently
utilizes the spatial-locality of data may have varying vulnerability estimates.
It should be noted here that any modification to the algorithm choice results in software design
cost, and a change in the cache parameters results in hardware design cost. Compiler based code trans-
formations on the other hand do not pose a design cost neither in software, nor in hardware. However, to
be able to implement such a technique an efficient method, to identify design points which are good both
in terms of runtime and vulnerability, has to be devised. To be able to find such design points, we need a
scheme to estimate the vulnerability of data in caches. Only cycle-accurate simulation based techniques
are known to estimate cache vulnerability. While they can certainly be used (e.g. in our motivating exam-
ple) to explore some code transformations, and optimize for vulnerability and runtime, however there are
limitations. Cycle-accurate simulation is very slow (only a few Kilo instructions-per-second [14]), and
the design space for some compiler transformations can be very large. For example, using cycle-accurate
simulation to explore design space for array placement for even a 32× 32 matrix multiplication will take
months on a 2 GHz dual-core processor system. Thus there is a need for efficient techniques to estimate
cache vulnerability of programs; that accommodate the various interdependent factors influencing data
cache vulnerability. To exploit vulnerability-runtime trade-offs, an accurate static analysis techniques to
estimate vulnerability are required, if we want the compiler to make these trade-off decisions automati-
cally.
4.4 Analytical Cache Vulnerability Analysis
Program Model
As is common with many static loop analysis techniques (e.g., [21, 33]), we consider a single loop nest,
whose loop bounds and array index expressions are defined by affine functions of the enclosing loop
indices. We also assume that all the load/store references inside a nest correspond to only the array
references. Scalars can be analyzed as single element arrays. We use reuse vectors to find the last access,
which further requires that references generate memory addresses in a uniform manner. In this paper we
consider only perfectly nested loops and assume that the loop body has no conditional statement other
than the loop itself. We also assume that memory accesses are made only through array references and
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arrays do not overlap (no alias). In practice, however, the constraints in our program model are not too
restrictive. Ghosh et al. [33] showed by an empirical study, that most of the runtime-wise important loop
nests in standard benchmark suits, like SpecFP are amenable to these analysis constraints.
Architecture Model
The basic architecture modeled here is a uni-processor model with a single-level, data cache hierarchy.
It will be possible to extend the analysis to multi-level cache hierarchies, but, lower level of caches are
relatively easily and routinely protected through ECC-based hardware techniques. We assume a direct-
mapped cache with write-allocate policy, implying that if the processor writes to a cache block, and the
cache block is not present in the cache, it is brought into the cache before writing on it.
Terminology
A Reference is a static memory read or write operation in the program whereas an access refers to
a dynamic instance of a reference [33]. In the example illustrated in Figure 4.16 (a), Ra = a[ j], and
Rb = b[i] are references. For N = 4, each of them is invoked 16 times, and each invocation is an access.
Figure 4.16: Access Space and Access Relations: (a) Ra = a[ j] is a reference, while each instance
of it when the program executes is an access. (b) 16 points in the i× j space denotes the iteration
space, and 2 sets of these points, one for reference Ra and one for Rb constitute the access space. (c)
Accesses (0,1,Ra) and (1,1,Ra) have a reuse relation since they access the same memory address. (d)
Accesses (2,2,Ra), and (3,3,Rb) access the same cache block, therefore they have a conflict relation,
while accesses (1,1,Ra) and (2,2,Ra) are unrelated since they access different cache blocks.
The iterations of an n-level nested loop can be represented by an n-dimensional convex polytope
I ⊂ Z n bounded by the loop bounds, called Iteration Space (outermost loop index being the first
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element in the vector). Each point in an iteration space represents an iteration of the loop nest. We
augment each iteration with reference ID to represent access (IDs are given in the order in which they will
be accessed in the loop of interest). We then define the Access Space as A = {(~j,R) | ~j ∈I ,R ∈R},
whereR is the set of IDs for all references. In the example (Figure 4.16(a)), the access space of reference
Ra is shown by the 4×4 grid of points in the light square, while that of Rb is shown by the points in the
dark square in Figure 4.16(b).
Like iterations, accesses are ordered. An access (~j,R) precedes another access (~k,S) if (~j,R) is
lexicographically less than (~k,S), or (~j,R)≺ (~k,S). 1 We use access and iteration interchangeably when
considering only one reference.
The mapping from an iteration to memory address for a reference is called it’s access function,
AFR : I → Z , and the set of all possible memory addresses accessed is the Memory Space of the
program. Figure 4.16(c) shows the memory space of the program, where both arrays have 4 elements.
Array a starts from the origin, and array b starts immediately after it ends. The access function of
reference Ra is AFRa(i, j) = Sa + j, where Sa = 0 is the starting address of the array a in the memory.
To model caches, we note that data is organized as blocks in caches. The cache block function CB gives
the cache block number for a memory address. Thus CB :Z →Z . The set of block numbers is called
Cache Space. For a direct mapped cache, CB(n) = ( nCS )%BS, where CS is the cache size, and BS is
the block size of the cache. In the example in Figure 4.16(d), the cache has 2 blocks, each of size 2
elements.
Every pair of memory accesses have either a reuse relation, a conflict relation, or are unrelated.
Two accesses have a reuse relation if they access the same memory address. In Figure 4.16, the
access (0,1,Ra) and (1,1,Ra) access the same address in memory (corresponding to the location of a[1],
therefore they have a reuse relation. Given a memory access, ~a = (~j,R), any access (~k,S) that has reuse
relation with it is called a reuse access of~a, and~k is called a reuse iteration of ~j. Of particular interest is
the last reuse access ~a, and which is just the latest of reuse accesses among those that precede ~a. Reuse
vectors are used to succinctly capture last reuse access for references [104]. The reuse vector for Ra is
~ra = (1,0), and the reuse vector for reference Rb is ~rb = (0,1).
Two accesses have a conflict relation if they access different memory address, but the same
cache block. In Figure 4.16, access (2,2,Ra) and (3,3,Rb) access different memory addresses, a[2],
and b[3] respectively, but access the same cache block, CB1. Therefore accesses (2,2,Ra) and (3,3,Rb)
1Note: The lexicographical size of a vector~v, denoted by ||~v|| and simply called size, is defined as the number of points that
are lexicographically less than~v in the iteration space. Greater/smaller/minimum is also in the lexicographical sense.
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conflict with each other. Finally, if both the memory addresses and the cache blocks of two accesses
are different, then the two accesses are unrelated. In Figure 4.16, accesses (1,0,Ra) and (2,2,Ra) are
unrelated, since they access different cache blocks.
In the absence of aliasing (e.g., the arrays are non-overlapping, the references are always ac-
cessed by their true names), there is no reuse between accesses of different references. However, there
still may be conflicts between accesses of different references. Finally, if cache block size is equal to one
element, there is just one reuse vector per reference to an array.
4.5 Cache Miss Equations
Any memory access that has a preceding reuse access but has no conflict access between itself and its
last reuse access must result in a cache hit. Conversely, a conflict access between the two accesses to the
same address will cause a cache miss in a direct-mapped cache. Thus in order to identify cache hits and
misses, we need to know only two things: i) last reuse access, and ii) whether a conflicting access exists
or not.
Figure 4.17: The access space of reference R is represented. Two successive accesses of elements of
reference R ((~j,R) and (~j−~r,R)) are labeled, and the reuse vector (~r) is marked by an arrow. A cache
miss at (~k,S), between data accesses over the reuse vector~r is marked by a star.
Finding conflicts among accesses is easy. We know that two accesses (~j,R), and (~k,S) conflict
iff CB(AFR( j)) =CB(AFS(k)). Finding the last reuse access is a little tricky. First lets assume that there
is only one reference to an array, and there is only one reuse vector per reference. Then for the reference
R, we assume that~r is the reuse vector, then by definition of reuse vectors, if some memory address is
accessed in iteration ~j, then it was last accessed in iteration (~j−~r), and both access the cache block
CB(AFR( j)). Now by our definition of cache miss, there will be a miss iff, some other reference, say S,
accesses the same cache block in iterations (~j−~r) through ~j. Figure 4.17 represents the cache miss over
labeled points in the data access space. This is captured in the Cache Miss Equation:
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CMESR(~j,~k,~r) := (CB(AFR(~j)) =CB(AFS(~k)))
∧ ((~j−~r)≺~k ≺ ~j) (4.2)
It states that the reference R will experience cache miss at iteration ~j along the reuse vector ~r, due to
another reference S in iteration~k, iff they access the same cache block. If the equality is satisfied for any
value of~k, there is a cache miss at iteration ~j. Now we can collect the iterations in which miss occurs:
MISR(~r) = {~j ∈I | ∃~k ∈I ,CMESR(~j,~k,~r)} (4.3)
MISR is the set of all iterations ~j in which there is a cache miss for accesses of reference R due to a conflict
with another reference S, along the reuse vector~r.
Figure 4.18: The access space of reference R, and the reuse of two data elements ((~j1,a[1]), (~j2,a[2])),
by the same reuse vector, is represented. A cache miss occurs on the access (~j1,a[1]) due to interference
by (~k1,S). In the presence of multiple interfering references (with the same reuse vector), access (~k2,T )
by reference T causes a cache miss at (~j2,a[2]). The interfering accesses causing caches misses are
marked by stars.
Till now we have only considered misses because of one other reference S. If there are multiple
references, then there will be a miss at iteration ~j, if there is a conflicting access due to any of the other
references. Therefore,
MIR(~r) =
⋃
S∈R
MISR(~r) (4.4)
MIR(~r) will be the set of all iterations ~j at which a cache miss occurs due to a conflict with any other
reference (except another reference to the same array) by conflicting with the reuse due to reuse vector
~r. This is depicted in Figure 4.18.
Now if there are multiple references to the same array, then it will result in multiple reuse
vectors [34]. There can be more than one reuse vector, even if the cache block size is more than one
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element. In that case, there is spatial reuse [33]. When there are multiple reuse vectors, then, a cache
miss will occur at iteration ~j, if there is a cache miss due to the smallest reuse vector. Noting that if there
is a miss due to smallest reuse vector, then even the longer reuse vectors must suffer a cache miss, we
can simply use the intersection operator. Therefore,
MIR =
⋂
i
MIR(~ri) =
⋂
i
(⋃
S∈R
MISR(~ri)
)
(4.5)
MIR will contain the set of all iterations ~j at which a cache miss occurs for accesses of reference R due to
any reuse vector, and any other reference. All the misses in the loop are then just a collection of misses
of each reference.
4.6 Cache Vulnerability and Challenges in Estimation
Cache vulnerability(CV) is defined as the number of vulnerable bits in the cache, summed over the
duration of a program execution, measured in byte-cycles. A bit is vulnerable if a soft error in it can
destroy architecturally correct execution [75] of the processor. Any bit that is going to be overwritten is
not vulnerable. Any bit in the data array that is protected with parity bit is not vulnerable if the cache
block is clean and the bit is going to be accessed while the block remains clean. This is because a clean
block can be simply invalidated if an error is detected in it. We assume, that all lines are protected by a
parity bit, and therefore clean lines are not vulnerable.
Only cycle-accurate simulation based schemes are known for cache vulnerability estimation.
While simulation based techniques are time consuming, they can be used in extremely embedded ap-
plications, where neither the program flow, or the data changes. However, if the data and its size can
change, then simulation based techniques are of little help. In addition, the design space of some code
transformations and data layout optimizations is so large, that exhaustive simulation is infeasible. Thus,
except for in extremely embedded systems, an efficient technique to estimate data cache vulnerability is
needed to decide on code transformations and data layout optimizations. An analytical model to estimate
cache vulnerability offer the additional advantage of insights that we gain, and can then be utilized either
apply these technique more to a different architecture/data set. In addition, it also provides a systematic
and more informed mechanism to trade-off accuracy for the analysis time.
We build our cache vulnerability estimation technique similar to cache miss equations, but esti-
mating cache vulnerability is far more complicated than cache misses. Cache miss equations estimate the
number of cache misses, which is a subset of the cache accesses to the same data. In comparison, cache
vulnerability is the sum of “time duration” between two consecutive accesses to the same data, when the
second access is a read, and the data that was accessed was dirty. There are two main complications in
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vulnerability estimation, as compared to estimating cache misses. These drive the key modifications and
additions being incorporated in our cache vulnerability equation technique over that of the methodology
in cache miss estimation:
1. Notion of “time” between accesses.
2. More information about the accesses, e.g., whether the access is a read or write, the knowledge of
whether the data was “dirty” at the time of access.
While the second problem is simpler (in theory) and can be solved by adding more detailed
information about references, the first is a fundamentally challenging problem. To compute cache misses,
fundamentally for every access we only define a Boolean function AM : A → {0,1} from the access
space indicating whether there was a miss at the access. The misses in the program are then just specified
as a subset of the access space, i.e., Miss= {~a | AM(~a) = 1,~a ∈A }. While enumerating the elements of
Miss is doubly exponential [21], the number of cache misses can be found in polynomial time by simply
counting the number of elements in the set [33].
In contrast, to compute cache vulnerability, we need to define an Integer function AV : A →Z
which captures the vulnerability of the data since it was last accessed. The program vulnerability can
then be computed by adding the vulnerabilities of each access, i.e., Vul =∑~a∈A AV (~a). One of the main
challenges in computing cache misses is of converting the integer function into sets, such that the total
vulnerability can be computed by finding the number of elements in a set.
Other practical challenges in vulnerability estimation is that analysis at iteration granularity is
required, as compared to estimating cache misses in which analysis at cache access granularity suffices.
Furthermore, since the dirty information in caches is maintained at a block level of granularity, a whole
block is considered vulnerable if any single bit in it is vulnerable. This makes modeling cache vulnera-
bility at word or byte granularity challenging. This is because, a word may be vulnerable even if there
are no access to it at all – it can be vulnerable if the blocks containing them are dirty! Finally, even if
we can exactly compute CV by considering all these factors, such a model is likely to be very compli-
cated (as we will see in the paper), so as to jeopardize its practical use. Thus, an important challenge in
vulnerability estimation is also to be able to make trade-off between modeling complexity and modeling
accuracy, so that we can develop a relatively simple, yet accurate model of cache vulnerability.
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Figure 4.19: Access Vulnerability is the vulnerability from the last accumulated from the last access to
the same data. Cold Miss: The vulnerable duration for the first access is 0. Cache Hit: The vulnerable
duration is the length of the smallest reuse vector. Cache Miss: The vulnerable duration is the distance
from the previous access to the first interfering access.
4.7 Cache Vulnerability Equations
Access Vulnerability
Unlike cache misses, which is an “event”, vulnerability is computed as an “interval”, or “duration”.
The key idea in computing vulnerability is to associate it with each access. The Access Vulnerability,
AV : A →Z of an access ~a = (~j,R) is the vulnerability of the datum at the memory location MFR(~j),
since it was last accessed. If~a is the first access to the data, then the datum is not considered vulnerable,
or AV (~a) = 0. Similarly, if if this access is a write access, then it is not considered vulnerable. The reason
is, that the datum is overwritten, and any error in it since the last access is inconsequential. Also if if the
datum was not dirty at the time of access, then the datum is not considered vulnerable. This is because
we assume that parity protection will detect the error, and the correct value can be read from the lower
levels of memory, which we consider protected (through use of ECC or any other scheme).
The access vulnerability is non-zero only when the the access is a “read”, and the datum was
dirty at the time of access. However, the value of vulnerability depends on whether the access is a cache
hit or a miss. If the access is a cache hit, then the datum was vulnerable for the whole duration from
the last access to this access. Suppose that R is the only reference to the array, and it has only one reuse
vector~r. Then the datum that is accessed by~a= (~j,R) was last accessed by~b= ((~j−~r),R). If the access
~a = (~j,R) is a cache hit, then the datum was vulnerable for the whole duration from (~j−~r) through ~j,
i.e., AV (~a) = ||~r|| (shown in Figure 4.19). However, if the access ~a = (~j,R) is a cache miss, then this
datum was replaced by a conflicting access, say~c= (~k,S), at iteration~k. Therefore, the datum was in the
cache only from iteration (~j−~r) through~k. After this, from iteration~k through ~j, the datum was in the
lower levels of memory, which we consider “protected”. Therefore, AV (~a) = ||~k− (~j−~r)||. However,
even in the case when there are only two references, and only a single reuse vector per reference, the
34
other reference may access and conflict more than once between accesses~b and~a. In this case, we must
consider only the distance from the last access (~j−~r) to the first access that interferes ~k∗ = min(~k). All
these cases are illustrated in Figure 4.19.
Representing Integer Function
Figure 4.20: In the case of multiple references accessing the cache-block data, possible cache-misses
can be recognized over multiple interference points over the reuse vector (~k1, ~k2, · · · , ~k∗). These are
represented by the stars over the reuse vector. The first interference point For vulnerability calculation,
we consider the first possible interference point (~k∗), represented by the larger solid star.
A central problem in CV modeling is how to represent the integer function AV . Recall that
AM is a Boolean function, which can be easily represented as a set. Our solution is to augment the
vector ~j in Equation (4.3) with a scalar c, and let c take on all integer values less than the vulnerability l:
{(~j,c) | 0≤ c < l = ||~k∗||− ||~p||, · · ·}. Essentially we diversify each ~j exactly l times, so that we can get
the total vulnerability simply by counting the elements of the set. However, still it is not obvious how to
express~k∗. Since~k∗ is the earliest conflict iteration we would like to say~k∗ =min{~k}, or~k∗ ≤~k,∀~k. This
phenomenon is represented by Figure 4.20. However,~k is already qualified with existential quantifier
(∃), and moreover adding universal quantifier (∀) causes the equation to be only a general Presburger
formula and not a simpler Diophantine equation, greatly increasing the complexity.
We resolve this problem by counting nonvulnerability instead, i.e., the size of a reuse vector
minus the vulnerability. Thus we first calculate vulnerability capacity, and subtract nonvulnerability
from it to compute real vulnerability. This is depicted in Figure 4.21
Access vulnerability AVr of reference r with only one reuse vector~v:
ANV SR (~r) = {(~j ∈I ,c) | ∃~k ∈I ,
0≤ c < ||~j||− ||~k||,CMESR(~j,~k,~r)} (4.6)
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Figure 4.21: Access nonvulnerability = ANV SR ), is the sum of iterations which are not vulnerable, between
the two successive accesses on the reuse vector. The iterations after a cache-miss at (~k,S), are not
vulnerable and therefore are enclosed within a box. The remainder of the iterations, not enclosed within
a box, between (~j−~r) and (~j) are computed using Equation (4.6).
ANVR(~r) =
⋃
S
ANV SR (~r) (4.7)
AVR = ||~r|| · |I |− |ANVR(~r)| (4.8)
Working with nonvulnerability also makes it easier to consider multiple references, as shown
in Equation (4.7). Further, read-hit iterations are automatically taken care of in this formula; for a hit
iteration ~j, Equation (4.6) returns null since no~k exists, and Equation (4.8) returns the correct value.
However, cold miss iterations should be excluded, which is not done by the formula.
Multiple Reuse Vectors
The formula Equation (4.6)–Equation (4.8) has two limitations: incorrect handling of cold miss itera-
tions, and considering only a single reuse vector. Those two limitations are closely related and can be
solved at once by extending the concept of reuse vector with domain. In our formulation as well as in
CME, reuse vectors serve the purpose of limiting the search space for conflict miss to the previous m
iterations, where m is given by the size of a reuse vector. Ideally, m should be given by the last reuse
iteration (LRI). However, exact computation of LRI is intractable in the general case, but most often it
can be found from reuse vectors. A reuse vector~r of reference R is derived from
MFR(~j−~r) = MFR(~j) (4.9)
which suggests ~j−~r is a possible LRI of ~j. In order for that to be the case, two conditions must be met:
i)~r should be valid on ~j for Equation (4.9), ii) there should be no smaller reuse vector valid on ~j. We
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call the set of iterations where a reuse vector is valid for Equation (4.9), the domain of the reuse vector.
Certainly, domain can be defined for any reuse vector.
While there can be iterations that are not included in any domain (they are cold miss iterations),
we can easily find the smallest reuse vector for any iteration that is included in at least one domain.
Given a set of reuse vectors {~ri} sorted in their sizes, i.e., ~r1 ≺~r2 ≺ ·· · , and the corresponding set of
domains {Di}, we define differential domains, {Pi}, as follows.
Pi =Di−Di−1−·· ·−D1 (4.10)
Differential domainPi is the set of iterations in which~ri is the smallest reuse vector. Clearly, differential
domains are mutually disjoint, and do not include any cold miss iteration. Now we can easily extend
Equation (4.6)–Equation (4.8).
ANV SR (~ri,Pi) = {(~j ∈Pi,c) | ∃~k ∈I ,∃n ∈Z ,
0≤ c < ||~j||− ||~k||,CMESR(~j,~k,~ri,n)} (4.11)
ANVR(~ri,Pi) =
⋃
S
ANV SR (~ri,Pi) (4.12)
AVR =∑
i
(||~ri|| · |Pi|− |ANVR(~ri,Pi)|) (4.13)
Access Type and Cache block State
So far we have considered how to model the effect of cache hit/miss on CV. Now we consider how to
model the effect of read vs. write difference. AVR in Equation (4.13) is accurate for read accesses. For
write accesses we need to exclude vulnerability due to hit accesses, which we call hit-nonvulnerability.
Hit-nonvulnerability, HNVR:
HNVR =∑
i
||~ri|| · |HIR(~ri,Pi)| (4.14)
HIR(~ri,Pi) =Pi−MIR(~ri) (4.15)
where MIR(~vi) is calculated by Equation (4.3)–Equation (4.4).
Modeling cache block state is less obvious than access type. Exact modeling requires looking
even beyond LRI (= ~j−~r) for any write to the same memory block, with the search space expanded
up to the next conflict access. Compared to the formulation developed so far, which needs to find only
one conflict iteration (~k), this new modeling requires two more (write reuse, the next conflict), which
37
will greatly impact the complexity. Fortunately, for loops with uniformly-generated references we have
a much simpler rule. Among uniformly-generated references we can define a total order from their
leading/trailing relationship. For instance, in a i- j loop nest, A[i][ j] trails A[i+2][ j+3] at the distance of
[2,3], which is in fact one of the reuse vectors of A[i][ j]. We consider that a reference accesses only clean
blocks if it does not follow a write reference. The other references are considered to access dirty blocks.
We understand that this simple rule is only an approximation and is not always correct. However, it can
be very easily applied and yet highly accurate if a write reference has no group reuse or the group reuse
vector is small, which is the case in many loops including matrix multiplication.
Post-access Vulnerability
Our access vulnerability can account for only the portion of CV that becomes certain by the last access
to each memory block. After the last access, there can be no more reuse but only zero or more conflict
accesses. If a conflict access exists, the vulnerable interval extends to the first conflict access; otherwise,
the vulnerable interval extends to the end of the program (provided that the block is dirty). Thus we need
to find out i) the set of iterations in which the last accesses (per memory block) are made, and ii) the
lengths of vulnerable intervals.
First, given a reference R, the set P∗ of iterations for last accesses can be found from the
ranges, {Ri}, of reuse vectors, {~ri}. Range is defined similarly to domain except that −~v is replaced
with +~v in Equation (4.9). Then it follows from the definition that P∗ is the set of iterations that
are not included in any range, or P∗ = I −R1−R2− ·· · . Second, the vulnerable interval is either
|I | − ||~j|| or ||~k∗|| − ||~j||, whichever is the smaller, where~k∗ is the earliest of, if any, future conflict
iterations. Again we use nonvulnerability to find this interval. Post-access vulnerability of reference
R is PVR = |UR|− |PNVR|, where UR = {(~j ∈P∗,c) | 0 ≤ c < |I |− ||~j||} and PNVR, the post-access
nonvulnerability, is the union of all the post-access nonvulnerabilities PNV SR from different references S.
Finally, PNV SR = {(~j ∈P∗,c) | 0 ≤ c < |I |− ||~k||,∃~k ∈ I ,∃n ∈ Z ,CME’SR(~j,~k,n)}, where CME′ is
CME with (~j,R)≺ (~k,S) substituting for the original range constraint.
Implementation and Complexity
Algorithm 1 lists the procedure to compute access vulnerability for all references in a loop (post-access
vulnerability can be computed similarly). The core of this procedure is writing extended CMEs (line 7)
and counting the integer points in them (line 9). CME, extended or not, is a set of constraints that specify
a polytope possibly using existential quantifier, and counting integer points in such a polytope can be
done in polynomial time using the barvinok library [102], which is based on PolyLib [65]. However,
further complication comes from the union operation in between (line 9), which exists in CME as well.
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Algorithm 1: Find access vulnerability of all references
1: for all R ∈R that can access dirty cache blocks do
2: integer (vulnerability of R): VR← 0
3: Find all the reuse vectors~ri and their domains Di
4: for all i in the increasing order of ||~ri|| do
5: FindPi from {Di}
6: for all S ∈R do
7: Find ANV SR (~ri,Pi) /* CME extended for CV */
8: end for
9: integer: ANVR(i)← |∪SANV SR (~ri,Pi)|
10: VR←VR+ ||~ri|| · |Pi|−ANVR(i)
11: end for
12: if R is a write reference then
13: Compute HNVR using CME
14: VR←VR−HNVR
15: end if
16: end for
There are several ways to handle unions. A simple method is to convert unions into intersections (inter-
sections pose no problem) using the inclusion-exclusion property (|A∪B| = |A|+ |B|− |A∩B|), which
has unfortunately an exponential complexity. Another way is to use Pugh’s method of converting unions
into disjoint unions [88]. Counting the integer points is repeated for each reuse vector (line 4) and for
each reference that can access dirty cache blocks (line 1). In our current implementation the complexity
is dominated by the handling of union operator, and is O(c ·N · 2|R|), where c is the average time for
handling unions, and N is the total number of reuse vectors of references that can access dirty blocks.
4.8 CVE Model Validation
To validate our static analysis as well as to demonstrate its effectiveness and usefulness in program op-
timization we use the matrix multiply loop kernel. Our static analysis is performed using an automated
analysis flow, which first derives reuse vectors and their domains from application description, then gen-
erates vulnerability equations, and finally calculates cache vulnerability using an integer-point counting
engine. Simulation is performed using the SimpleScalar cycle-accurate simulator [14]. In all our exper-
iments we assume that the L1 data cache is write-back and direct-mapped, with 32-byte line size. The
cache size is set to 1∼4 KBytes depending on the application’s memory footprint. Small cache sizes are
chosen not only to model embedded systems but also to induce frequent cache misses, which will create
more variety in the number of cache misses and cache vulnerability, and thus make it more challenging
to predict the cache behavior.
Loop interchange is a well-known loop optimization that changes the order of loops in a loop
nest. Since it can completely reorder the memory accesses in a loop, loop interchange can greatly affect
cache vulnerability as well as cache misses. As we will see in our experimental results, there is usually
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much greater variation in cache vulnerability than in the number of cache misses. Moreover, the loop
order with the least number of cache misses is not always the one with the lowest cache vulnerability.
This suggests that in order to address reliability issues, compilers should specifically target vulnerability
reduction rather than just cache miss reduction.
Loop Analytical Simulation
order CV(li) #CM ACV CV(li) #CM CV(bc) RT(c)
ikj† 2071 538 1321 2071 538 1.71M 41.2K
kij 5488 788 2874 5488 788 4.67M 45.9K
ijk∗ 6744 418 2669 6744 418 5.07M 39.0K
kji 15163 1746 7377 15163 1746 16.71M 68.5K
jik 33852 598 8816 33852 598 22.59M 42.5K
jki 32341 1544 11732 32341 1544 33.06M 65.4K
Corr. 1.000 1.000 .995 −
Table 4.1: Vulnerability Results for mmult, N=12 Legend – CV: cache vulnerability, CM: cache miss,
ACV: adjusted CV, RT: runtime, (li): line-iteration, (bc): byte-cycle, and (c): cycle.
Table 4.1 compares the cache vulnerability of mmult (matrix multiplication) computed by our
static analysis and by simulation. The adjusted cache vulnerability (ACV) is calculated using the number
of cache misses (#CM) predicted by the CM equations [33] with modifications due to domains. The rows
are sorted in the increasing order of simulation CV in byte-cycles (7th column). The last row lists the
correlation coefficient between each column on the analytical side and the corresponding column on the
simulation side, with ACV corresponding to CV in byte-cycles on the simulation side.
First, we can see that the second column (analytical CV in line-iterations) exactly matches
the fifth column (CV in line-iteration from simulation). mmult has nontrivial access pattern in that all
three references have different pairs of spatial and temporal reuse vectors. Thus this validation result
gives some assurance of our CV equations. In the table, we also observe that the number of cache
misses predicted by the CM equations, with modifications due to domains, is 100% accurate as compared
to simulation. Finally, the ACV numbers also closely follow the simulation results, with a very high
correlation.
In addition to the basic validation results, there are interesting points to observe from the table.
First, the CV variation is much higher than CM variation or RT (runtime) variation. Cache vulnerability,
as measured in byte-cycles from simulation, varies from 1.71M to 33.06M, or more than 19 times,
whereas the number of cache misses and runtime vary by mere 3.2X and 1.7X respectively. Therefore
the effect of compiler optimizations for cache vulnerability can be greater than for cache misses. Second,
the loop order for the minimum RT is not the same as the one for the minimum CV. The original loop
order, which is marked with an asterisk in the first column, has minimum CM and consequently minimum
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runtime as well. However, if we choose another loop order, marked with a dagger, the cache vulnerability
can be reduced by almost three times while the runtime is increased by only 5.7% (The minimum-CV
loop-order can be correctly predicted by our analysis as shown in the table). Please note that the cache
vulnerability in byte-cycles already takes into account the effect of increased runtime; therefore, the three
times reduction in CV is the real reduction that we can expect to see in the soft error rate of the data array
of L1 data cache. The above two points strongly suggest the need and scope of compiler optimizations to
reduce cache vulnerability, which has been neglected in traditional loop optimizations focusing on cache
misses only. Our static analysis can be an important first step toward compiler optimizations for cache
reliability.
Loop Analytical Simulation
order CV(li) #CM ACV CV(li) #CM CV(bc) RT(c)
ikj† 3622 2173 3055 3622 2333 3.19M 92.3K
ijk∗ 9892 1462 5230 10778 1574 9.25M 79.4K
kij 10221 2653 6520 8988 2773 10.47M 99.1K
kji 26150 3658 13575 26103 3801 35.79M 130.3K
jik 63882 1564 18549 53568 1692 49.15M 82.9K
jki 66581 3438 24793 57827 3565 81.88M 127.1K
Corr. .9978 .9998 .9919 −
Table 4.2: Vulnerability results for mmult, N=14 Legend – CV: cache vulnerability, CM: cache miss,
ACV: adjusted CV, RT: runtime, (li): line-iteration, (bc): byte-cycle, and (c): cycle.
A potential weakness of our technique, as it relies on reuse vectors to simplify the equations, is
the inaccuracy of reuse vectors and their domains. The prediction of reuse vectors on the last reuse access
can become less accurate at the boundary of the iteration space. In our first example where N = 12, the
iteration space is divided by the cache line size in all its dimensions (a cache line contains exactly four
array elements of double word each). If we change N to 14, the boundary effect starts to appear, which
is shown in Table 4.2. In the table we notice that even the CM equations start to disagree with simulation
although the overall correlation is very high. Comparing Columns 2 and 5 (CV in line-iterations), our
CV equations tend to be more accurate in low CV region while it amplifies in high CV region. Our CV
analysis sometimes loses on the details but it accurately captures the overall trend. Most importantly, the
ordering in the adjusted CV exactly matches the ordering in the simulation CV in byte-cycles. Again in
this example, we observe the same pattern that the loop order for minimum CM is different from that
of minimum CV, and there is much more to gain in terms of cache vulnerability if we can make a little
trade-off in terms of runtime.
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for ( i = 0 ; i < N ; i++ )
for ( j = 0 ; j < N ; j++ ) {
A j,i+1 = f1(Pj,i+1,Pj,i,U j,i+1)
B j+1,i = f2(Pj+1,i,Pj,i,Vj+1,i)
C j+1,i+1 = f3(Vj+1,i+1,Vj+1,i,U j+1,i+1,
U j,i+1,Pj,i,Pj,i+1,Pj+1,i+1,Pj+1,i)
D j,i = f4(Pj,i,U j,i+1,U j,i,Vj+1,i,Vj,i)
}
Figure 4.22: Calc1 loop from swim (after loop interchange).
4.9 Analytical Optimization of CVE: Case Study
Many loop transformations significantly affect cache vulnerability, often much more than cache misses.
While our cache vulnerability equations can be used to accurately compute the total cache vulnerability
of a loop nest, and thus can guide compiler optimizations, evaluating the equations is not always easy due
to the limitations of back-end tools. Here we showcase alternative use cases of our cache vulnerability
equations, using data placement.
Array Placement
In loops, array placement can dramatically affect the number of cache misses and cache vulnerability.
There are two ways to change array placement. Intra-variable padding increases row sizes to reduce
cache conflicts (both self and cross), which increases memory footprint. Inter-variable padding, or array
placement adds unused space between arrays, or changes the base addresses of arrays, to reduce cache
conflicts between different arrays. We use array placement to demonstrate the effectiveness of analytical
optimization on cache vulnerability.
Figure 4.22 shows an abstract version of a loop nest from swim after loop interchange (detail
is omitted to avoid copyright infringement). Hereafter we refer to the loop-interchanged loop as the
original loop. This loop involves 7 arrays and many more references with very complex access patterns.
Exhaustive exploration of array placement parameters for such a loop is prohibitive. For a very small
1KB cache, and even after restricting the base addresses to the cache line boundary (=32B), the design
space has still (25)6 = 230 combinations. Instead, we can quickly find optimal points exploiting the
intuition provided by our CV equations.
Our CV equation has two parts. It first computes the total vulnerability capacity and then sub-
tracts nonvulnerability from it. Often the total vulnerability capacity is not affected by base addresses.
Therefore our goal is to maximize nonvulnerability by changing base addresses. Nonvulnerability is pro-
portional to the distance between the current iteration and the earliest conflict iteration after the previous
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Figure 4.23: Cache vulnerability and runtime reduction through array placement.
reuse. In other words, maximum nonvulnerability occurs if a dirty cache line is evicted immediately
after it is accessed, which agrees with the intuition. However, since frequent cache conflict will increase
runtime, which negatively impacts cache vulnerability, our strategy is to evict as soon as possible those
dirty cache lines that will not be accessed for a long time.
In our original loop in Figure 4.22, dirty cache lines are generated only by the four LHS (left-
hand side) references. We can evict those lines by creating conflicts between each of them and any of
the ensuing accesses. Let us use write accesses for that, since write misses generally incur less penalty.
Then we have a chain of conflicts like this: A j,i+1→ B j+1,i→C j+1,i+1→ D j,i. The last reference D j,i
can be made to have conflict with one of the read references in the next iteration.
To derive formulas let us assume that all the arrays are initially placed at offset zero modulo the
cache size, and that we can independently control the offset µX of each array X . Note that this can be
implemented very easily without losing optimality. Let us also assume µA = 0. Then the above chain of
conflicts gives the offsets of the other three arrays. For instance, between A and B:
Addr(A j,i+1)≡ Addr(B j+1,i)
⇔ µA+ jM+(i+1)≡ µB+( j+1)M+ i
where ≡ is equality under modulo on the cache size and M is the size of each row (assuming every array
has the same row size).
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For the last reference, we must consider the next iteration, which can be either the next j-
iteration or the next i-iteration. For each case we can set up a different array to have conflict with D j,i.
We explore two choices.
(1) Simple choice: Using U j,i+1 and Pj,i
Addr(D j,i)≡ Addr(U j,i+1)| j= j+1
⇔ µD+ jM+ i≡ µU +( j+1)M+(i+1)
and
Addr(D j,i)| j=N−1 ≡ Addr(Pj,i)|i=i+1, j=0
⇔ µD+(N−1)M+ i≡ µP+(i+2)
Figure 4.23 plots CV and runtime results from simulation for random offsets (5000 instances). It
also shows the CV and runtime for the original loop, which is about the center of the distribution.
For parameters we use N = 14 and M = 16, and the cache size is set to 1KB. Compared to the
original loop, our simple choice can reduce CV by more than 80%, which further validates our
static vulnerability model. However the runtime is significantly increased. Although it is not
surprising given that we have tried only to reduce CV, it suggests that cache misses should be
considered in order to get truly optimal parameters.
(2) Pareto-optimal: To contain the runtime increase problem we resort to traditional CM reduction
methods such as [33]. The key idea is to make the read references conflict as little as possible.
Close examination of the offsets determined by the simple choice reveals that µU = µC and µV =
µA, which creates unnecessary conflicts and increases runtime. The latter is because we did not
set any constraint on µV , which defaulted to zero, and the former is by chance. To improve the
situation we set up a different reference Vj+1,i to have conflict with D j,i along the j-loop, and used
either Pj,i+1 or Pj+1,i to have conflict along the i-loop, which gives two sets of parameters. Then
the remaining free array U is assigned an offset that is farthest away from all the other arrays. The
simulation results for these sets of parameters are shown in Figure 4.23 (marked as Optimal). Both
points are pareto-optimal, and reduces CV by up to 90% or runtime by up to 16% compared to the
original loop. Table 4.9 summarizes the exploration results.
4.10 Related Work
Solutions to mitigate the impact of soft errors are being sought after at all levels of computer design
e.g., careful selection and screening of materials [9], SOI fabrication technologies [16], increasing the
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Loop CV (bc) %reduc. RT (c) %incr.
Original (loop-interchanged) 14.08M − 47.7K −
Simple choice 2.69M 80.9% 53.6K 12.4%
Pareto-optimal 1 1.36M 90.3% 45.8K –3.9%
Pareto-optimal 2 3.92M 72.1% 40.0K –16.2%
Table 4.3: Array placement optimization results for swim
transistor size, adding passive capacitance, or changing the transistor types with threshold voltage shifts,
adding gated resistors [91], partially protected caches [60], software duplication [89], to triple modular
redundancy [86].
As opposed to hardware techniques, software techniques reserve the advantages of flexibility of
application, and therefore the overheads thereof. Indeed, the most important benefit of software schemes
is as a last-minute fix. For example, if it is required to improve the system reliability after system
design, then only software techniques may be easily applicable. Most existing software approaches that
attempt to improve reliability and mitigate the effect of soft errors are based on some form of program
duplication [23, 35, 79, 89], and therefore incur severe power and resource overhead. This work is
fundamentally different from all those previous software approaches – we study code transformations
that will improve the reliability of application programs – without re-executing any instruction of the
program. Therefore our techniques can have much less power, performance, and resource overheads.
Caches are one of the most vulnerable microarchitectural components in the processor and
several techniques have been developed to reduce failures due to soft errors in caches, e.g. [12, 60, 76,
97], however the effect of code transformations, and in general compilers has not been evaluated. While
there has been recent work in developing compiler techniques for register file protection [57, 105],
there are no compiler approaches to mitigate the impact of soft errors in caches. Vulnerability [75]
is the measure of failure rate of caches, and only simulation-based techniques are known to estimate
it [97]. The ability to estimate the vulnerability for any given code is fundamental to not only driving,
but even developing any compilation technique to optimize for vulnerability, and in general, simulation
based techniques are not usable. This underscores the need for more efficient techniques to estimate
vulnerability of data in caches.
This dissertation proposes a static analysis to estimate program analysis, and our approach
builds upon cache miss analysis [33]. While there is a more general approach [21] to model reuses in
Presburger arithmetic [87], we use the reuse-vector based approach [104], since it is much more tractable.
We use the Omega library [87] to perform polygon union and intersection operations and Polylib [65] to
count the number of points in the polygons containing vulnerable iterations.
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4.11 Summary
To combat the threat of soft errors, techniques have been developed at all abstractions of processor de-
sign. Software schemes are particularly useful since they provide flexibility of application and therefore
overheads, and can be applied in current or even previous generation processors, and most importantly,
are irreplaceable as a last-minute fix. Caches are the most “vulnerable” component in the processor,
and traditional ECC-based techniques are getting used up in manufacturing errors, and effectively only
parity protection remains. For the first time, in this work, we perform design space exploration to de-
termine the impact of algorithm choice, and system I/0 data-set sizes, on the vulnerability of a system.
We also perform experiments to analyze the impact of various system design choices towards improving
reliability with limited performance trade-off. Our experiments thus reveal the need for an efficient and
accurate means to estimate data cache vulnerability; while considering both the program data access be-
havior and also the cache microarchitecture configuration – for which only simulation based techniques
are known. This paper develops for the first time, analytical techniques to efficiently and statically esti-
mate data cache vulnerability of programs; opening the doors for compiler techniques to make trade-off
decisions between: power and performance for reliability. In addition, we demonstrate how the insights
from vulnerability calculations can be used to innovate simple practical schemes to reduce program
vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 5
HYBRID COMPILER MICRO-ARCHITECTURE TECHNIQUES: FOR RELIABILITY
“To improve system reliability, researchers have developed techniques at the hardware micro-architecture
level [45, 62, 91] and compiler level [57, 60]. By integrating the system information captured from the
compiler and micro-archtiecture design layers, the advantages and accesible resources at each design
layer can be best utilized for improved system benefit. The impact of soft errors in a system is a com-
pletely random phenomenon. Over the years, in an attempt to provide reliable computing, researchers
have been limited by the overheads (power and performance) in enabling protection throughout the du-
ration of system execution; though the occurrence of soft errors is rare and unpredictable.”
In this chapter, we highlight on the the trade-off between system reliability, and additional
power consumption for protection. We propose a smart mechanism that extracts information through
program analysis, and then enforces the hardware architecture with this information, to efficiently pro-
vide power-efficient reliability.
5.1 Introduction
To model the susceptibility of data in caches, the metric of vulnerability is used. A datum is vulnerable
(or susceptible to data corruption by soft errors) in the cache, only if it is dirty (written by the processor),
and is then either, i) read by the processor, or ii) written back to the next level of memory. Herein, the
assumptions of the underlying cache architecture are that:
i) the probability of double-bit errors is negligible (typically 3 orders of magnitude lesser [76]) than
single-bit errors; simple hardware techniques like interleaving the bits of a cache-line can reduce
the onset of multi-bit errors.
ii) data in the cache is protected by parity bit error detection [38] (as in popular processor architectures
like Intel Xscaler [48], Intel IA-32r [49], AMD Athlonr [3], etc.).
In a cache where every cache-line is protected by parity bits, if an error is detected on a cache-
line that is not dirty (.i.e., clean or not updated), it can be invalidated and re-loaded from the memory as a
cache-miss. One method to protect cache data from soft errors, is by ensuring that an updated copy of all
the cache-data is available in the memory (to re-load, when an error is detected). A write-through cache
ensures such a scenario, by writing copies of cache-blocks as and when they are updated in the cache,
thereby realizing zero vulnerability. However, write-through caches suffer from very high memory traffic
between the cache and the rest of the memory subsystem. These memory-writes keep the data-bus busy,
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thereby increasing the cache-miss latency for new memory accesses, and affect the overall performance
of the system. Another consequence is excess energy consumed by the memory subsystem:
i) at the data-bus between the cache and the lower levels of memory (which are typically off-chip in
embedded systems), and
ii) by accesses to the lower level memory components on every write-back; increasing the total power
consumption of the system.
To find a middle ground, Early Write-Back (EWB)[63] cache architecture was proposed; In this, all the
dirty cache-blocks are written back to the next level of memory only at periodic intervals. Reducing the
frequency of write-backs, reduces the memory traffic and therefore the power consumption of the system,
but at the cost of cache-data vulnerability, when compared to a write-through cache. By varying the
periodicity of cache write-backs, EWB caches can explore the inversely proportional trade-off between
vulnerability reduction and power overhead due to the additional memory traffic.
Both these techniques write-through (WT), and early write-back (EWB) are hardware tech-
niques, and are not sensitive to the data access patterns of the application. For example, if a datum is
vulnerable across two write-back periods (in the EWB technique, by executing write-backs at desig-
nated intervals), the additional write-backs eventually do not affect the vulnerability realized, but only
increases memory traffic. If the cache write-back process can be customized according to the changing
data access pattern of applications, vulnerability reduction can still be achieved, but with reduced number
of write-backs, and thus reduced power overheads. Thus, there is scope for power-efficient vulnerability
reduction by customizing the write-backs based on the data access patterns of data in a program.
In this chapter, we propose a hardware-software hybrid scheme: Smart Cache Cleaning (SCC),
that provides a means to dynamically moderate the cache write-backs and thus achieve power-efficient
vulnerability reduction in embedded systems. Our scheme is composed of three important components:
1. application analysis to determine, which data accessed in the program, has to be write-back and
when the said write-back has to be executed, to achieve power-efficient vulnerability reduction,
2. succinctly represent the time sequence identified as to when a reference must be written back, and
3. transfer this information to the specialized SCC architecture, that performs write-backs of the
specified references at specified times.
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Our experiments over scientific benchmark loops like Livermore[4] and LINPACK[70] show
that smart cache cleaning achieves 26% better energy-vulnerability product than the lowest energy-
vulnerability product achieved by the EWB scheme (across various write-back periods). Our SCC
scheme achieves almost zero vulnerability, at < 1% power overhead. Using the EWB scheme, to achieve
the same level of vulnerability, a minimum of 40% and an average of 2.88× power-overhead is incurred.
5.2 Background: Intermediate Vulnerability Time (IVT)
t
W W E
t
W R EW R
IVT1
IVT2 IVT3
(a) W-W Access
(b) W-R-W Access
Vulnerable lifetime of
data in the cache
Figure 5.1: Intermediate Vulnerable Time (IVT) .i.e., the time a data element remains vulnerable in the
cache is defined for two data access patterns (where, W=Write, R=Read, E=Eviction): a data element
once written is vulnerable as long as it remains in the cache across read accesses. Since the second write
(W) operation over-writes the updated data element, any error that may affect the unused data in the
cache, deems the access as not-vulnerable for that time slot.
On a store operation from the processor, a data element in the cache (byte or word) is written.
The containing cache-line now is deemed dirty, such that this becomes the only updated copy of the data
stored. The time that such dirty cache-data remain in the cache, it is vulnerable to data corruption by
soft errors. Over the sequence of different accesses on the cache-data (write (W), read (R), eviction or
write-back (E)), the vulnerability of the data varies based on its usage. We define Intermediate Vulnera-
ble Time (IVT), as the duration for which a data element is vulnerable in the cache; after being updated
by a write operation. Data access patterns in a program can be broadly classified into two types WW
(write only) and WR (write and read). In Figure 5.1, the two data access patterns over a data element are
portrayed, and the IVT definition in each case is highlighted:
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a) The updated (written) data may be over-written by the program. In this case, since the updated
data (in the first write operation) is not used but again updated, any soft error on the stored data
between the two write accesses is not recognized. Therefore, the IVT for the data here is only the
time from the last write operation to the time it was evicted (E) from the cache; when the data
updates the underlying memory.
b) The updated (written) data may be used by other data accesses (read) during the course of the
program. Since the correctness of this data is essential for the correct functioning of the system, it
is vulnerable throughout this duration in the cache (till eviction E). However, as in Figure 5.1(b),
if the same data is updated by another write operation, the data is over-written; therefore, the time
slot between the last use (read) and update (write) operation is deemed not-vulnerable.
5.3 Motivation
Figure 5.2: Demonstrating the need and importance of smart cache cleaning. (a) Two dimensional loop
operating over two data arrays one read-only (B) and the other read-and-written (A). (b) Summary of
array A’s vulnerability in each cache configuration shows the SCC scheme achieves energy efficient
vulnerability reduction. (c) Detailed iteration-level analysis of cache write-backs, in each configuration,
and their impact on the vulnerability of array A’s elements.
We motivate the need for a mechanism to dynamically moderate the cache write-backs, with
help of an example as in Figure 5.2(a). For this, we take a two-dimensional loop operating over two
arrays, executing for a total of nine iterations. We assume that, during the course of the program, there
occur no cache-evictions or write-backs due to cache-line replacements; the program terminates on the
10th iteration or cycle and all the cache-data is finally written-back to the memory. We again assume that
the cache is protected with a parity-bit error detection mechanism, such that its copy from the memory
can be re-loaded, if an error is detected on the cache-data. From the definition of vulnerability, we
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observe that the three elements of array B are only read, and therefore not vulnerable. On the other hand,
the three elements of array A are updated (read and written) on every iteration, and therefore vulnerable
for the entire time that they remain in the cache. In Figure 5.2(c), a time-line for the program execution
is drawn and below it, in each section is the cache behavior on the elements of array A, in each cache
write-back configuration. Immediately below the time-line in Figure 5.2(c), the position of each element
of array A denotes the time it is first accessed by the program (for e.g., A[2] is first accessed when index
i=2 and j=1 on the 4th iteration of the program); the vertical dotted line that follows, indicates the last
iteration it is updated/used by the program.
In the baseline write-back cache configuration, once an element is loaded into the cache, it is not
evicted by any additional write-backs. Therefore the data element remains vulnerable from its first access
(write access) till the end of the program; described by red bars, for each element, extending from the
start to end of its life-time in the cache. The total number of write-backs (wb) and the vulnerability (vul)
of each data element is marked on the right of the time-line. In the write-through cache configuration, on
each iteration when the data in the cache is updated, it is also written-back to the memory. The downward
pointing arrows in Figure 5.2(c) denote the write-back operations in the cache, on every iteration of the
program; which is a characteristic of the write-through cache configuration. Rightly so, the vulnerability
of data in the cache is 0, because there always exists a copy of the updated data in the lower level memory
(which can be re-loaded when an error is detected in the cache), and data in the cache is always clean.
On similar lines, we explore the vulnerability vs write-back count ratio of the early write-back
(EWB) cache architecture and our customized smart cache cleaning scheme. Li et al. [63], report through
design space exploration the power efficiency trade-offs involved in the choice of a write-back period.
Based on their recommendations and using a conservative estimate for the sample program and cache
model considered, we set the write-back period to be 4 iterations. In this, once every 4 iterations of the
program, the EWB architecture identifies dirty data in the cache and writes-back the same into the lower-
level memory, thus rendering the data clean. We observe that this mechanism achieves 55% reduction in
data-cache vulnerability, at the cost of only 22% additional write-backs (compared to the WT cache)to
the lower-level memory. The highly regular nature of the sample program here, ensures such a profit by
this technique, but such is not the case in general purpose applications. We arrive at such a conclusion
owing to some key observations on the operation of the EWB scheme:
1. The pre-defined periodic nature of the write-backs rarely corroborate with the data access patterns
of the application. Cache-data here, more often than not, tend to remain vulnerable beyond the time
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they are required and/or updated by the program. For example, in Figure 5.2(c) the double-ended
arrows indicate the time that each data element remained vulnerable, after it was last updated by
the program. This functionality of the EWB scheme, causes the array A to be, vulnerable for an
additional 4 unused iterations.
2. The working of the EWB scheme is to identify all dirty cache-lines on each period and per-
form write-backs on all of them, may require writing-back (or cleaning) data when it can be
used/updated by the program in the immediate future. For example, in Figure 5.2(c), during the
access time of A[3], a periodic write-back (once every 4 iterations) cleans A[3] in addition to the
previously accessed A[2]. However, since A[3] is updated the very next iteration (which in-turn
is the last iteration it is used), the data remains vulnerable from then till the end of the program.
This functionality of the EWB scheme, while reducing vulnerability by one iteration, causes the
data to remain vulnerable for one additional iteration; the additional vulnerable time would at the
least be four, if the program runs for more than 10 iterations.
In Figure 5.2(c), the last section below the time-line, describes the vulnerability of each data
element and the number of write-backs required in our smart cache cleaning technique. Here, we observe
67% vulnerability reduction, with only one additional write-back (compared to the EWB scheme). Here,
i) data is vulnerable in the cache only for as long as it is used; and ii) every write-back operation is timed
and positioned in such a way that it achieves overall vulnerability reduction. Such an adaptive scheme,
that can dynamically moderate the cache-write-backs, would thus achieve power efficient vulnerability
reduction on cache-data.
Quantifying the Claims
In order to quantify the claims stated above, we performed an experiment on the matmul program, and
observed the variation in vulnerability and the number of memory writes with each of the loop orders of
the program over the same set of data. From the results gathered as in Figure 5.3, we observe that the
vulnerability of the data in the program cannot be studied independent of the data access pattern of the
program, and therefore any method to mitigate this “data-cache vulnerability”, cannot be implemented
efficiently without appropriate analysis of the program’s data access patterns. We propose Smart Cache
Cleaning (SCC), in this work, to perform this specific data cache analysis and present an energy efficient
mechanism to reduce data cache vulnerability in embedded systems.
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Figure 5.3: Relative comparison of vulnerability (in byte-cycles) and the number of memory-writes
incurred during the implementation of write-through cache, and early-writeback on a simple matrix
multiplication program. The vulnerability in the presence of early-writeback varies with the loop order,
which demonstrates the room for smart cache cleaning on programs by analyzing the data access patterns.
5.4 Related Work
Careful selection and screening of materials [9], SOI fabrication technologies [16], increasing the tran-
sistor size or adding gated resistors [91] are some hardware techniques proposed to reduce soft errors
in SRAM cells. In addition to the chip area and power overheads, the cost of design and fabrication of
such device/circuit level techniques, and the yield obtained upon manufacture, over-weighs the reliabil-
ity achieved. This reduces its applicability and/or wide-spread use of such methods to protect embedded
systems. At the architecture level, ECC based techniques like SECDED [45] provide a means to protect
the caches by storing ECC codes for every cache block and checking the same for correctness when
used by the processor. In this, 8 check bits are required for every 64 bits of cache-data, which involves
a 12.5% increase in the size of the cache. In addition to this, additional logic, to generate and verify
the ECC codes of the read/written data, is added to the cache read-write path. Li et al. [62] in their
work indicate that the hardware costs (area, performance and power) incurred in the implementation
of such an ECC based error detection and correction technique is unacceptable for embedded systems.
Sridharan et al [97], propose selective re-fetching of cache lines combined with a write-through cache
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implementation to achieve 85% reduced cache vulnerability at the cost of 2.5% power, 7% performance
and 15% chip area overheads. Authors in [63], propose to use a fixed interval early write-back tech-
nique to periodically clean the dirty cache lines and reduce their vulnerable lifetime. In spite of the
reduced hardware overhead involved in its implementation, such a technique has been shown to achieve
an effective trade-off between vulnerability and power only for large caches (hundreds of MB or GBs).
Zhang [106] in his work, proposes two hardware based techniques (LRU and Dead-time based prediction
scheme), to vary the periodic interval between write-backs from the L1 cache to the underlying memory.
In this, the methodology used does not acknowledge the availability of 1-bit parity based error detection
hardware in almost all modern processors, thereby underusing the available resources. In addition, for
the implementation for such a smart hardware only scheme, the additional hardware required would add
to the additional write-backs executed, thereby adding to the total hardware performance and energy
costs to the system. In this work, we aim to achieve increased reliability in a system, by utilizing the
available resources in the system, with minimum additional hardware, performance and/or energy costs.
We also show through experiments over varying range of periods, that such a hardware technique when
implemented in an embedded processor, has a significant impact on the number of cache write-backs
and thereby adds to the power consumption of the system and also affects performance.
Software solutions are preferred as they can be implemented on existing architectures. The
authors in Chapter 4 we develop Cache Vulnerability Equations (CVE) to determine statically the vul-
nerability of a program for a particular cache configuration. We motivate on this understanding of data
reuse and cache vulnerability to develop a profile analysis techniques to determine important store ref-
erences and accesses that have to be cleaned to achieve vulnerability reduction with reduced memory
writes.
Software-hardware hybrid techniques have the advantage of reduced architecture overhead and
the flexibility and accessibility to hardware structures aided by software techniques. Chen et al [22],
propose a compiler based technique to determine the critical data used in the application and enable error
correction techniques(ECC) for only those data elements. Partially Protected Caches (PPC) in which a
portion of the cache is protected against soft errors can achieve around 47X vulnerability reduction in
data intensive multimedia applications [61]. Lee et al. [59] then propose compiler techniques to statically
partition data into critical and non-critical, to further enhance the protection available in a PPC. In this
work, we determine the right data to clean and exactly when to do so through memory profile analysis,
and with the help of hardware support, ensure that vulnerability reduction is achieved with reduced
energy overhead.
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5.5 Our Approach
Key Idea
Copying a dirty cache block into the memory, through write-backs (cache cleaning), reduces the vulner-
ability of the system but incurs an energy overhead due to memory accesses. To reduce energy overheads
while also increasing reliability in a system, a prudent decision has to govern each cache cleaning opera-
tion ensuring that a memory access is performed iff significant vulnerability can be reduced. In embedded
applications, such prudence can be achieved through profile based techniques which help in identifying
the right references and the right instances that cache-data has to be cleaned.
Overview
Figure 5.4: Our 4 stage Smart Cache cleaning methodology.
The memory profile information of a given program is used to evaluate the vulnerability per
cache write-back profit metric for each data-reference (store instruction) in the program in the Reference
Selection stage. For each reference in the list (scc reference list) and a given threshold scc threshold
for the intermediate vulnerable time (IVT) generated during accesses, the list of instruction accesses to
be cleaned are identified. This decision formed as a bit stream for each reference is represented by a
k-bit pattern, where k =scc pattern size. The instruction addresses and their corresponding representa-
tive k-bit patterns (scc pattern) are instrumented into the given program through compiler directives to
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be loaded into their respective hardware components accordingly. With the help of hardware support
from the cache cleaning architecture, the embedded processor now executes the program with minimal
additional cache write-backs, and maximum reliability.
Smart Cache Cleaning Architecture
Figure 5.5: Smart Cache Cleaning Architecture: The architecture blocks as part of the SCC are shaded.
Every marked store instruction (denoted by csw) is compared and based on the cleaning decision read
by the iterator, Clean EN is signaled triggering targeted cache block cleaning.
The shaded blocks in Figure 5.5 represent the hardware components added to implement our
smart cache cleaning technique. The “SCC Register Pair” contain the instruction address (scc insn addr)and
bit pattern (scc clean pattern), for the reference set to be cleaned by profile analysis. On every access
to the targeted store instruction (marked as csw in the instrumented code), an bit-iterator iterates over
the pattern in the scc clean pattern register. A 1 read by the iterator indicates (through the Clean EN
signal) that the cache block accessed has to be cleaned (copied to the memory by a cache write-back)
while a 0 indicates otherwise. The iterations on this scc clean pattern are wrapped such that the pattern
is repeatedly accessed throughout the program runtime that the corresponding instruction is accessed.
The instrumented program input to the processor, contains special instructions to load SCC-data
into the “SCC Register Pair” at specific points in the program based on the memory profile analysis. The
remainder of this section describes in detail the 4 step procedure that generates SCC-data for program
instrumentation (as shown in Figure 5.4) and thereby trigger the cache cleaning architecture blocks to
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ensure energy efficient reliability. The “Targeted Cache Cleaning Block” performs the cache cleaning
operation as follows,:
1. the target cache-block address to be cleaned is input along with the Clean EN signal, from the
LSQ.
2. data from the specific cache block is copied, and written-back into the underlying memory. This
operation is performed after the completion of the sw operation, and independent of the memory
access thereby causing no interference to the cache performance of the system.
Overall the SCC architecture requires 1× (32+ 32) = 64 bit register, 1× 32bit XOR gate and 1× 2bit
AND gate. We assume here that these SCC registers are protected against soft errors by energy efficient
hardware techniques for the same. We observe that the targeted cache cleaning architecture exists in
most modern embedded processors in the form of cache-flush execution units, which can be modified (if
required) with minimal hardware changes. It is thus evident, that the overall area and power overheads of
the additional hardware components required for our SCC implementation, are minimal and negligible.
Step 1: Smart Reference Selection
The memory profile data gathered by profiling the application is used to identify the set of references
that generate significant vulnerability, and therefore have to be cleaned accordingly. The key idea behind
this reference selection step is that it is possible to identify the vulnerability generated by each reference
individually and thereby compare references based on the vulnerability per access metric. This metric
gives an estimate of the possible vulnerability-energy trade-off that can be achieved if all the reference
accesses are set to be cleaned.
Every store instruction during program execution may accesses different data elements, and
each such accesses renders a cache block vulnerable. This time for which the accessed cache block
remains vulnerable in the cache, is defined as the Intermediate Vulnerable Time (IVT) (defined in Sec-
tion 5.2) generated by that instruction access. In order to map the vulnerability of a program to the
references generating them, we calculate ref-vulnerability for each reference, defined as the sum of all
the IVT values generated by the reference during program execution. The profit metric for each reference
is thus given by re f−vulnerabilityre f−access−count . From the description of our cache cleaning architecture in Figure 5.5
we observe that the there is only one SCC Register Pair and therefore only one reference can be set to
be cleaned at any point in time. Among the references in the program, the chosen set of references to be
cleaned are those with highest vulnerability per access values (or highest profit), with non overlapping
execution time-lines.
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Figure 5.6: Demonstrating Smart Reference Selection: On the memory profile of a program over its ex-
ecution time-line, arrays A and B are accessed by instruction addresses 0x0010 and 0x0020 respectively.
The individual IVT values (A1, A2, B1) are labeled and annotated by arrows that connect their W and R
accesses points.
The program in Figure 5.6 is of the W-R-W access pattern and the IVT values generated by
reference A is A1,A2 and that for reference B is B1. From the annotated data in Figure 5.6 we derive
the data table Table 5.1. It can be noted here that, the efficiency achieved due to higher profit numbers,
in selecting reference B to be cleaned, automatically precludes selection of reference A under the non
overlapping execution time-lines condition.
Parameters Ref A Ref B
ref-vulnerability 10+20 = 30 20
ref-access-count 2 1
CSW Profit 302 = 15
20
1 = 20
Table 5.1: Data table derived for statistics on the example program in Figure 5.6.
Step 2: Smart Access Selection
In a program, the ref-vulnerability generated depends not only on its own data access pattern but also
is affected by other references and data elements accessed on a set associative cache, causing cache-
block replacements (cache eviction). We thus understand that not all IVT values of a reference are same
owing to possible cache replacements. Having identified the most profitable reference(s) to clean, the
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most profitable reference accesses can be identified as those that have IVT values greater than a given
threshold value (design parameter scc threshold). This threshold defines the maximum time (in cycles)
that vulnerable data can remain in the cache before being evicted or over-written. For every access by the
selected reference, the IVT values generated (by each access) are compared with the given scc threshold,
and those that exceed the threshold are slated to be cleaned. This cleaning decision is represented by
a bit stream (scc access stream)of length equal to the total number of accesses by the reference, and a
Clean operation is denoted by 1 on the bit stream and a 0 otherwise. This stream in conjunction with the
scc reference list, thus contains input instructions for the smart cache cleaning architecture.
Step 3: Smart Pattern Generation
Algorithm 2: SCC BIT PATTERN MATCHING ()
Require: scc access stream ¡csw list¿, scc clean pattern size K.
1: for k from 0 to K do
2: k ones← Count 1s in csw list
3: k zeros← Count 0s in csw list
4: Cost o f 0← k ones×1
5: Cost o f 1← k zeros×2
6: if Costo f1 ≤Costo f0 then
7: BitPattern[k] = 1
8: else
9: BitPattern[k] = 0
10: end if
11: end for
12: return BitPattern
The bit stream (scc access stream) represents the set of accesses that have IVTs greater than
a threshold for a reference that has been identified to have the highest vulnerability per access met-
ric. In order to implement cache cleaning based on this bit pattern, multiple and complicated load
instructions are required to ensure that the correct pattern is loaded into the scc clean pattern register
for the corresponding instruction access. Therefore, a bit pattern of size k (a design pattern defined by
scc pattern size), has to be determined that best represents the bit stream scc access stream of the ref-
erence accesses. In line with our intentions to ensure smart energy efficient cache cleaning, we use the
SCC Bit Pattern Matching algorithm to analyze the bit stream and derive a representative k bit pattern.
The SCC Bit Pattern Matching algorithm described in Algorithm 2 reads the given bit stream
and using a moving window of size k bits, the number of 1′s and 0′s in each bit position are calculated.
Using these numbers, a cost is associated (Cost o f 0 or Cost o f 1) with each bit position that represents
the cost of representing the bit as 1 or 0 respectively. For example, for a given bit stream, if a particular bit
position in the k sized window, has many 0′s, it is right to assume that majority of these reference accesses
don’t generate vulnerability greater than the threshold and will therefore deliver low vulnerability savings
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for the energy cost, represented by the Cost o f 1 calculated. Therefore, giving precedence to energy
savings, we ensure that a bit is represented by 1 iff the Cost o f 1 is less than twice the Cost o f 0
value. The costs associated with the bit positions thus ensures that the resultant k bit pattern is an energy
efficient representative of the given bit stream.
Step 4: Program Instrumentation and Execution
From the memory profile of a program, after the first 3 steps, a scc reference list is identified, and then
for each reference in this list, a representative k bit pattern scc pattern is generated. The program is then
instrumented with these two inputs so as to instruct the processor hardware to load corresponding values
into the “SCC Register Pair”. Using the memory profile, access points of the first and last accesses
for each reference in the list can be identified, and at these points, corresponding load instructions are
introduced with the respective reference address and k bit pattern data. It should be noted here that these
instructions are compiler-directives and will not be executed through the processor pipeline, thereby
involving negligible performance variation.
Cache Cleaning on Multiple References
Our smart cache cleaning architecture is scalable over the number of references set to be cleaned simul-
taneously. In the above discussion, we illustrate the use of only one SCC register pair (scc insn addr,
scc clean pattern) while additional register pairs will enable the hardware to support multiple references
to be cleaned over overlapping execution time-lines. For this purpose, the only modification in the pro-
file analysis will be, at step 1 where references are selected such that n references may overlap in their
execution time-lines, thereby allowing for corresponding access stream and k bit pattern generation. It
should be noted here that additional hardware structures involve additional area and power overheads
(32+ 32 = 64 bits for each SCC register pair added), which does not add significantly to the existing
architecture.
5.6 Experiments and Results
Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we model an embedded system with a RISC processor, an on-chip L1 cache and
off-chip SDRAM memory. The SimpleScalar [14] sim-outorder cycle-accurate simulator is config-
ured to model the Intel XScale [48] processor architecture, with a 2-way set associative L1 cache (size
= 4KB). The simulator is instrumented with code to accurately evaluate vulnerability of data used in the
program (in byte cycles). To estimate memory access power, we use power numbers from the MICRON
MT48V8M32LF SDRAM on an Intel 440MX chipset[94] to represent the off-chip components of the
system. The energy per memory access is composed of data bus energy (9.46 nJ per burst) and SDRAM
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energy (32.5 nJ per read/write burst). The power consumed during memory accesses is given by the
product of total number of memory accesses and the total energy per memory access (41.96 nJ). To ex-
perimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of our SCC methodology, the SimpleScalar sim-outorder
simulator is modified to include the Smart Cache Cleaning Architecture blocks (described in Section 5.5)
and also recognize our instrumented program instructions (csw instructions).
To compare the trade-off between vulnerability and energy on a one dimensional scale, we
use the product of vulnerability (in byte-cycles) and memory access energy (in nJ) to form Energy
Vulnerability Product (EVP). Here EVP provides us with a single metric to quantitatively compare the
impact of the various configurations on both vulnerability and energy consumption, thereby allowing us
to achieve the required balanced trade-off. In any application, the data acceses on arrays within nested
loops, are the program segments that contribute to data-cache behavior. We perform our experiments on
benchmark loops from LAPACK[4] and LiverMore Loops[70], which are scientific, data-intensive and
computation-intensive benchmarks representative of applications executed on such embedded systems.
To compile our benchmarks we used GCC (v 2.7.3) with all optimizations turned on. In our attempt to
analyze the efficiency and impact of SCC, we experiment over each benchmark varying all the possible
design parameters like scc threshold (5,10,15, · · · ,200 cycles), scc pattern size (4,8,16,32 bits) and the
number of scc insn reg registers (number of references to clean). We then compare the EVP values thus
obtained with that of a write-through cache and early-writeback (EWB) cache configuration of varying
periods (100,200, · · · , 2000 cycles).
Better Energy-Vulnerability Efficiency With Smart Cache Cleaning
The graph in Figure 5.7 plots EVP values, normalized to that of the original program, obtained for the
best EWB configuration and best SCC threshold values. For each benchmark, among the results obtained
for the set of EWB periods experimented (100,200, · · · ,2000 cycles), we choose the one with the least
EVP value. Similarly, from the results for varying scc threshold values, we choose the threshold that
delivers lowest EVP. The graph clearly demonstrates that overall the benchmarks, the SCC technique
achieves lower EVP and therefore better energy efficient vulnerability reduction. From the graph in
Figure 5.7 we observe:
1. The second bar (labeled ”SCC (1 Reg)”) represents normalized EVP values of the SCC technique
obtained for experiments using 1 scc insn reg register, showing the efficiency obtained when only
one reference is selected (to be cleaned) at any point in time. For most benchmarks this bar remains
unseen owing to their significantly low EVP values (≤ 2× 10−7) indicating highest possible
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Figure 5.7: The graph showing Normalized EVP of the best EWB period (EWB configuration with least
EVP) and the best scc threshold parameter using 1 and 2 scc insn reg registers, demonstrates higher
energy-vulnerability efficiency with the SCC technique.
efficiency.
2. In the case of benchmarks like ICCG, ADI, 2D PIC, 1D PIC and diff-predictor the program con-
tains multiple references executing in overlapping time-lines with comparable vulnerability per
access profits, and therefore the selection of only one reference seems insufficient. For majority of
the benchmarks experimented we observe that the use of a second scc insn reg register decreases
the EVP significantly, which is represented by the third bar (labeled ”SCC (2 Reg)”).
3. From the results for the Recurrence benchmark, we see that the early writeback mode of cache
cleaning loses on EVP by 60% compared to the original program. Owing to the complex data
access pattern in the program, the best early write-back configuration (EWB period = 1800 cycles)
achieves only 26% vulnerability reduction at the cost of 2X increased memory writes. On the
other hand, having the knowledge of the data access pattern and the flexibility to enable cache
cleaning only at instances that achieve profitable vulnerability reduction, the SCC technique using
one register achieves 26% vulnerability reduction at < 1% increase in memory writes. Moreover,
with the use of an additional register, we achieve 100% vulnerability reduction at 96% increase in
memory writes.
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4. The average EVP plots, towards the right end of the graph indicate that our SCC technique using
one scc insn reg register is 8% lesser, and using two registers is 26% lesser than that of the EWB
technique.
More Energy Efficient Design Points in SCC
Figure 5.8: Normalized vulnerability and energy plots for two benchmarks across varying
SCC Threshold values. The plots for 32-bit Pattern SCC closely follow that by Ideal SCC in DSWAP,
while they overlap in DAXPY, demonstrating the accuracy of Algorithm 2. Vulnerability and energy
trade-off is observed for varying threshold values for each benchmark.
For each benchmark, we experiment over varying thresholds and for each perform experiments
using the ideal SCC Access Stream derived after memory analysis and again using the K-Bit pattern that
best matches with the access stream (determined using the pattern matching algorithm Algorithm 2). In
Figure 5.8, The x-axis plots the normalized vulnerability values, while the y-axis plots normalized energy
(number of cache write-backs). For one benchmark, in the EWB configuration, the early write-back
period is varied (100,200, · · · ,2000) and the normalized vulnerability and energy overhead incurred are
plotted in Figure 5.8 labeled EWB. Similarly, for the same benchmark the vulnerability and overhead
values are plotted for varying threshold values (5,10 ,15, · · · ,200), using our SCC technique. In the
graph plotted in Figure 5.8, each plotted point is a design point in a design space exploration to determine
the right EWB period or SCC Threshold to choose for energy efficient vulnerability reduction. A design
point closer to the x-axis denotes that it has a low energy overhead, and a point closer to the y-axis
denotes low vulnerability (or increased reliability) of the program. A point that is close to the origin
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(0,0) is the most efficient point which denotes least vulnerability at least energy overhead. It can be
clearly seen here, that the results from our SCC technique over varying threshold parameters have points
more closer to the x-axis and also more closer to the y-axis than any other point in the EWB plot; thereby
demonstrating the energy efficiency realized. In other words, we say that design points obtained by our
SCC technique are pareto-optimal to design points achieved by hardware techniques like WT or EWB.
Generated K-bit pattern achieves close-to-ideal SCC efficiency
The algorithm Generate Bit Pattern defined in Algorithm 2, uses a weighted matching technique to
analyze the ideal access stream (SCC Access Stream) of a reference selected to be cleaned, and repre-
sents the same as a k-bit pattern. In our experiments we evaluate the accuracy of the algorithm over
SCC Pattern Sizes 4,8,16 and 32. In Figure 5.8, the normalized vulnerability and energy values for
DAXPY, across varying threshold values, are plotted for a pattern size of 32bits. It is evident from the
overlapping plots of SCC values in Figure 5.8, the values obtained after pattern matching on a 32-bit
register closely follow that of the ideal access stream (CSW Access Stream). This demonstrates the ac-
curacy of our Smart Pattern Matching algorithm (Algorithm 2). We again observe that for larger pattern
sizes, the extent of matching accuracy increases, but when implemented does not show any significant
difference in the vulnerability and energy numbers. The system designer is thus able to choose between
allowing one 32bit register or 2 16bit registers based on hardware constraints, and still achieve intended
vulnerability reduction.
EVP decreases with increase in references to clean
When larger number of SCC registers are integrated into the system, our SCC technique provides for
scalability and therefore energy efficient vulnerability reduction in the system. Figure 5.9 plots the EVP
values of four benchmarks for varying numbers of references selected to be cleaned simultaneously. For
each benchmark, the maximum number of references allowed is determined through memory analysis.
We observe here that, in each benchmark the small additional SCC registers, translate into significant
EVP reduction. It is interesting to note that in the Diff-Predictors benchmark, with the choice of 2,3
and 4 registers the greedy nature of selecting references to clean translates into greater EVP numbers,
however as the number of selected references increases to 7, the EVP is significantly reduced.
Increase in the number of references selected to be cleaned simultaneously maps to an increase
in the number of scc insn reg and scc pattern registers in the cache cleaning hardware. In the case that
greater number of such registers are allowed in the system, our SCC technique provides for scalability
and thereby more energy efficient vulnerability reduction in the system. Figure 5.9 plots the EVP values
of four benchmarks for varying numbers of references selected to be cleaned simultaneously. For each
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Figure 5.9: The EVP of the application reduces with increase in the number of scc insn reg registers
used.
benchmark, the maximum number of references is given by that determined through memory analysis.
We observe here that, in each benchmark the small additional hardware registers translate into significant
EVP reduction and thereby efficient reliability of the system. It is interesting to note here that in the
case of Diff-Predictors benchmark, with the choice of 2 and 3 registers the greedy nature of selecting
references to clean simultaneously translates into bad EVP results, but when the number increases to 7,
the EVP reduction is significant. The metric used to sort each reference is nothing but the vulnerability
per cache-writeback ratio, which from this example shows a degree of inaccuracy. A more intelligent
metric and selection process would guarantee efficient choices in parameter values. We intend to pursue
this direction in our future work.
5.7 Software-only Smart Cache Cleaning
As described in Figure 5.5, additional hardware is required for the implementation of the proposed Smart
Cache Cleaning, as a hybrid software-hardware profile based technique. Though the added hardware is
relatively insignificant, the accesses of these hardware in conjunction with each cache access indicates
additional power overheads. In order to eliminate the need for the SCC hardware to load the bit pattern,
and then iterate over each bit for each cache access by the specified store instruction, in this work, we
propose a pure software-only solution to achieve the same effects. The given loop can be unrolled and
thus we have k instances of the specified store instruction as chosen from the SCC Analysis. Among the
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Figure 5.10: Software-only SCC Overview: Overview of the software-only SCC technique is described.
k instances, the derived scc pattern determines the instances that have to be cleaned, and those that are
not to be cleaned. The instances that need to be cleaned can be replaced by a new instruction csw - clean
and store word. In this, no significant decode or control logic needs to be added for its implementation.
In addition to performing the store operation, the cache-flush logic within the processor is triggered
for the targeted cache block. This performs the required cache cleaning on the specified instance on the
specified cache block. Figure 5.7 describes this software-only solution as a block diagram. Figure 5.7
plots the experimental results as a proof of concept that our software-only solution achieves the same
benefits as that of the hybrid SCC technique. In this case, we also see instances where the performance of
the loop can be improved owing to the instruction scheduling on a superscalar processor made possible
by the loop unrolling code transformation.
5.8 Summary
The cache, occupying the majority of chip area and with its unique architecture and circuitry is the most
susceptible architecture component in the processor. By reducing the time that vulnerable data resides in
the cache, we can reduce the probability of an error in cache data and thereby reduce the overall system
failure rate (or improve system reliability). Hardware based mechanisms like write-through cache or
early write-back cache though efficient in reducing the vulnerable data time in the cache, incurs a large
energy overhead due to increased L1-memory writes. we develop a hybrid hardware-software Smart
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Figure 5.11: Experimental Demonstration: The EVP of the application using SCC implementation on
varying orders of unrolled loops, which correspond to the different k-bit pattern sizes identified through
the SCC Analysis performed.
Cache Cleaning (SCC) technique, where we use the memory profile of an application to accurately
estimate data vulnerability (time that updated data is in the cache), identify the program instances that
generate the same. We then enable cache cleaning on specific cache blocks at specific instances, to
ensure energy efficient reduction of data cache vulnerability. Our experiments over scientific benchmarks
show that when compared to the hardware based early write-back cache architecture, the SCC technique
achieves 26% lower Energy Vulnerability Product.
Our profile base method currently identifies references with higher profit on non-overlapping
execution time-lines, but it is observed that for some applications, the references are accessed in bursts.
In such a case, the use of a reference to clean can be interleaved with another to achieve better results. It
is possible to analyze loops with affine access functions statically at the compiler for its vulnerability and
thereby identify the right references and access instances to perform cache cleaning. Intelligent schemes
can be devised to analyze the data access patterns statically, and thereby derive the design points for
varying threshold and k-bit values. Such a methodology will help develop a well-rounded and automated
scheme to implement smart cache cleaning.
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Chapter 6
HYBRID COMPILER MICRO-ARCHITECTURE TECHNIQUES: FOR POWER-EFFICIENCY
“In an attempt to reduce system power consumption, researchers have developed a wide array of tech-
niques at the hardware micro-architecture level [37, 83, 107], and compiler levels [27, 80] of embedded
design abstraction. By infusing the knowledge from one design layer over another, the combined ad-
vantage has been demonstrated to improve system benefits achieved. Such compiler micro-architecture
hybrid techniques developed have been proved to facilitate improved benefits to the system in the form of
relatively reduced hardware overhead, and increased energy reduction through the use of smart compiler
optimizations.”
In this chapter, we demonstrate such a hybrid technique to reduce the energy consumption of
the Translation Look-aside Buffer. In this, we develop code transformation techniques to reduce the
page switchings in data cache accesses and propose an efficient page-aware code placement technique
to enhance the energy reduction capabilities achieved by the Use-Last TLB architecture for instruction
cache accesses.
6.1 Introduction
The Translation Look-aside Buffer or TLB is an important component of high-end multi-tasking embed-
ded processors, like the Intel XScale [48]. The TLB performs virtual to physical address translation and
determines page access permissions. Most modern processors, including the Intel XScale implement
virtually-addressed caches, in which the cache lookup is directly performed on the virtual address pro-
vided by the processor, and therefore the TLB lookup comes in the critical path. Elkman et al. [30] note
that the TLBs can consume 20− 25% of the total L1 cache energy. Kadayif et al. [52] observed high
power densities of the data-TLB, as compared to the data-L1 cache. Thus reducing the power consump-
tion of TLBs is an important research problem. In [52], researchers show that the iTLB architecture has
a power density of 7.820 nW/mm2 compared to 0.975 and 0.670 nW/mm2 for iL1 and dL1, respectively.
Several TLB designs have been proposed to trade-off the TLB lookup delay, area and power
consumption [83, 107]. One simple, yet effective technique for TLB power reduction proposed in [26,
37], is the Use-Last TLB architecture. Observing that there is a high probability that instruction access
will refer to the same page as the last one, they store the previous page translation information into
a latch, and thereby reduce the TLB lookup power. The Use-Last TLB architecture is able to reduce
the instruction TLB power by 75%. However, since data accesses do not exhibit as high locality as
instructions, this micro-architectural technique was not effective for data TLBs.
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6.2 Data-TLB Power Reduction
Observing that there is a high probability that instruction access will refer to the same page as the last
one, they store the previous page translation information into a latch, and thereby reduce the TLB lookup
power. The Use-Last TLB architecture is able to reduce the instruction TLB power by 75%. However,
since data accesses do not exhibit as high locality as instructions, this micro-architectural technique was
not effective for data TLBs.
We develop compiler techniques to reduce the power consumption of the Use-Last TLB ar-
chitecture by improving the locality of data accesses. We propose a novel instruction scheduling and
operand reordering technique, heuristic for deciding when to perform array interleaving, and loop un-
rolling to minimize the page switchings between consecutive TLB accesses while minimizing perfor-
mance loss. Our combined technique can reduce the TLB switches by 39%, with minimal performance
impact on benchmarks from MiBench, Multimedia, DSPStone and BDTI suites. Note that this improve-
ment is above and beyond what the Use-Last hardware technique alone could achieve.
Related Work
Several researchers have proposed efficient circuit-level, micro-architectural and software techniques to
reduce the power consumption of the TLB and the Memory Management Unit.
Compiler based Approaches
A compiler-directed array interleaving technique [27] was proposed to save energy in multi-bank mem-
ory architectures with power control features. In this, the arrays used in separate banks are interleaved
such that only one of the banks is active and the other can be powered down, thus saving energy. The
energy reduction achieved by this technique does not account for the leakage power of the SRAM cells
during standby mode. Parikh et al in [80] schedule instructions within a block based on the minimum
obtainable value for a weighted cost function:circuit-state cost. One recent work is [24], where en-
ergy reduction is achieved through effective utilization of resources by switching between two processor
modes based on the cache misses.
Closest Approach
The work closest to our approach, is by Kandemir et al. [53]. Their compiler technique is to increase
the effectiveness of a previously proposed architectural technique that uses Translation Registers or TRs.
The addition of TRs requires changing the ISA, which may not be desirable in many cases. In contrast,
our approach is to improve the effectiveness of Use-Last TLB architecture, which exists in the Intel
XScale processor. They have to profile the code to find out which page will be accessed frequently in
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the near future, and then generate code to load the translations to that page into TRs. In comparison,
our approach is a static technique. We do not need/use profile information. Not only that profile-based
compilation is limited in application and scope, it has huge overhead in terms of compilation time.
Our technique does not have any such overheads. Finally, in their technique, the code is modeled as
nodes which represent loop nests that access data from a particular page region. Code transformations
to enhance the use of TRs are directed at scheduling these loop nests (nodes that access data from a
particular page region) together. In contrast, our approach is to schedule and transform instructions so
that the accesses to the same page are grouped together. Our technique operates at a finer granularity
than theirs, and could therefore co-exist, and enhance the effectiveness of each other.
Use-Last TLB Architecture
Figure 6.1: Representative block diagram of the Use-Last TLB Architecture [37]
Our compilation approach enhances the effectiveness of an already effective and popular TLB
architecture, the Use-Last TLB architecture. Proposed in [37], the Use-Last TLB architecture utilizes a
modified TLB-CAM structure (Figure 6.1. The virtual address input is matched with the TLB tag through
the CAM cells (which has reduced power consumption). The TLB tag is then used to retrieve the mapped
physical address from the register files. The lookup on the register files is a power consuming process
because of the bit-line and word-line drivers and other associated circuitry involved in its operation.
The key factor in this architecture design is the latch used to store the tag address of the previously
accessed address. If the two TLB tag addresses match, the page address and access information at the
output is the same for both. In this case, the word line (WL) of the register files are not activated and
the switching energy of the RF cells and associated circuitry is eliminated. The effectiveness of this
technique was demonstrated on instruction TLB, and it was shown to reduce the power consumption by
75%. However, this technique was deemed un-useful for data caches, as data accesses in general do not
exhibit high data locality as compared to instruction TLB. Our work aims to enhance the effectiveness
of this architectural technique on data caches through code transformations and achieve power savings
through reduction in the number of page-switches during successive data accesses.
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Experimental Setup
We explore and develop compiler techniques for the Intel XScale processor [48] on which the Use-Last
architecture was implemented (as described in Section 6.2). Intel XScale is an out-of-order, 7-stage
superpipelined high-end embedded processor, which runs at up to 1 GHz. The Intel XScale uses TLBs
to implement virtual memory support. The Intel XScale is intended to be used in wireless and handheld
applications and therefore we execute benchmarks from MiBench [36], MultiMedia [7], DSPstone
[108], Spec2000 [41], and the BDTI [11] benchmark suites. The sim-outorder cycle-accurate simulator
of the SimpleScalar Toolset [14] was modified to model the Intel XScale memory configuration and to
determine the total number of page switches in the data TLB in a program.
Page Switch-Aware Instruction Scheduling
Instruction scheduling can aggregate instructions that access the same pages consecutively, thereby re-
ducing page switches in the data TLB. In addition, for commutative operations, it is also possible to
reorder the operands, and effect the memory access pattern. We develop a combined instruction schedul-
ing and operand reordering technique.
Figure 6.2: Impact of code generation on TLB page switching
Motivation
We motivate the applicability and effectiveness of fine-grain instruction and operand reordering on TLB
page switches using a kernel from the compress benchmark, shown in Figure 1(a). The kernel accesses
71
elements from a two-dimensional array. If the array size is much larger than the page size(which is
typically small in embedded systems), elements from the higher dimensions may reside in different
pages. In this example, there are high chances that a[i], and a[ j] may be in different pages, if i 6= j.
Assuming this, the two code sequences generated by the compiler, illustrated in Figure 1(b) and (c), may
result in the same performance, they may differ significantly in the number of TLB switches they cause.
When executed, the code in Figure 1(b) will result in accesses in the sequence: a[i][ j], a[i− 1][ j− 1],
a[i][ j− 1], a[i− 1][ j], and a[i][ j], which will result in 4 page switches per iteration, while the code in
Figure 1(c) will result in only 1 page switch per iteration. Note that depending on the cache size and page
size, the page switches can vary, but if there is no performance impact, it will be better to generate the
code as in Figure 1(c). In the rest of this section, we first formulate the problem of minimizing the page
switches by instruction scheduling and operand reordering. Finding the problem to be NP-complete, we
propose a heuristic for the same.
Problem Formulation
Figure 6.3: DFG and page mapping of compress kernel
Input: Data Flow Graph (DFG) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) D = (V,E) of a code
sequence. The nodes v ∈ V represent instructions i ∈ I. An instruction i is represented by a ordered
(k+2)-tuple i=< op,d,s1,s2, ...sk >, where op is the opcode, d is the destination, and there are k source
operands, s1, ...sk, d,s1,s2, ...sk ∈ O, where O is the set of program variables, or operands. There is a
directed edge e = (v1,v2) ∈ E,3 v1,v2 ∈V , from v1 to v2 if the destination of the instruction represented
by node v2, is the same as any of the source operands of the instruction represented by node v1. i.e.,
(v1.i.d = v2.i.s1)∨ (v1.i.d = v2.i.s2)∨ ...∨ (v1.i.d = v2.i.sk). The data flow graph will also have nodes
at the beginning of the graph, representing loading of operands, and nodes at the end of the graph,
representing storing of operands, or intermediate values that will be carried over to the next loop. The
DFG of the compress kernel is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Output: Instruction Sequence represented by the function Time : I → N such that all data
dependencies are maintained. i.e., if there is an edge from instruction ia to ib, then Time(ia)< Time(ib).
Objective: Minimize Page Switches in the instruction sequence. To estimate page switching
at the compiler level, we define a function Page : O→ P, which maps operands o ∈ O to pages p ∈ P,
where P is the set of all the pages accessed by the application. A source operand may be a scalar, or an
array, and can be defined in a local scope or a global scope. We define Page(s) thus:
• Page(s) = unde f ined if the operand s is a local scalar variable. This is because most probably all
the local scalar variables will be allocated to registers and therefore will not involve in memory
access.
• Page(s) = p0 if s is a global scalar variable. We assume that all the global scalars are allocated to
a single page.
• For the global or local arrays, we assume that each array, irrespective of it’s size is mapped to
exactly one unique page.
Page Switch Model In addition, we also need a page switch model, i.e., given a sequence of
instructions, how many page switches will occur. We assume that when an instruction i executes, its
operands are accessed in the order {i.s1, i.s2, ..., i.sk, i.d}. Assuming that the page accessed just before
the execution of an instruction i is p, then, we define the page switching function, PSI(p, i1, ...in) to be
the number of page switches when a sequence of instructions i1, ...in is executed.
PSI(p, i1, ...in) = PSO(p, i1.s1, i1.s2, ..., i1.sk, i1.d,
= i2.s1, i2.s2, ..., i2.sk, i2.d,
= ...,
= in.s1, in.s2, ..., in.sk, in.d)
The total page switch count between operands can be recursively computed using the following equation:
PSO(p,o1, ...,om) = PSO(p,o1)
+PSO(LPO(p,o1),o2, ...,om)
where PSO(p,o) = 1, when both p and Page(o) are defined, and p 6= Page(o). LPO(p,o) is the last page
accessed when operand o1 is accessed after accessing page p. The last page function LP(p,o) =Page(o),
if Page(o) is defined, otherwise, it is p.
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Solution for Page Switch Minimization
To minimize page switches by instruction scheduling and operand reordering, we define a Page Switch-
ing Graph PSG f ull = (I,S), which is a directed graph, whose vertices are instructions i∈ I, and there is
an edge from instruction i to instruction j if instruction j can be scheduled immediately after instruction
i. We attach a weight attribute to each edge w(i, j), which is the minimum increase in the page switches
when instruction j is scheduled immediately after instruction i. Thus,
w(i, j) =

min

PSO(p, j.s1, j.s2, j.d)
PSO(p, j.s2, j.s1, j.d)
if j.op is comm
PSO(p, j.s1, j.s2, j.d) otherwise
where p is the last page that has been accessed after instruction i is executed. We add a dummy
source node, and a sink node so that there is an edge from the source node to all the instructions that do
not have any predecessors in DDG, and there are edges all nodes that do not have successors in DDG to
the sink node. Dummy nodes access only unde f ined pages.
The problem of finding the instruction sequence and operand ordering that minimizes the num-
ber of page switches is exactly equal to the problem of finding the shortest hamiltonian path from source
node to sink node. This implies that if we can solve the problem of page switch minimization in polyno-
mial time, we can also solve the hamiltonian problem, which is a well known NP-Complete problem in
polynomial time. This is quite unlikely, therefore the problem of scheduling for page switch minimiza-
tion is NP complete. Therefore we focus our efforts on developing scheduling heuristics for page switch
minimization.
Heuristic for Page Switch Minimization
For heuristics, we first construct a Page-Not-Switching Graph PNSG = (I,D,S), where the nodes (I) are
instructions, and there are two kinds of edges, first is the set of data dependence edges D, and the second
S is the set of inter-instruction page not-switching edges. Thus there is a an edge s = (i, j) ∈ S between
two instructions: i, j ∈ I, if there is NO inter-instruction page switch when instruction j is scheduled
immediately after instruction i. In other words, (i, j) ∈ S,∀i, j ∈ I, iff Qps ≥ 1, where
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Qps =

min

PSO(p,unde f ined, i.d, j.s1)
PSO(p,unde f ined, i.d, j.s2)
,if j.op is comm
PSO(unde f ined, i.d, j.s1) otherwise
An example of a PNSG is shown in Figure 3. The nodes 1 through 7 are instructions, and
the solid edges represent data dependencies. The dashed edges represent the inter-instruction page not-
switching edges. We now perform our scheduling on this graph representation.
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Data Dependence Edge
Page Not−Switching Edge
Figure 6.4: Problem in greedy solution.
We first developed a greedy algorithm. In the greedy algorithm, in every iteration, the last
scheduled instruction, l is maintained, and list of instructions that are now ready to be scheduled, R is
created. If there is a page-not-switching edge between l and any instruction r ∈ R, then r gets priority, as
it minimizes the page switches. Thus suppose instructions 1,2 and 3 are scheduled, with l = 3. Then R
can be computed as R = {4,5}. Out of these, the greedy heuristic will pick up instruction 4.
Figure 6.4 illustrates one problem with this simple approach. In the first iteration, the greedy
solution can pick up either instruction 1, or instruction 3. Picking up instruction 3 is a bad choice,
because it is not possible to schedule instruction 4 as the second instruction. Instruction 3 should only
be scheduled only if instruction 4 can be scheduled next. We fix this problem by adding that - when
picking an instruction which is the source of a page-not-switching edge, we pick up a pair of instructions
to schedule; plus, we give priority to pick up instructions that are not connected through page-not-
switching edges. This gives us more opportunities to pick up instruction pairs with page-not-switching
edges.
Experiments
We have implemented this page-aware instruction rescheduling algorithm as a compiler post-pass [93].
We compile our benchmarks with GCC -O3 optimization, to ensure that the benchmarks are compiled
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and scheduled for the maximum performance. We disassemble the generated object file, discover the
basic blocks, and re-create the control flow graph (CFG), and the data flow graph. We perform this
modified list scheduling heuristic on basic blocks. This fine grain instruction scheduling approach is
applicable to any program. The effectiveness of this approach could be increased by performing our
scheduling on hyperblocks, and/or superblocks. We observed that our scheduling gains from performing
local reordering of load instructions. There is not much increased opportunity to move load instructions
across basic blocks, because of tight data dependencies.
Figure 6.5: Impact of Instruction Scheduling on Page Switch Count
We modified the sim-outorder [14] simulator to count the page switches for an application exe-
cution. Figure 6.5 plots the page switch count, after implementing our page-aware instruction scheduling
and operand re-ordering transformations normalized to the baseline page switch count. On an average,
our technique achieves 23% reduction in the page switch count as indicated by the right-most bar in
Figure 4. As a matter of fact, we observed an average performance improvement of 4%. This reduction
in page switches directly translate into 23% power savings in the Use-Last TLB. Note that this is over
and above what Use-Last TLB architecture achieves on its own.
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Figure 6.6: Array Interleaving through example: (a)Example loop;(b)Array allocation and access pat-
tern; (c)Loop block with interleaved arrays; (d)Array allocation and access pattern of interleaved array
Page-Switch Aware Array Interleaving
Motivational Example
Figure 6.6 shows how array interleaving can reduce the TLB page switching over data accesses in the
program. The code in Figure 6.6(a) shows a loop which accesses elements from two different arrays A
and B, which are mapped to different pages. Figure 6.6 (b), shows that when this loop executes, there is a
page switch between consecutive memory accesses in the program. Figure 6.6(c) shows the transformed
code after interleaving. Array interleaving places the elements of the two arrays as alternate elements of
the array AB. Figure 6.6(d) shows that there is no page-switching between consecutive access to AB.
Identify the Arrays to Interleave
The problem of reducing TLB page switching is localized to consecutive memory accesses, therefore
interleaving of arrays need only be directed to decrease the page switching in the innermost loop. Con-
sider a nested loop of 3 levels, whose iterators are i, j, and k, in which are there are references to arrays
A and B. Suppose in the innermost loop, the reference functions are affine functions of the iterators, i.e.,
the access function can be represented as a linear combination of the iterators, fA = a0+a1i+a2 j+a3k,
and similarly fB = b0+b1i+b2 j+b3k.
We consider two arrays A and B as interleaving candidates only if i)the access functions of
the arrays are the same. Thus, a0 = b0,a1 = b1,a2 = b2,a3 = b3 ensuring minimized page switches
after interleaving. ii)the arrays of the same size. For example, we will interleave an array of integers
with another same size array of integers. It is important to note that while it is possible to interleave
arrays with slightly different access patterns also, it results in an overhead in terms of extra addressing
instructions. However, the innermost loop may contain several references to the same array. Two arrays
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will be interleaving candidates if the conditions are satisfied for any pair of references to the arrays. We
perform this analysis on all the important loops of the application, and find pair of arrays, which are
interleaving candidates, we take the union of interleaving candidates. Thus if arrays A and B are found
to be interleaving candidates from one loop, while B and C are interleaving candidates from some other,
then all the three arrays will be interleaved.
Interleaving Arrays
The process of interleaving r arrays of the same data type A1,A2, ...Ar is a three step transformation. The
first is to replace the individual array declarations with a single array A of r times the size of each array,
and second is to fix the access functions of all the array references. The access function fm = Am[ami+
bm j+cmk+dm] of the mth array is replaced by fm =A[r×(ami+bm j+cmk+dm)+(m−1)] in three-level
nested loop. At the end of the day, it is important to schedule the instructions that access the interleaved
array in the same pattern consecutively. This is done by moving the result of the first instruction in a
new temporary variable, and replacing all its uses by the temporary variable. Interleaving of r arrays of
different data types is done by declaring a new structure, say s, which contains an element from each of
the arrays. We then declare an array A of the same size as all the previous arrays consisting of elements
of data type s. Then we replace the access function of the mth array fm = Am[ami+bm j+ cmk+dm] by
fm = A[ami+bm j+ cmk+dm].m.
Experimental Results
We translate the source code into the FORAY format [50], which essentially consists of just the loop
structure and the array access functions as affine functions of the loop iterators. We analyze the code
in this format, and, perform our page-aware array interleaving transformations in this format, and then
convert it back to the source code. The application is compiled again, and our instruction scheduling
for page switch minimization is applied to enhance the impact of array interleaving. Figure 6.7 plots
the page switch count after performing array interleaving and instruction scheduling on all the bench-
marks. The plot thus shows that our page-aware array interleaving is a very effective transformation,
and reduces the data-TLB page-swith count by an average of 35% (indicated by the right-most bar) with
an overall average of 11% increase in performance. This performance improvement is inherent to array
interleaving, as it inherently increases the spatial locality of data, leading to improved cache behavior.
In swim, two global arrays and 5 local arrays were accessed together in the loop bodies. Interleaving
was possible on all the arrays, thereby forming two interleaved arrays (one global, and other local). This
transformation enhanced the opportunities for instruction scheduling and therefore 70% page switch re-
duction was observed. Since the TLB power is directly proportional to the number of accesses, we can
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Figure 6.7: Impact of Array Interleaving and Instruction Scheduling on Page Switch Count
expect a concomitant 35% reduction in TLB power due to the combined impact of array interleaving and
page switch-aware scheduling.
Impact of Loop Unrolling
Loop unrolling is a loop transformation in which the loop body is replicated a finite number of times,
thereby reducing the loop overhead instructions. It is important to observe that loop unrolling by itself
does not reduce TLB page switching, but, it may increase the effectiveness of instruction scheduling, by
providing more opportunities to schedule instructions and thereby reduce inter-instruction page switch-
ing.
Unrolling a loop may reduce page switches if there is at least one instruction, such that if we
schedule two copies of the instruction belonging to different iterations when scheduled consecutively,
will not result in inter-instruction page switching.
In other words, loop unrolling can be performed if ∃i ∈ I such that,
min

PSO(unde f ined, i.d, i.s1)
PSO(unde f ined, i.d, i.s2)
if i.op is comm
PSO(unde f ined, i.d, i.s1) otherwise
= 0
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Figure 6.8: Impact of Loop Unrolling on Page Switch Count
We have implemented our page-switch aware loop unrolling transformation also as source code
transformation. Figure 6.8 plots the effect of loop unrolling on the page switch count of various bench-
mark applications. The normalized page-switch count for the case when page-switch aware instruction
scheduling and array interleaving are performed is plotted as the dark bar (to the left for each bench-
mark), and the lighter graphs indicate the page-switch count for unrolling factors of 2,4 and 8 times
respectively. The right-most set of bars in Figure 6.8 indicate the average values for the cases plotted.
On an average, for an unrolling factor of 8, we obtain a reduction of 37% in the page switch count for
the applications on which page-aware loop unrolling was possible with 9% performance improvement.
Comprehensive Page Switch Reduction (PSR)
Finally we study the impact of all the three transformations together. The ordering of the transformations
is an interesting issue. Instruction scheduling and array interleaving are the fundamental transformations
that reduce data TLB page switches. Loop unrolling will be most effective when all the opportunities for
page switch reduction achievable after re-scheduling, are exploited. Our page switch-aware instruction
scheduling is done at a more fine-grained level, and therefore has to be performed only after array inter-
leaving and unrolling to maximize the effect. We first perform Page-Switch Aware Array Interleaving to
group the memory allocation of varied arrays together into one overlapped page, and then Loop Unrolling
on the instructions such that all the instructions capable of being implemented without page-switch are
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Figure 6.9: Page Switch Count and Runtime reduction by our Page-Switch Reduction Algorithm
executed together. Our fine-grain instruction scheduling is then performed as a post-pass.
The dark bars on the left in Figure 6.9 plot the percentage reduction in the data TLB page switch
count for each application. The reduction is calculated as compared to the data TLB page switch count
when the application is compiled using GCC−O3 alone. The rightmost dark bar shows that there is
an average 39% data TLB page switch count reduction over all the benchmarks. The light bars on the
right in Figure 6.9 plot the reduction in runtime for all the applications. The rightmost light bar shows
that there is an average 6.4% reduction in runtime. In conclusion, the effect of page switch reduction
techniques is additive, and the effect is realized after each step of the Page Switch Reduction algorithm.
6.3 Instruction-TLB Power Reduction
An important feature of embedded systems is their support of small page sizes. Smaller pages are pre-
ferred in embedded systems, as the applications are small, and small page sizes result in better utilization
of the limited memory in the embedded system. For example, the ARMv5 [5] and later architectures
support the tiny page, in which the page sizes can be as small as 1KB, as compared to the default 4KB.
Although tiny pages have a performance benefit, they result in more TLB misses and therefore increase
the power consumption of the TLB. The combination of V/P caches and small page sizes (for perfor-
mance reasons), result in the TLB becoming not only a significant consumer of the processor power
budget, but also an important thermal hotspot on the embedded processor. Ekman et al. [30] note that the
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TLBs can consume 20−25% of the total L1 cache energy. Kadayif et al. [52] find that address translation
logic consumes as much as 17% of on-chip power in the Intel StrongARM and 15% in the Hitachi SH-3
processors. In addition, they also find that instructuion-TLB has a power density of 7.820 nW/mm2,
compared to 0.975 and 0.670 nW/mm2 for iL1 and dL1 caches, respectively. Reducing the power con-
sumption of TLBs in embedded systems is therefore an important research problem.
Most of the previous research efforts in reducing TLB power consumption were at the hardware
level [19, 25, 58, 67]. One effective microarchitectural technique for TLB power reduction, is the Use-
Last TLB architecture [26, 37], in which the Use-Last latch stores the TLB tag of the last translated
page. During a program execution, since majority of the cache accesses are to the same page, there
will be lesser TLB lookups resulting in power savings. Essentially, power is only consumed in the TLB
when consecutive accesses are to different pages. Although the Use-Last TLB architecture achieves
75% reduction in i-TLB power, there is scope for further i-TLB power reduction by altering the relative
position of the code so as to minimize the total number of page-switches in the program.
In this section, we,
1. formulate the problem of reducing the total number of page-switches in a program, as a code
placement problem.
2. prove that the code placement problem for reduced page-switches is NP-complete.
3. propose an efficient Bounds Based Procedure Placement (B2P2) heuristic for use in the linker-
phase of the program compilation, to reduce the program’s total page-switch count, and thus
achieve i-TLB power reduction.
Related Work
Hardware Approaches
At the hardware level, circuit and microarchitectural modifications aim to reduce the per-access power
consumption of the TLB and the Memory Management Unit as a whole. Over the years, a fully associa-
tive TLB architecture with (Content Addressable Memory) CAM implementation has been proved to be
efficient in terms of performance and power. Manne et al. [67] propose a Banked Associative design for
TLBs (BA-TLB) which consumes less power than a fully associative TLB. Through the use of a banked
cache design, during each access to the TLB, only half the CAM entries are looked up and therefore
overall power-per-access is reduced. In another technique, the TLB is constructed as multiple banks
with a small filter-bank buffer located above its associated bank [58]. Through the use of selective fil-
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tering and banking mechanisms, the number of entries activated on each access is reduced and therefore
efficient in embedded processors.
Choi et al. [25] in their work, propose a two-level TLB architecture that integrates a 2-way
banked filter TLB with a 2-way banked main TLB design. This architecture, aims at reducing the power
consumption of the TLB, by distributing the TLB accesses across the banks in a balanced manner. Chang
[19] presents a real-time filter scheme to remove redundant TLB accesses by distinguishing them as
soon as the virtual address is generated. This in combination with two adaptive banked TLB designs,
has proved to effectively improve the energy delay product of data TLBs. Kadayif et al. [51] introduce
Translation Registers (TR) to store the most frequently accessed TLB address translations as a lookup
table matching the virtual and physical address tags. During subsequent cache accesses, these TRs are
looked up first and if present, no translation is performed (the information stored is used). This saves on
switching activity at the register files, mapping the virtual address to their physical address. It should
also be noted here that the granularity at which this technique achieves power reduction is influenced by
the number of registers or successive access to the architecture blocks. The power savings achieved by
such hardware techniques are therefore limited by the area, power and performance traded-offs realized
in their implementation.
Software and Hybrid Approaches
At the compiler-architecture interface, the problem of power reduction in the TLB manifests itself as the
problem to efficiently reduce accesses on the TLB through optimal changes in the software execution.
The key difference between hardware and software approaches is the fact that the TLB architectures are
identical for both instruction-TLB and data-TLB, whereas the access patterns of the instruction-cache
and data-cache vary significantly. The implementation and design of a software technique for TLB power
reduction, varies according to the targeted TLB structure. On the other hand, a hybrid approach has the
critical advantage of proposing architectural modifications and corresponding software techniques that
make efficient use of the underlying architecture, achieving efficient results. The state-of-the art software
and hardware approaches can be broadly classified based on their target TLB structure.
Software Techniques
Parikh et al. [80] propose a set of energy-oriented instruction scheduling techniques where the instruc-
tions within a basic-block of code is scheduled with regard to its energy consumption. The energy
component is calculated as a weighted cost function: circuit-state-cost for each schedule of in-
structions. Energy-oriented scheduling achieves 30% reduction in energy as compared to performance-
oriented scheduling. Chiyonobu et al. [24] in their work propose an efficient scheduling technique that
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allows for the execution of critical instructions on power-hungry functional units, and the other instruc-
tions on power-optimal units, thereby reducing the overall power consumption of the system. This
scheduling technique achieves an average 27.3% ED2P reduction with 1.4% performance degradation.
It should be noted here that the impact of these software techniques on a broad spectrum of applica-
tions are limited by the underlying architecture and also realize a performance trade-off. As far as our
knowledge goes, no software only approach has been proposed for instruction-TLB power reduction.
Hybrid Approaches for data-TLB
A compiler-directed array interleaving technique was proposed to save energy in multi-bank memory
architectures with power control features [27]. In this, the arrays used in separate banks are interleaved,
such that only one of the banks is active and the other can be powered down, thus saving energy. Though
effective in power savings, the energy reduction achieved by this technique does not account for the
leakage power of the SRAM cells during standby mode for current and future technology embedded
processors. Kandemir et al. [53] propose to increase the effectiveness of Translation Registers (TRs) to
reduce the data-TLB power consumption through compiler optimizations (using profile information) to
maximize reuse of the data stored in the TRs. This technique incurs a performance overhead of 3.5%
due to compiler updates and achieves an average of 32.6% reduction in TLB lookups. In addition, the
proposed technique requires changes to the (Instruction Set Architecture) ISA, which may not be desir-
able for many embedded applications. In Section 6.2, we develop a static compiler technique to achieve
data-TLB power reduction, effectively utilizing the Use-Last TLB architecture implementation. In this,
we present a series of page-aware code transformations (instruction re-ordering, array interleaving and
code fission/fusion), and an all-inclusive comprehensive algorithm that demonstrates an average of 39%
data-TLB power reduction with negligible impact on performance. These software and hybrid tech-
niques proposed, target the data cache and data-TLB accesses only. Owing to the significant difference
in data and instruction cache access patterns, their effectiveness is restricted to data-TLBs. Our Bounds
Based Procedure Placement (B2P2) heuristic, accentuates the applicability of this Use-Last TLB archi-
tecture and thus achieves maximum possible i-TLB power reduction on a wide range of applications. We
assume henceforth that the underlying embedded processor used for our description and analysis has an
implementation of the Use-Last TLB architecture for the i-TLB structure, and our objective is to reduce
the number of page-switches that occur during program execution.
Hybrid Approaches for instruction-TLB
One effective hybrid approach with the goal to reduce instruction-TLB power, is by Kadayif et al. [52],
where they propose a set of software only, hardware only and integrated hardware-software techniques.
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In this, the processor is facilitated with a set of Translation Registers (TRs) that assist in storing re-
cently accessed page translations. The compiler techniques proposed, aim to reduce the instruction TLB
lookups by changing the i-cache access patterns, by introducing marker instructions for intelligent use
of the TRs. This technique achieves 85% i-TLB power savings and proves to be effective only for larger
and slower i-TLB structures. Our work though simlar in intent, differs from this based on the underlying
TLB architecture. In [52], an array of power-hungry registers are used to maintain a lookup table, while
our work involves the implementation of an energy efficient Use-Last TLB architecture [37], involving
only limited hardware additions. Again, the size and design of these registers (TR) has a significant
impact on the effectiveness of their technique (work in [52]), while the key component of the Use-Last
TLB is a latch (detailed discussion of the architecture is available in Section 6.2).
In the previous sectionSection 6.2, we perform code transformations to efficiently utilize the
Use-Last TLB architecture implementation, and reduce data-TLB power consumption. In this work,
we propose a similar compiler-microarchitecture hybrid approach over the Use-Last TLB architecture,
to reduce instruction-TLB lookups and thereby power. This being an optimization technique over the
instruction cache accesses, the program’s profile information is used as input to the B2P2 heuristic. The
result of this heuristic are the start addresses of the procedures in the program, optimized for intelli-
gent page-locality and when executed on the Use-Last TLB architecture, achieve reduced i-TLB power
consumption.
Page-Switch Reduction by code Placement
Page-Switches in the Instruction Memory
In any program, the total number of page-switches incurred can be classified as follows:
1. Function-call Page-Switches (PSF ): The set of page-switches in a program, caused due to function-
calls executed across a page-boundary are called function-call page-switches, denoted by PSF .
2. Loop-execution Page-Switches (PSL): The page-switches incurred during the execution of loops
that span across page-boundaries, are called loop-execution page-switches, denoted by PSL.
3. Sequential-execution Page-Switch (PSS): The page-switches caused during sequential instruction
execution within the basic-blocks of the program, are called successive-access page-switches, de-
noted by PSS.
4. The total number of page-switches in the program is thus given by: T PS = PSF +PSL+PSS.
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Objectives for Page-Switch Reduction
To minimize the page-switches caused during program execution, the required modifications on the code
fall under one of the following cases based on the type of instructions involved:
1. The call-site and the start address of the callee-function should reside in the same page, to avoid
page-switches during the function-call.
2. The call-site and the end address of the callee-function should reside in the same page, to avoid
page-switches during the call-return.
3. For loops of size atmost page-size, the loop should be positioned to completely reside in a single
page and avoid page-switches on each iteration.
4. For loops of size at least page-size, the loop has to be positioned to span across minimum number
of page-boundaries as possible.
5. The functions of size atmost page-size, should be positioned completely within a page to remove
the page-switches incurred during each function-call.
6. For functions of size greater than a page-size, the function has to be positioned such that it spans
across minimal number of page-boundaries.
Granularity of Code Placement for Page-Switch Reduction
Compiler directed code placement techniques can alter the relative position of the instructions in the
program and thus vary their instruction memory access patterns. At the compiler, this problem of page-
switch reduction can be approached at different granularities: (i) Instruction level, (ii) Basic-block level
and (iii) Procedure level.
Instruction Level Granularity
At the instruction level granularity, code placement involves reallocating instructions or a set of instruc-
tions in the memory, while their original control sequence is maintained with the help of inserted control
instructions (branch, jump, jump-and-link,etc.). This fine granularity of approaching the code placement
problem gives greater freedom for reallocation and probably maximum page-switch reduction in the
program. This technique involves the insertion of control instructions and also variable number of nop
instructions for page-alignment purposes. Addition of these instructions have the following disadvan-
tages:
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• Increase in code-size due to the inserted instructions may be of concern for embedded applications.
• The added executable instructions (branch, jump, jump-and-link, etc.), increase the runtime of the
application and thereby affect the performance of the system. In the presence of nop instructions,
out-of-order scheduling of instructions on a multi-issue processor affects the overall performance
of the system.
• The branch and jump instructions added, activate the branch-target buffer and allied branching
hardware thus increasing the accesses to such power-hungry components of the processor. The
overall power reduction achieved through any optimal code placement, could thus be overthrown
by the increase in runtime and overall power consumption of the system.
Basic-block Level Granularity
At the basic-block level, existing branch instructions between blocks can be reassigned to a new address
when reallocated, but new control instructions will have to be inserted to maintain the control of the
fall-through basic-block. Therefore, comparatively significant number of instructions are required to be
added to the code. Here again, variable number of nop instructions may be added for page-alignment
purposes. Approaching the problem at a more coarser granularity causes lesser freedom for movement
of the code and thus may lead to lesser page-switch reduction than that at the instruction level. The
disadvantages that plague instruction-level code placement (described above), also impact basic-block
level code placement, but to a relatively lesser degree.
Procedure Level Granularity
At an even more coarser granularity, the procedure blocks can be reallocated in the instruction memory.
No control instructions are required for this modification as the procedures already have branch instruc-
tions for the program control and only the target addresses have to be varied accordingly. Owing to the
coarser granularity, freedom to move the code blocks is restricted and therefore the possible page-switch
reduction is relatively lesser. Since the TLB structure is a small part of the processor, any power reduc-
tion technique for the TLB should consider its impact over the system power as a whole and therefore
additional instruction insertions should be avoided.
In this work, we formulate the code placement problem for minimized page-switches, at the
procedure level granularity and define it as a Procedure Placement Problem (PPP). In this, the functions1
in the program are moved as a whole. No executable instruction is introduced into the existing program
code, and padding (if any) for page alignment, is done by using nop functions. The challenge here is to
1We use the words function and procedure, interchangeably to denote procedure blocks of a program.
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efficiently place the procedures in the instruction memory, such that the total number of nop functions
added are minimized and page-switches incurred are minimal. This mechanism experiences a variation
in the overall program runtime, only due to the instruction cache associativity factors. We observe
through experiments that this performance variation is limited to less than 2%.
The Procedure Placement Problem (PPP)
The problem here is to assign start addresses to the functions in a program such that, the program exe-
cution incurs reduced number of page-switches and thereby reduced i-TLB power.
Input
The program can be represented by a hierarchical structure of tuples rooted at P. The tuple P=<n,FN[]>
lists the set of P.n functions, in the form of a tuple array P.FN[], where each entry is represented by the
6-tuple FNx =<Id,Pos,Size,Calls,CS[],LP[]>. In this, FNx.Size represents the function size, FNx.Id the
unique function-id and FNx.Calls the total number of calls to the function. The set of call-sites and loops
within the function are represented by their respective tuple arrays FNx.CS[] and FNx.LP[]. Each is a
4-tuple described as follows.
Call-site tuple FNx.CS =<Id,Offset,Callee,Count> within function FNx:
• CSi.Id← id of the call-site in the function FNx.
• CSi.Offset← represents the position of the call-site from the start of the function.
• CSi.Callee← contains the callee function-id (e.g., FNy).
• CSi.Count← indicates the number of calls to the callee function FNy from FNx.
Loop tuple FNx.LP =<Id,Offset,Size,Count> within function FNx:
• LPj.Id← id of the loop in the function FNx.
• LPj.Offset← represents the position of the loop start address from the start of the function.
• LPj.Size← represents the size of the loop in bytes.
• LPj.Count← indicates the total number of iterations of the loop.
Output and Constraint
The output of our procedure placement problem are the values FNx.Pos ∀FNx ∈ P, that represent the
start addresses of the functions, under the constraint that no two functions should overlap each other in
the instruction memory.
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PSF = ∑
∀x:FNx∈P
∑
∀i:CSi∈FNx.CS[ ]
(FPSF(FNx.CSi)+RPSF(FNx.CSi))×CSi.Count (6.2)
PSL = ∑
∀x:FNx∈P
∑
∀i:LPi∈FNx.LP[ ]
(FPSL(LPi)+RPSF(LPi))×LPi.Count (6.3)
PSS = ∑
∀x:FNx∈P
FNx.Calls×LonePB(FNx) (6.4)
Objective
Given a program, the procedure placement problem can be defined as the problem to relatively position
the functions in the instruction memory (assignment of start addresses FNx.Pos) such that page-switches
caused by loops (PSL) or functions (PSS) crossing page boundaries during their execution or function
calls (PSF ) to callee-functions on different pages, are minimum. Given a program and its profile infor-
mation in the form of the tuple hierarchy (defined above), the objective to minimize the total number
of page-switches is given by Equation (6.1), where the individual components are represented by the
equations: Equation (6.2)(PSF(FNx)), Equation (6.3) (PSL(FNx)) and Equation (6.4) (PSS(FNx)).
minimize ∑
∀FNx∈P
PSF(FNx)+PSL(FNx)+PSS(FNx) (6.1)
Figure 6.10: Function-call Page-Switches:
(i)PSF(F2) is the sum of the function’s caller-to-callee page-switches (FPF(F2.C2)) and callee-to-caller
function-return page-switches(RPSF(F2.C2)).
(ii)PSF(F1) is the number of callee-to-caller function return page-switches(RPSF(F1.C1)).
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PSF : Page-Switches due to Function-calls
The total number of page-switches in the function FNx, due to function calls at the call-site FNx.CSi, is
equal to the sum of forward page-switches (FPSF ) and reverse page-switches
(RPSF ). In Figure 6.10, the call-site CS1 in function F1 experiences a page-switch only during the
return from F2, since only the end address of F2 is on a different page. In the case of call-site CS2 in
function F2, since the function F3 entirely resides in a different page, both the function call and function
return experience forward and reverse page-switches respectively. The total number of page-switches in
a program due to function calls, is given by Equation (6.2).
Figure 6.11: Loop-execution Page-Switches for:
(a)PSL(Loop1) is equal to the sum of its forward iteration FPSL = 1003 and loop-return RPSL = (100)+
(1002)+(1003).
(b)PSL(Loop2) is the sum of FPSL = 100 and RPSL = 100.
PSL: Page-Switches due to Loop iterations
The total number of page-switches in the function FNx, due to loops that span across page boundaries, is
the sum of forward page-switches (FPSL) and reverse page-switches (RPSL). We will describe the nature
of these page-switches through examples. In the nested loop structure as in Loop1 of Figure 6.11(a), the
instruction accesses cross a page-boundary only for the innermost loop (indicated by solid arrow) in the
forward direction, while the last and first instructions of every loop is accessed in the reverse direction.
Thus for this example, the total number of page-switches is given by FPSL = 100× 100× 100 (total
iteration count of the innermost loop) and RPSL = (100)+(100×100)+(100×100×100). In the case
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of a loop structure as in Loop2 of Figure 6.11(b), the page-boundary is crossed during each iteration
of the outer loop (over i) and not by any of the inner loops. Therefore, the total page-switches is given
by FPSL = 100 and RPSL = 100. The total page-switches due to loops in the program is thus given by
Equation (6.3).
PSS: Page-Switches due to Sequential Accesses in functions
A page-switch is incurred when a basic block, not covered by a loop within the function, spans across a
page-boundary. The total number of page-switches PSS, incurred by such basic blocks, for each function
is equal to the product of the function call-count FNx.Calls and the number of such lone page-boundaries
crossed within the function. If function LonePB() : FNx→N return the number of lone page-boundaries
within each function FNx ∈ P, the total page-switches within function blocks in the program is given by
Equation (6.4).
Intractability of the Procedure Placement Problem
In deriving the computational complexity of the PPP, we take a subset of the problem and prove that this
problem-subset, obtained by adding constraints on the input of the PPP, is NP-complete and therefore
our PPP is definitely NP-complete.
Subset of the Problem: PPPS
In order to prove the intractability of our problem, we derive here a subset of the problem and use that in
our reduction from a known NP-complete problem. The input to this problem subset is restricted in the
sense that only the page-switches due to function-calls are considered and so the function is described
by a set of call-sites and their corresponding call-counts. The placement of the functions into pages is
constrained, such that a function can be placed in a page if and only if the whole function fits into the
page (i.e., a function cannot reside in two pages).
Decision Version of PPPS
Let us consider a program with n functions (F) and p pages (P) available for allocation. The size of each
function is denoted by w( f ) for each function f ∈ F. A caller-to-callee function-call is denoted by the
calls c ∈ C that connects the two functions. The function call-count between the two functions is given
by the cost function t(c) for each call c ∈C. The size of each page is a constant given by S and an upper
bound equal to the maximum page-switch cost M ∈ Z+ for the program. This is formally defined as
follows:
INSTANCE: Set of functions F and edges E, function sizes w( f ) ∈ Z+, ∀ f ∈ F, page-switch costs
t(c) ∈ Z+, ∀c ∈ C, page-size constant S ∈ Z+ and upper bound on page-switch cost M ∈ Z+.
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QUESTION: Is there a partition of the functions F into p disjoint subsets F1,F2, · · · ,Fp, such that
∑ f∈Fi w( f ) ≤ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ p, and for all calls C′ ⊆ C that have their caller and callee functions on
two different subsets Fi,Fj, then ∑c∈C′ t(c)≤M?
The Graph Partitioning Problem (GPP) [32]
Given a graph G = (V,E), where w(v) defines the weight of each vertex v ∈ V, and each edge e ∈ E has
a cost c(e) attached to it. Two positive integers defined are K and J. This can formally be defined as
follows:
INSTANCE: Graph G = (V,E), weights w(v) ∈ Z+, ∀v ∈ V, and cost c(e) ∈ Z+, ∀e ∈ E, positive
integers K, J.
QUESTION: Is there a partition of V into disjoint sets V1,V2, · · · ,Vm, such that ∑v∈Vi w(v)≤K, 1≤
i ≤ m, and such that if E′ ⊆ E that have their two endpoints in two different subsets Vi,Vj, then
∑e∈E′ c(e)≤ J ?
The Reduction: GPP ≤p PPPS
From an instance of the GPP, an instance of PPPS can be generated in polynomial time as follows:
• Graph G = (V,E) in GPP⇒ program call-graph (F,C) formed of functions and function-calls.
• vertices V in GPP⇒ set of functions F in PPPS.
• edges E in GPP⇒ set of function-calls C in PPPS, where the end-points indicate the caller and
callee functions.
• weight of vertex w(v) in GPP⇒ function size w( f ) in PPPS.
• cost of edge c(e) in GPP⇒ page-switch cost due to function-call t(c) in PPPS.
• The m partitions of V in GPP ⇒ the p pages into which the program’s functions have to be
allocated.
• The disjoint subsets V1,V2, · · · ,Vm in GPP⇒ the subset of functions F1,F2, · · · ,Fp allocated in
the p pages.
• Constraint ∑v∈Vi w(v) ≤ K⇒ ∑ f∈Fi w( f ) ≤ S that defines the upper bound on the functions that
are allocated to a page.
• Objective ∑e∈E′ c(e) ≤ J in GPP⇒ ∑c∈C′ t(c) ≤M, that defines the minimization function with
an upper bound on the page-switch cost.
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Proof
A given solution to the PPPS problem can be verified in polynomial time, and therefore we deduce that
the PPPS is of NP class. From the reduction above, we observe that an instance of GPP can be directly
converted into an instance of the PPPS, from the call-graph of the program. Therefore, we derive that
an optimal solution to the PPPS exists if and only if there exists an optimal partitioning of the vertices
in GPP. Given an instance of the GPP, a YES decision on the partitioning Π, indicates that there exists
a partition of the functions ∆ for an equivalent instance of the PPPS. Conversely, if we obtain a YES
decision for the partition ∆ on an instance of the PPPS, we can say that there exists a partitioning Π for
an equivalent instance in GPP.
The decision version of GPP, is a known NP-complete problem [32]. Having reduced an in-
stance of GPP to PPPS (GPP ≤p PPPS), we have shown that the PPPS is atleast as hard as GPP and
therefore definitely NP-complete. The PPPS (from our description above) is a subset of our original
code placement problem PPP with limited constraints in placement and input. From our construction
of the PPPS problem, and nature of the constraints, we deduce that the problem to obtain an optimal
solution to our procedure placement problem for minimized page-switches is NP-complete.
Related Code Placement Techniques
Over the years, researchers have developed various code placement techniques targeting power and per-
formance issues in embedded processors. Xianglong et al. [43] develop a dynamic code management
technique for processors with managed runtimes, reducing the total number of i-TLB misses and thereby
improving performance. Here, a JIT compiler is used to analyze the program call graph, and reallocate
procedures with high call frequency closer together. Researchers in [17, 100] propose different com-
piler optimizations and code placement techniques to increase code locality and reduce cache-misses,
efficiently improving performance of the embedded system. The authors in [6, 52] propose to enhance
cache and TLB effectiveness through compiler-directed code transformation techniques. Bernhard et
al. [29] propose a dynamic code placement technique for i-cache power savings, where the instruction
cache is replaced with a scratchpad and mini-cache. Program profile information is used to map high
execution blocks (loops) to the scratchpad (fixed size), thereby achieving power savings. The runtime
overhead and code size increase due to instruction insertions (as discussed in Section 6.3) is compensated
by the energy and performance advantage of scratchpad memories.
Though our procedure placement problem resembles in principle with some of the above com-
piler techniques, it differs from them in the problem formulation and underlying architectural intricacies.
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We target embedded processors, and propose compiler techniques to support architectural modifications
that can be implemented in a wide variety of applications. In techniques that increase code locality by
reallocating procedures with high call frequency closer together, it should be noted that the existence of
loops within the procedures and their respective iteration counts are not considered. In a program, there
may exist a case where majority of the execution time is spent on a loop within a procedure that has only
one call to it, and when such a loop crosses a page-boundary, page-switches are incurred. In our B2P2
technique, we profile the loops (iteration count) and procedures (call count) to efficiently position the
procedures, such that minimal page-switches are incurred during the execution of such loops/procedures.
During procedure placement, to reduce power and runtime overheads, the entire procedure is treated as
one entity and positioned in relation to the page-boundaries, provided no executable instruction is in-
serted into the code.
ILP Formulation of a PPP Problem-Subset
Having proved that PPPS is NP-complete in Section 6.3, we formulate a 0-1 ILP for the problem.
Preliminaries
In accordance with our assumptions and definition of the PPP problem-subset (as described above), the
constraints on the tuple variables (defined above) are defined as follows:
• the function size FNx.Size ≤ PS.
• the function contains no loops and therefore the tuple array FNx.LP[]=φ .
• the function contains only function-calls and therefore the tuple array FNx.LP[]6= φ .
The notations involved in the ILP formulation of the above stated problem subset are defined
as follows:
• set of functions F = { fi : 0≤ i < n}
• set of i-cache pages P = {p j : 0≤ j < n}
• function SizeO f : F → N that returns the size of function fi
• costi1,i2 = page-switch cost when function fi1 and fi2 are in separate pages.
• vector X = (x0,0, ...x0,m, ...xn,m) where element xi, j is defined as,
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xi, j =

1 when function fi is allocated in page p j
0 otherwise
Constraints
The constraint equations defining the problem formulation, follow from our assumptions (as described
above) and the requirements of an optimal procedure placement for reduced page-switch count. Equa-
tion (6.5) defines the constraint that a function can be allocated to only one cache page. Equation (6.6)
states that the set of functions allocated to a single page have to fit completely within the page allocated.
Page Limit j = ∑
i: fi∈F
xi, j× sizei ≤ PS, ∀ js.t.p j ∈ P (6.5)
Function Limiti = ∑
j:p j∈P
xi, j = 1, ∀is.t. fi ∈ F (6.6)
Objective function
The objective function for our problem subset is defined: ”Given the sets F,P, function-sizes SizeO f ( fi ∈
F), and the 2−D data table containing cost values for all pairs of functions ( fx, fy ∈ F), find the vector
X that defines the placement of the functions ( fi ∈ F) to pages (p j ∈ P) such that the total page-switch
cost is minimized.” This objective function is thus described by the relation:
∑
∀i1,i2∈F
∑
∀p j∈P
(
xi1, j(1− xi2, j)+ xi2, j(1− xi1, j)
)× costi1,i2 (6.7)
The expression (within the summation) in Equation (6.7), defines the decision-value= 0, if the
functions fi1 and fi2 can be placed in a single page (p j ∈ P), and 1 otherwise. The sum of the decision-
value and the cost incurred due to their placement on different pages, over all possible placement options,
determines the total page-switch count of the program. The non-linear terms in Equation (6.7) forming
the objective function can be transformed into a linearized implementation using well known lineariza-
tion techniques [99].
We have implemented the above ILP formulation in GMPL and have been able to achieve an
optimal solution for reasonable small number of functions and components using GLPK [66] solver. For
the call graph similar to that of dijkstra benchmark considering only the page-switches due to function-
calls, an optimal solution was achieved after 1548 iterations, using 1.3 MB of memory and 661 variables.
This formulation only involves one of the constraints that defines the actual code placement problem, and
adding further constraints may increase the runtime and memory requirements. This essentially makes
this solution impractical for use in a compiler and clearly a more efficient technique is required.
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B2P2:Bounds Based Procedure Placement Heuristic
We develop here an efficient Bounds Based Procedure Placement (B2P2) heuristic solution to the PPP
for minimizing total number of page-switches in a program.
Overview
The profile information gathered from the program, populated into the tuple hierarchy P is the input to
our B2P2 heuristic. The program-elements:
call-sites (FNx.CSi,∀i : FNx.CSi ∈ FN,∀x : FNx ∈ P)
and loops (FNy.LPj,∀ j : FNy.CS j ∈ FN,∀y : FNy ∈ P)
of the program are listed in the list ELEMENTS LIST, in the decreasing order of their weights equal to the
page-switches incurred during their execution. The weight for a call-site is its corresponding function
call-count and that for a loop is its iteration count. Each element from this list is considered greedily
(by extracting from top of the sorted heap), for optimal procedure placement, by forming bounds that
contain the element within page-boundaries and thereby avoid the occurrence of page-switches during
their execution. The formed bounds are affine inequalities over the variable FNx.Pos (function start-
address) of the function FNx that contains the element under consideration.
During each iteration over the ELEMENTS LIST, an element (or function) can be assigned to
a page iff, the newly formed bound does not conflict with any existing bounds for that page. Once
bounds are formed for all the elements in the list, the function start addresses FNx.Pos for the functions
assigned to a page is obtained by taking the smallest integer value that satisfies all the inequalities for
the corresponding page. By taking only the smallest possible value for the function start addresses, we
guarantee that the amount of required padding (using nop functions) is minimized. Algorithm 3 de-
scribes the main function ALLOCATE FUNCTIONS() of the heuristic and the following sections describe
the implementation details of the ASSIGN BOUNDS LP() and ASSIGN BOUNDS CS() functions.
Illustration
Input to the Heuristic and DCFG Formation
In order to facilitate the implementation of our B2P2 heuristic, we define a back-pointer in the call-
site and loop tuples that represent the functions the element belongs to. The value FN.CS.FnId in the
tuple FN.CS represents a pointer to the caller function (FN.Id) and FN.LP.FnId in the tuple FN.CS
represents a pointer to the function in which the loop is located. Since the input to the heuristic is a call
graph (annotated with tuple information from profile data) without any page assignments, the variable
FN.Pos is treated as a variable throughout the operation of the heuristic.
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Algorithm 3: ALLOCATE FUNCTIONS(Function List, Page List, Elements List)
Require: Function List=(FP1,FP2, · · · ,FPn), Page List=(PG1,PG2, · · · ,PGn),
Elements List=(CL1,CL2, · · · ,CLn).
1: for each element CPx from Top (ELEMENTS LIST) do
2: type← Get Element Type Of (CPi)
3: if type == LOOP then
4: LPi← addr(CPx)
5: ASSIGN BOUNDS LP (LPi.FnId,LPi)
6: else if type == CALL-SITE then
7: CSi←∗CPx
8: ASSIGN BOUNDS CS (CSi.FnId,CSi)
9: end if
10: end for
Figure 6.12: Original DCFG of dijkstra program with page demarcations.
Figure 6.12 describes the DCFG formed for the dijkstra benchmark program annotated with
the gathered profile information. Here, the rounded rectangles denote the functions in the program. Each
program-element: call-site (solid arrows) and loops (solid line rectangles) are annotated with their id
values and corresponding weights, as indicated in Fig. 4. The page boundaries are marked by dotted
lines labeled with their respective page numbers.
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The list of pages (PAGE LIST) available for allocation is described in Fig. 4. The size of this
list given by: dProgramSizePageSize e, and each element in the list is a 4-tuple PG =< Id,Bounds,SA,EA > where,
PGr.Id is the page number, PGr.SA its start-address and PGr.EA its end-address. PGr.Bounds is a
vector array initialized to null and used to hold the affine bounds for each page. For each iteration of the
loop in Algorithm 3, the program element with highest weight is taken, and its corresponding bounds
assignment function (ASSIGN BOUNDS LP() or ASSIGN BOUNDS CS()) is executed.
Function ASSIGN BOUNDS LP()
When the element considered for placement is a loop, affine equations are formed with the loop’s start
address (FNx.Pos+FNx.LPi.O f f set), size (FNx.LPi.Size), and page boundaries (PGr.SA,PGr.EA) of
the available page. The objective is to ensure that the entire loop exists within the page assigned and/or
crosses minimum number of page-boundaries as possible.
LPi.SA ← FNx.Pos+FNx.LPi.O f f set
LPi.EA ← FNx.LPi.SA+FNx.LPi.Size
bound ← PGr.EA≥ LPi.EA > LPi.SA≥ PGr.SA
(6.8)
For the example in Figure 6.12, loop L1 of function enqueue() is the first element in the
ELEMENTS LIST and the bounds to contain this loop within a page is formed while assigning this
function to page PG1 =< 1,B1,0,1024 > and input to the bounds PG1.B1 Equation (6.9). Here, the
loop enqueue().L1 is of size 24 bytes located at an offset of 208 bytes from the function start address
enqueue().Pos obtained by substituting variables in Equation (6.8). When a bound is formed for the
next element in the list di jkstra().L3, we realize the conflict with the existing bound in PG1.B1 owing to
the function size (di jkstra().Size = 1408 bytes), and therefore a new bound PG2.B2 Equation (6.10) is
formed. In Equation (6.9) and Equation (6.10), the← indicates that the newly formed bound is appended
with the existing set of bounds.
PG1.B1 = 1024≥ enqueue().Pos+208+24
PG1.B1 ← PG1.B1 > enqueue().Pos+208 > 0 (6.9)
PG2.B2 = 2048≥ di jkstra().Pos+1032+16
PG2.B2 ← PG2.B2 > di jkstra().Pos+1032 > 1024
(6.10)
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Function ASSIGN BOUNDS CS()
When the element considered is a call-site, affine equations are formed with the call-site position CSi.Addr,
the callee-function start address (Callee.Pos) and size (Callee.Size), within page boundaries (PGr.SA,PGr.EA)
of an available page. The objective is to ensure that both the callee function and the call-site (at the caller
function) are in the same page.
CS.Addr← FNx.Pos+FNx.CSi.O f f set
Callee.Pos← (FNx.CSi.Callee).Pos
Callee.EA←Callee.Pos+(FNx.CSi.Callee).Size
tb1← PGi.EA≥CS.Addr ≥ PGi.SA
tb2← PGi.EA≥Callee.EA≥Callee.Pos≥ PGi.SA
bound← tb1 & tb2
(6.11)
In Figure 6.12, the third element on the ELEMENTS LIST is a call-site di jkstra().CS1 and the
bounds formed assign the call-site and the callee-function of size (qcount().Size = 16bytes) to page
P2. The page P2 is chosen because of an already existing bound for function di jkstra() in PG2.B2.
The bounds formed are given in Equation (6.12). Here, the call-site is at an offset of 360 bytes from
di jkstra().Pos, and the bound B2 which includes both tb1 and tb2 assures page-switch reduction.
tb1 = 2048≥ di jkstra().Pos+688≥ 1024
tb2 = 2048≥ qcount().Pos+16≥ qcount().Pos > 1024
B2 ← tb1 & tb2 (6.12)
The next element in the ELEMENTS LIST is the loop
di jkstra().L2 of size (472 bytes), and when analyzed by the function ASSIGN BOUNDS LP(), gener-
ates bounds over the nested loop structure L2− L3 in the function di jkstra() to be contained within
the page P2, is added to array PG2.B2 Equation (6.13). For the next element di jkstra().CS4, since the
callee function enqueue() was earlier assigned to PG1, a conflict arises in the bounds formed and there-
fore no bound is formed for this element. The next subsequent call-site d jikstra().CS2 generates the
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corresponding bounds to place function dequeue() within page PG2 Equation (6.14).
PG2.B2 = 2048≥ di jkstra().Pos+648+472
PG2.B2← PG2.B2 > di jkstra().Pos+648 > 1024
(6.13)
tb1 = 2048≥ di jkstra().Pos+702≥ 1024
tb2 = 2048≥ dequeue().Pos+184≥ qcount().Pos > 1024
B2← tb1 & tb2
(6.14)
Assigning Function Start Address (FN.Pos)
The set of inequalities within the array PGr.Bounds for each page is evaluated to derive the smallest
Figure 6.13: Optimized DCFG of dijkstra program with page demarcations.
integer value that can be assigned to the variable FNx.Pos for all functions having bounds within that
page. Figure 6.13 gives the page allocations for the dijkstra benchmark after applying optimal place-
ment of the functions by our B2P2 heuristic. The bounds formed in Equation (6.10), Equation (6.12),
Equation (6.13) and Equation (6.14) are evaluated to achieve the required placement conditions for the
functions. This optimal placement required 16 bytes of nop instructions to align function dequeue()
to a page-boundary. Our experiments demonstrate that this procedure placement achieves 52% reduced
page-switch count with < 2% performance variation.
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Heuristic Runtime
For a program with m procedures, n total loops, and c total call-sites, the size of the list ELEMENTS LIST
is N = m+ n+ c governs the runtime. The list when implemented as a heap structure takes O(log N)
time for insertion and constant time for extraction. The for loop in Algorithm 3 runs for O(N) iterations
and within each iteration the functions to form bounds take constant time. The overall runtime of the
B2P2 heuristic is thus bounded by O(N) = O(m+n+ c).
Experimental Setup
We have implemented our B2P2 heuristic as a profile based compiler post-pass optimization technique.
For our experiments, we use the SimpleScalar [14] sim-outorder cycle-accurate simulator (implemented
with the Use-Last i-TLB architecture), modified to count the total number of instruction-TLB page-
switches for a program, configured to resemble the architectures of the Intel XScale [48] embedded
processor with tiny-page (page-size = 1KB) configuration.
In our experiments to demonstrate the application of our B2P2 heuristic over a wide variety
of uni-processor embedded systems, we have isolated benchmark programs (from the MiBench [36]
benchmark suite) that represent different code varieties. The program in assembly language(.s format),
is first compiled using the GCC (version 2.7.2.3)−O2 option. It is then profiled through execution in our
processor simulator to populate the tuple hierarchy as discussed above. The output of our B2P2 heuristic
is the values for function start addresses (FNx.Pos). Padding using nop functions (each of size 8 bytes)
are introduced to align the functions to page-boundaries.
Experiments
Benchmark Page-Switches due to
from Function-Calls Loops Sequential Access PSR Perf.
MiBench Orig Opt Orig Opt Orig Opt Varn.
Dijkstra 229517 2354 0 10000 86734 139791 52% < 1%
Patricia 23580 900 0 0 4336 456 95% −3%
Bl dec 94592 15592 311876 50 524453 284244 68% −3%
Bl enc 15592 15592 50 50 213671 213671 0% 0%
Sha 88 4885 623744 0 14623 4873 98% < 1%
a caudio 688 688 0 0 685 685 0% 0%
a daudio 688 688 1368866 0 1370 685 100% −8%
fft 8196 8196 8202 0 2074 13 56% < 1%
fft inv 16388 16388 16395 0 4123 13 56% < 1%
Table 6.1: Table showing page-switches due to function-calls, loops and sequential-executions, in bench-
mark applications
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In this section we describe in detail our experimental results over an implementation of our
B2P2 heuristic in the embedded processor simulator.
Overall Page-Switch Reduction
Figure 6.14: Impact of Code Placement on Page Switch Count.
In Figure 6.14, the normalized page-switch count of each benchmark application, normalized
to the page-switch count of the baseline (un-optimized) program, is plotted. The average page-switch
reduction achieved over the set of experimented benchmarks, is indicated by the bar on the right of the
graph. Applications patricia and adpcm are characterized by procedures of large size and a number of
call-sites with high call-counts. These characteristics of the program are identified by the B2P2 heuristic
through the use of sorted ELEMENTS LIST structure, and were therefore optimally placed to achieve
significant page-switch reduction. On the other hand, the fft benchmark is dominated by the three nested
loop structures in the fft float() function. Owing to the sizes of these loops and the containing function,
the B2P2 heuristic greedily binds the nested loops to a page, eliminating the dominating page-switches
but causing smaller interfering function-calls and function sequential-executions to cause page-switches.
Over the set of benchmarks experimented, we observe an average of 76% reduction in the page-
switch count, with less than 2% variation in performance and maximum variation of −8% (in adpcm).
The achieved active power savings through our B2P2 heuristic (directly proportional to the page-switch
reduction), is over and above that achieved through the Use-Last TLB architecture alone.
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Program Page-Switches: break-up
In Table 6.1, the page-switches due to each instruction type (loops, function-calls or function blocks) in
the program is tabulated for the set of benchmark applications used in our experiments. This tabulation
portrays the impact of our greedy heuristic on the program page-switch count. The last two columns
describe the overall page-switch reduction and performance variation of the optimized program when
compared with the original program. A performance variation > 0 indicates runtime decrease while < 0
indicates runtime increase after optimization. For example, in dijkstra the original program placement
did not cause any page-switches due to loops, but in optimizing for reduced total page-switch count, an
overall reduction of 52% (with ¡ 1% variation in performance) was achieved through code placement,
which resulted in a loop (iteration count = 10000) to span across a page-boundary causing increase in
page-switches due to loops.
Our code placement technique aims to achieve maximum possible page-switch reduction on
a given program and the benchmark Blowfish demonstrates such a condition. The encode and decode
functionality of this benchmark, use the same code but for an if condition that chooses one loop over
the other in the bf cfb64 encrypt() function. Each of these loops have an iteration count 311825 equal to
33% of the program’s total page-switch count. The page-switch count of the original program, incurred
minimum number of total page-switches for the encode functionality, but owing to the use of different
loops in the bf cfb64 encrypt() function, procedure placement optimization was possible on the decode
functionality resulting in an average of 68% page-switch reduction.
6.4 Summary
Most modern processors implement virtually addressed physically tagged caches, where virtual to phys-
ical address translation (using TLB) is required on every cache access. The Use-Last TLB architecture
proposed in [37] reduces the TLB power consumption, if the same page is accessed successively; which
was effective for the instruction-TLB. However, the approach was ineffective for data-TLB, because
data accesses do not exhibit high locality as compared to instructions. Through analysis of the soft-
ware application, system information could be extracted to develop smart compiler-level optimizations
that efficiently modify the data access pattern such that the Use-Last d-TLB architecture shows reduced
power consumption. In addition, we observe that by optimizing the placement of code within a binary,
the power consumption of the instruction-TLB (equipped with Use-Last) can be further reduced.
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Chapter 7
COMPILER-AWARE ARCHITECTURES
“Recently coarse-grained reconfigurable architectures (CGRAs) have drawn increasing attention due to
their power-efficiency and flexibility. While many CGRAs have demonstrated impressive performance
improvements at low energy cost, the effectiveness of CGRA platforms ultimately hinges on the com-
piler. Existing CGRA compilers do not model the details of the CGRA architecture, due to which they
are, i) unable to map applications, even though a mapping exists, and ii) use too many PEs to map an
application.”
In this chapter, we model several CGRA details in our compiler and develop a graph mapping
based approach (SPKM) for mapping applications onto CGRAs. On randomly generated graphs our
technique can map on average 4.5X more applications than the previous approaches, while using fewer
CGRA rows 62% times, without any penalty in mapping time. We observe similar results on a suite of
benchmarks collected from Livermore Loops, Multimedia and DSPStone benchmarks.
7.1 Introduction
However, the success of CGRAs critically hinges on the efficient mapping of applications onto it so as
to exploit the parallelism in the application and utilize minimum computation resources of the CGRA.
Minimizing the number of computation resources in CGRAs is an extremely important goal, as it directly
translates into either reduced power consumption, or increased throughput. The problem of mapping an
application onto a CGRA to minimize the number of resources used has been shown to be NP-complete,
and therefore several heuristics have been proposed. However existing heuristics do not consider the
details of the CGRA architecture. In particular,
PE Interconnection Most existing CGRA compilers assume that the PEs in the CGRA are connected
only in a simple 2-D mesh fashion, i.e., a PE is connected to it’s neighbors only. However, in most
existing CGRAs each PE is connected to more PEs than just the neighbor. In Morphosys, a PE is
connected to , in RSPA, each PE is connected to .
Shared Resources Most CGRA compilers assume that all PEs are similar in the sense, that an operation
can be mapped to any PE. However, modern CGRAs, in order to reduce the cost, power and
complexity, do not include the multiplier in each CGRA. Few multipliers are made available as
shared resources in each row. For example, RSPA has 2 shared multipliers in each row.
Routing PE Most CGRA compilers cannot use a PE just for routing. This implies that in a 4x4 CGRA,
it is not possible to map application DAGs in which any node has more than 4 degree. However,
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most CGRAs allow a PE to be used for routing only, which makes it possible to map any degree
DAGs onto the CGRA.
Owing to the simplistic model of CGRA architecture in the compiler, existing CGRA compilers
are i) unable to map an application on the CGRA, even though it is possible to map them. ii) uses too
many PEs in the solution.
In this chapter,
• we formulate the application mapping problem onto CGRA considering the arbitrary PE intercon-
nections, shared resource constraints, and routing PEs.
• we develop an ILP solution to solve the application mapping problem to minimize the number of
rows used in the CGRA.
• we propose a graph drawing based approach to map applications onto CGRAs which can map
4.5X more randomly generated application DAGs than previous approach, while using less rows
62% of time, without any mapping time penalty.
7.2 Notation and Definitions
Since applications spend most of their time and energy in loops, in this paper, we focus on mapping loops
to CGRAs. Significant power and performance trade-offs can be made by unrolling the loop. Therefore,
the first step in mapping applications onto CGRAs is to first unroll the loops to meet the power and
performance requirements. The focus in this paper is solving the problem of mapping the kernel of a
given loop to a CGRA while minimizing the number of resources required.
Loop kernel
The loop kernel can be represented as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), K = (V,E), where the set of
vertices V are the operations in the loop, and for any two vertices, u,v∈V , e= (u,v)∈E iff the operation
corresponding to v is data dependent on the operation u.
CGRA
An M×N CGRA can be represented as another directed graph C = (P,L), where the elements of P, pi j,
where 1≤ i≤M, and 1≤ j≤ N are the PEs of the CGRA. For any two elements p,q ∈ P, l = (p,q) ∈ L
iff PE q can use the result that PE p computed in the previous cycle.
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Application Mapping
An application mapping is a function φ : K→C, which in turn implies two functions, φV : V → P, and
φE : E → 2L. φV is an injective function that maps the operations to the PEs. This implies that each
vertex v ∈V maps to a distinct PE p ∈ P, and that some PEs may be unused.
φE is a multi-valued function that maps data dependency edges e ∈ E of the application kernel
to a subset of interconnection links ll ∈ 2L. Thus a dependence edge can be mapped onto a set of
interconnection links on the CGRA, starting from φV (u), and ending at φV (v).
Path Existence Constraint
If φE(e = (u,v)) = ll ∈ 2L, then ∃l1 = (p1,q1) ∈ ll such that p1 = φV (u), and ∃l2 = (p2,q2) ∈ ll such
that q2 = φV (v), and ∀l = (p,q) ∈ ll such that q 6= φV (v) then ∃l = (p′,q′) ∈ ll, such that p′ = q.
Simple Path Constraint
If φE(e = (u,v)) = ll ∈ 2L, then ∀li, l j ∈ ll, if li = (p,q), and l j = (r,s), then q 6= s. This implies that
there are no loops in the path from φV (u) to φV (v), described by ll.
Routing Order
Under the path existence and the simple path constraint, a total order can be defined on the elements of
ll. This total order, which we call routing order, and identified by ≺, identifies a unique path from φV (u)
to φV (v). The total order is defined as:
1. ∀li, l j ∈ ll, if li = (p,q)∧φV (u) = p, then li ≺ l j,
2. ∀li, l j ∈ ll, if l j = (p,q)∧φV (v) = q, then li ≺ l j
3. ∀li, l j ∈ ll, if li = (p,q)∧ l j = (q,r), then li ≺ l j
The routing order implies that the first element φV (u) is the smallest element, and φV (v) is the
largest element. When two active interconnection links share a PE, the one that uses the PE as the source
is larger than the one that uses it as a destination. If we arrange the PE vertices in increasing order, as
defined by ≺, they describe the path from φV (u) to φV (v). The simple path constraint makes sure that if
ll 6= φ , then there exists a path from φV (u) to φV (v).
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Routing PE
RPE for a data dependence edge e ∈ E is the set of PEs, which are used to transfer data between two
interconnection links. Thus, for any e = (u,v) ∈ E, if ll = φE(e), then RPEe = {q|∀l = (p,q) ∈ ll,
q 6= φV (v)∧ p 6= φV (u)}. We also define RPE =⋃e∈E RPEe.
Uniqueness of Routing PE
A routing PE can be used to route only one value.
No Computation on Routing PE
No computations can be performed on a routing PE.
Shared Resource Constraint
Most CGRAs have row-wise constraints, that arise from the fact that the rows share expensive resources,
e.g. multipliers, memory buses etc. For example, there can be only two multiply operations in each
row. To specify such constraints, we define an attribute “type” to each vertex of the kernel graph K and
the number of shared resources, type t, within a row in C as St . Thus, ∀vt ∈ {v ∈ V |v.type = t} and
pti j = φV (vt), ∑ j |pti j| ≤ St .
Utilized CGRA Rows
We define UR as the set of CGRA rows that are utilized in mapping the application K onto the CGRA
C. Thus UR = {Pi|∀ j, pi j ∈ Range(φV )∨ pi j ∈ RPE}.
7.3 Problem Formulation
Although the previously considered objective for the problem has been to minimize the number of PEs
used. However, in practice, owing to the severe restrictions of the shared resource constraints, utilizing
less number of rows is the most useful objective function. Utilizing lesser number of rows directly
translates into increased opportunities for novel power and performance optimization techniques. For
example, to reduce the energy consumption, a whole row of PEs may be power gated. In addition it
might be possible to cleanly execute another application on the remaining rows to improve throughput.
Therefore, we formulate our problem as follows: Given a kernel DAG K = (V,E), and a CGRA C =
(P,L), find a mapping φ(K), with the objective of min|UR| or min|RPE|, under i) path existence, ii)
simple path, iii) uniqueness of routing PE, iv) No computation on routing PE, and v) shared resource
constraints.
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7.4 Related Work
Various coarse grained architectures have been proposed as summarized in [40]. MorphoSys [95] con-
sists of an 8 × 8 array of reconfigurable Cells coupled with a Tiny RISC processor. The Cell array
performs 16-bits SIMD-style operations and each Cell has its own multiplier. RSPA [55] is based on
MorphoSys, but it is not SIMD but MIMD-style. Furthermore, RSPA shares multiplier and pipelines it
in order to reduce the chip size. REMARC [74] is 8 × 8 array of nano processors containing an ALU,
data RAM, register file, and special purpose registers. ADRES [72] has an XML-based architecture
description language to define the overall topology, operation set, resource allocation, timing, and an
internal organization of each PE. Another CGRA is XPP [10]. It has 4 × 4 or 8 × 8 PE array and each
PE has no multiplier.
The performance of CGRA critically hinges on the mapping algorithm. For MorphoSys, a
compiler framework [101] to analyze SA-C programs, perform optimizations, and map the application
was proposed. XPP has mapping algorithm described in [39]. However, their approach was evaluated
only for simple loops. Another approach is DRESC [71] for ADRES architecture template. They exploit
loop level parallelism by adopting modulo scheduling. This approach takes very long time for mapping
and mapping results shows low utilization of PEs. In order to improve utilization, similar approach [81]
using affinity graph was proposed.
However, all the previous application mapping approaches assume a very simple model of the
CGRA, and do not model the complexities in the CGRA designs like row constraints, shared resources,
limited load/store bandwidth, and irregular interconnections.
The work closest to ours is the Spatial mapping approach proposed in [2], in which the authors
consider both shared multipliers and memory interface, and propose a spatial mapping technique. How-
ever, their approach often fails to find the mappings due to their simplistic model for the routing PEs.
For example, their concept of channel PE is similar to the routing PE but it is added only for connecting
two column-wisely unreachable PEs. Thus channel PE is not helpful for removing the diagonal edges
or mapping node with more degree than the degree of PE. In addition, they can handle very restricted
form of the applications. They only consider planar graphs and kernels which do not have loop-carried
dependencies as their input applications. Since the input is limited to only simple binary trees and they
do not use a PE only for a routing, their technique is not able to map non-planar DAGs onto CGRA. We
compare our approach against [2] which is described above, and refer to their algorithm as AHN in this
paper.
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7.5 ILP Formulation
Application mapping onto a CGRA has been proven to be NP-complete [20], even in the special case
when the application is a complete binary tree and the CGRA is a two dimensional grid with just the
neighboring connections. Therefore, we formulate an Integer Linear Programming (ILP) solution for the
problem.
|V|=4, |E|=4, M=2, N=3, |Re|=M*N - |V|=2,
v113=1, v223=1, v322=1, v421=1, …
r1113=1, r1222=1, r2113=1, r2213=1, …
q1113=0, q1212=1, q2113=0, q2213=0, q3123=0,…
(d) Variables in ILP
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Figure 7.1: Example of ILP formulation
When an edge e is mapped to a subset of interconnection links ll, such that |ll| > 1, it uses
routing PEs. To accommodate the routing PEs, we add extra routing vertices on each edge of K. Since
the exact number of routing PEs required for an edge e ∈ E cannot be known until after the mapping is
complete, we insert the maximum possible number of routing vertices. The upper bound on the number
of routing PEs is |P−V |. Therefore we transform K → K′ = (V ′,E ′) by inserting |P−V | vertices on
each edge e ∈ E. Figure 7.1 shows the transformation of adding the routing vertices (dark vertices) on
every edge in K. Let Re be the set of the inserted black vertices onto e ∈ E, and R as R = ⋃∀e∈E Re.
The problem now translates into mapping K′ to C. Unlike normal vertices v ∈V , several black vertices,
r ∈ R, can be mapped to the same PE p ∈ P of the CGRA, including the PE to which a normal vertex
v ∈V is mapped to. Now we define our ILP, on the transformed DAG K’.
Boolean Decision Variables
• vikl is 1 if ith vertex vi ∈V is mapped onto pkl ∈ P.
• ri jkl is 1 if jth routing vertex r j ∈ Rei for ei ∈ E is mapped onto pkl ∈ P.
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• qi jkl is 1 if jth routing vertex r j ∈ Rei is mapped onto pkl ∈ P−Range(φV ), which means q corre-
sponds to using an actual routing PE.
In Figure 7.1(d), r1113 is 1 because the first r for edge e1 is placed on p13, and q1212 becomes a
routing PE because the second r for edge e1 is placed on p12 where there are no operation v.
Objective Function
The objective function is to minimize the number of utilized rows. Thus,
min(
|V |
∑
i
M
∑
k
N
∑
l
k · vikl +
|E|
∑
i
|Re|
∑
j
M
∑
k
N
∑
l
k ·qi jkl) (7.1)
Constraints
∀pkl ∈ P,
|V |
∑
i
vikl ≤ 1 (7.2)
∀r ∈ R,
M
∑
k
N
∑
l
ri jkl = 1 (7.3)
∀pkl ∈ P,
|V |
∑
i
vikl +
|E|
∑
i
|Re|
∑
j
qi jkl ≤ 1 (7.4)
∀Pk,
|V |
∑
i
N
∑
l
vtikl ≤ St (7.5)
∀e = (p,r1) ∈ E ′
M
∑
k1
N
∑
l1
M
∑
k2
N
∑
l2
Zk1l1k2l2 · vpk1l1 · ri1k2l2 = 1 (7.6)
∀e(r j,r( j+1)) ∈ E ′, 1≤ j ≤ |Re|−1
M
∑
k1
N
∑
l1
M
∑
k2
N
∑
l2
Zk1l1k2l2 · ri jk1l1 · ri( j+1)k2l2 = 1 (7.7)
∀e(r|Re|,q) ∈ E ′
M
∑
k1
N
∑
l1
M
∑
k2
N
∑
l2
Zk1l1k2l2 · ri|Re|k1l1 · vqk2l2 = 1 (7.8)
• Each v ∈V is mapped onto exactly one PE p ∈ P, Equation 7.2
• Each routing vertex, r ∈ R is mapped onto exactly one PE p ∈ P, Equation 7.3
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• Each pkl ∈ P can have only one operation, v or q, Equation 7.4
• Each pkl ∈ P can have at most St number of type t operations in the same row, Equation 7.5
• Equations 6-8 represents the interconnection links between pkl ∈ P. We use a adjacent matrix
table Z which contains all the information about the connections between pkl . Zk1l1k2l2 is 1 if pk1l1
is directly connected to pk2l2 or if k1 = k2 and l1 = l2. Using Z, we represent all the possible
connections when all v,r ∈V ′ are mapped onto pkl ∈ P using following three constraints.
Note that Equation 7.6- 7.8 are not linear. The contain products of boolean decision variables.
Let a and b be boolean variables. The term a · b can be linearized by using an additional boolean variable
t, and the following constraint : t ≥ a+b−1, t ≤ (a+b)/2
7.6 Our Approach : Split-Push Kernel Mapping (SPKM)
Although the previously considered objective for the problem has been to minimize the number of PEs
used. However, in practice, owing to the severe restrictions of the shared resource constraints, utilizing
less number of rows is the most useful objective function. Utilizing lesser number of rows directly
translates into increased opportunities for novel power and performance optimization techniques. For
example, to reduce the energy consumption, a whole row of PEs may be power gated. In addition it
might be possible to cleanly execute another application on the remaining rows to improve throughput.
Our approach of mapping a kernel onto a CGRA is based on the Split & Push algorithm [8] in
graph drawing. Figure 7.2 shows an example of mapping 4-operation kernel K graph onto a mesh CGRA
C.
(a) (b) (c)
1 2
1
2
1 2 1 2
1
2
1
2
Figure 7.2: Split & Push Approach
The algorithm starts with a degenerate drawing where all the nodes in a graph are located at the
same coordinate(1,1), as shown in Figure 7.2(a). In the first step, we locate each v ∈ K using cuts. A cut
is a plane orthogonal to one of the axis. It is shown by a dotted line in Figure 7.2. The cut splits all v ∈ K
into two groups. All v in one of the groups are pushed to new coordinate. Figure 7.2(b) shows the result
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Figure 7.3: Formation of fork
of split & push along the dotted line. This split & push is repeated until every v has distinct coordinate
like the drawing shown in Figure 7.2(c).
The crucial step in the split & push approach is finding a suitable cut. Consider the application
of split & push applied to the same K in Figure 7.3. The final graph requires much more PEs than the
solution in Figure 7.2. This is because v3 is separated from other nodes in the first stage of split & push
algorithm. This separation produces a fork. A fork is adjacent edges both cut by a split. Once there is a
fork and the fork consists of n adjacent edges, n− 1 bends (or dummy nodes, or routing vertices(PEs))
are required as n−1 edges in the fork become slant, which is not allowed in mesh graph drawing.
Forks can be avoided by finding a matching-cut. A matching-cut is defined as a set of edges
which have no common node and whose removal makes the graph disconnected. The problem of finding
a matching-cut in a graph is again an NP-complete problem [82].
In order to minimize the number of utilized rows in the mapping, we propose a three stage
heuristic based on the split & push approach. Following three subsections explain SPKM by mapping
the kernel graph K = (V,E) shown in Figure 7.4(a), onto a 4×4 mesh CGRA C = (P,L), shown in Fig-
ure 7.4(b).
We assume that in C, all p ∈ P are connected to their first, as well as their second horizontal
or vertical neighbors. Thus a PE is connected to at most 6 other PEs. We also assume that in a row, at
most 2 load operations and one store operation can be scheduled. In K of Figure 7.4(a), we have ten
operations including three loads (gray nodes) and one store (dark grey node).
Column-wise Scattering
This step distributes vertices v in V to minimum number of UR in the same column considering minimum
number of forks and shared operations like multiply and load/store. First we compute the lower bound
on |UR| in the CGRA, as in |UR|min =max(d|V |/|N|e,dL/Lre,dS/Sre) =max(d10/4e,d3/2e,d1/1e) =
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Figure 7.4: Mapping process example
3. We try to map K onto three rows of C. We distribute all v in K to pk1, 1 ≤ k ≤ |UR|min. All
v located at pk1 are separated into two sets and the nodes in one of the sets are pushed into p(k+1)1.
For example, all the nodes in p11 of Figure 7.4(a) are separated into two sets of nodes {v4,v8,v10}
and {v1,v2,v3,v5,v6,v7,v9}. The nodes in the set {v1,v2,v3,v5,v6,v7,v9} are pushed into p21 like in
the Figure 7.4(c). Now the nodes {v1,v2,v3,v5,v6,v7,v9} are separated into two sets {v1,v3,v9} and
{v2,v5,v6,v7} again, and the nodes {v2,v5,v6,v7} are pushed into p31. The split & push is repeated until
there are no empty pk1 in the |UR|min. In each repetition, a matching cut is found to minimize the number
of routing PEs.
ILP Solution of Matching Cut
Since matching cut problem is NP-complete, we solve it by formulating as an ILP. In the kth repetition,
the graph Kk consisting of all the nodes in pk1 are split into two disconnected graphs, and one of them,
Kk+1 is pushed into p(k+1)1. K1 is the same as K. We find a matching cut in Kk satisfying following ILP.
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Objective Function
d = | ∑
v∈V k
vik1−ξ | (7.9)
where vik1 is 1 if the nodes are not pushed into p(k+1)1, or 0 otherwise, and ξ is a constant restricting the
number of nodes left in pk1. As evenly distributing all nodes in Kk to all pk1 within |UR|min gives better
chance for getting an optimal mapping, we set ξ = b(N+ |UR|min−1)/|UR|minc.
Constraints
• The first constraint restricts the number of nodes left in pk1 due to shared resources like memory
buses or heavy computation resources. For example, the node v1 in Figure 7.4(a) has one load
primitive operation inside. So s111 is 1. In our CGRA, pkl within one row share two read buses, S
is 2.
• To minimize the forks, we have another constraint for all vmi with multiple edges in Kk.
∑
vi∈V k
vtik1 ≤ St (7.10)
∑
v j∈ad j(vmi )
(v jk1+ vmik1)≤ ζ1 or
∑
v j∈ad j(vmi )
(v jk1+ vmik1)≥ 2 ·deg(vik1m)−ζ2 (7.11)
where adj(vmi ) is the set of nodes adjacent to v
m
i and deg(v
m
i ) is the degree of v
m
i . ζ1 and ζ2 are
used for determining how many forks are allowed.
Equation 11 is not linear due to “or”. In order to linearize this, we change this equation to
Equation 7.12 and 7.13 using new constant η which is big enough.
∑
v j∈ad j(vmi )
(v jk1+ vmik1)≤ ζ1,+η · vmik1 (7.12)
∑
v j∈ad j(vmi )
(v jk1+ vmik1)≥ 2 ·deg(vik1m)−ζ2−η · (1− vmik1) (7.13)
When a muti-degree-node vmi , black node in Figure 7.5 and its adjacent nodes in K
k are deter-
mined to be pushed into p(k+1)l , there are four ways to avoid generating forks. Figure 7.5(a) and (b) show
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two possible cases where vmi is not pushed into p(k+1)l and deg(v
m
i ) or deg(v
m
i )-1 adjacent nodes are not
pushed either. Figure 7.5(e) and (d) show the other cases where vmi is pushed into p(k+1)l and only 0 or
1 adjacent node is not pushed. Thus, if we want to allow no forks, we set ζ1 = ζ2 = 1. If there is no
matching cut in the kth repetition of split & push, we increase ζ1 and ζ2, allowing more forks.
The left kernel DAG K in Figure 7.4(d) shows the result of column-wise scattering. Because
|UR|min is three, it attempts a mapping within three rows. Fortunately, it has a valid mapping in three
rows within C in the end, instead it allows two forks.
Figure 7.5: Fork minimization algorithm
Routing PE Insertion
After finishing column-wise scattering above, routing vertices should be inserted on each edge of each
fork generated in the first stage of SPKM to route data via indirectly connected PE. In this step, we
generate needed routing vertices and connect them with existing vertices. As (v7,v8) is an edge of the
first fork in Figure 7.4(d), we need a routing PEs (black nodes) on it. A outing PE is also inserted into the
edge (v3,v5) of the second fork. Sometimes there are no available PEs after routing PEs are inserted into
K. For instance, the right K with routing PEs in Figure 7.4(d) has five nodes at p31 due to the insertion
of a routing PE. Because we have four PEs in a row, this is an invalid mapping. In this case, we go back
to column-wise scattering with increasing |UR|min by one. Figure 7.4(e) shows the result of column-wise
scattering with |UR|min of four. We also need two routing PEs. One is on the edge (v7,v8) and the other
is on (v6,v7). After the insertion of routing PEs, it is still a valid result.
Row-wise Scattering
In this last stage, we distribute all the nodes at pk1 to the nodes pkl where l ∈ [1,n]. To avoid diagonal
edge as well as edge crossing, all the nodes that have connections between different rows should be
placed in the same column. For example, the nodes {v3,v5,v6} in Figure 7.4(d) are located in different
rows but they have connections to each other. If the node v6 is located in the fourth column while other
two nodes v3 and v5 are located in the third column, we need a routing PE between v3 and v6.
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7.7 Experiments
Experimental Setup
We test SPKM on a CGRA called RSPA [55]. RSPA is a 16 PEs in which each PE is connected to 4
neighboring PEs, and also the 4 next neighboring PEs (PE interconnection). In addition, it has 2 shared
multipliers in each row (shared resource), each row can perform two loads and one store (also shared
resource), and it allows PEs to be used for routing (routing PE). However, when a PE is used for routing,
it cannot perform any operation.
For quantitative estimation of the effectiveness of SPKM, we have devised a random kernel
DAG generator. Our DAG generator randomly generated 100 DAGs are for each value of node cardi-
nality from 5 to 16 nodes (1200 in total). Each DAG is generated according to following steps. First
the number of nodes is set. For each node, the operations possible in each PE of RSPA are randomly
assigned. At least one load operation should be assigned to leaf vertices and one store operation to root
vertices respectably. Finally edges are inserted, satisfying that each node should not have more than two
incoming edges. In addition, we also compare SPKM and AHN on a collection of benchmarks from
Livermore loops, MultiMedia and DSPStone. All experiments are done on Pentium4 3GHz machines
with 1GB RAM. We use glpk4.8 for solving our ILP formulations.
SPKM can map more applications
Figure 7.6: Number of applications mapped on CGRA validly
Figure 7.6 plots how many applications out of 100 applications can be mapped by the three
techniques for each value of node cardinality. The X-axis represents the number of nodes that each input
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application contains, and the Y-axis shows the number of valid mappings among 100 applications. ILP
takes a lot of time for large input graphs. We stop the ILP solver after 24 hours. ILP cannot find a
solution for graphs with 13 or more nodes, therefore, there are no ILP bars from 13 nodes in Figure 7.6.
The main observation from this graph is that SPKM can on average map 4.5X more applications than
AHN. It is interesting to note that the graph shows that the map-ability of SPKM over AHN increases
with the increase in the number of nodes. This implies the effectiveness of our technique for the large
applications.
SPKM can generate better mappings
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Figure 7.7: Percentage of better mapping for SPKM and AHN
In addition to being able to map more application than AHN, SPKM is also able to generate
better mappings for the applications, in terms of the number of rows. Figure 7.7 plots how many appli-
cations out of 100, better, similar, or worse mapping is generated by SPKM and AHN. The white bars
represent the number of applications in which SPKM and AHN maps with the same number of rows.
For example, for the 100 applications which have 12 nodes, in 82 cases, SPKM can generate mappings
which have fewer rows than AHN; AHN generated a mapping with fewer rows in 1 case, and in the rest
17 cases, SPKM and AHN generate mappings with similar number of rows. On average, SPKM can
generate better mappings than AHN for 62% of the applications, and the similar or better mappings for
99% of the applications.
Figure 7.8 plots in how many applications out of 100 ILP generates better mapping than SPKM.
Note that this graph has data only till 12 nodes since ILP cannot map large applications in reasonable
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Figure 7.8: Percentage of better mapping for SPKM and ILP
time. Also note that there are only two kinds of bars. This is because SPKM can never generate better
mapping than ILP. On an average, SPKM is able to generate optimal mapping in 72% of the applications.
SPKM has no significant mapping-time overhead
Figure 7.9: Total mapping time
SPKM generates effective mapping described above with minimal mapping time overhead. Fig-
ure 7.9 shows the average mapping time for all the three algorithms. Note that the Y-axis is a logarithmic
scale. On average, SPKM has only 5% overhead in mapping time as compared to AHN, and both are
much less than the time taken by ILP.
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Real Benchmarks
To demonstrate the effectiveness and usefulness of SPKM, we compare the number of rows and the
mapping time of SPKM and AHN for a set of benchmarks collected from Livermore loops, multimedia,
and DSPStone. Since these applications are large, we try to map them onto a 6x4 RSPA.
Figure 7.10: Number of rows for real benchmarks
Figure 7.10 shows the number of rows required for the mapping generated by SPKM and AHN.
ILP is unable to find a mapping for any of these benchmarks in reasonable time. The first observation
from this graph is that AHN is unable to map three of the applications, demonstrating that SPKM can
map more applications than AHN. The second observation is that the mappings generated by SPKM uses
less number of rows than AHN. SPKM uses fewer rows in 4 benchmarks out of 7, that can be mapped by
AHN, demonstrating the goodness of mapping. For the benchmarks that AHN could map, SPKM uses
just 2% more time than AHN.
7.8 Summary
While coarse-grained reconfigurable architectures (CGRAs) is emerging as attractive design platforms
due to their efficiency as well as flexibility, efficient mapping of applications onto them still remains a
challenge. Existing CGRA compilers assume a very simplistic architecture of the CGRA, due to which
they are unable and ineffective. In this paper, we propose a graph drawing based based approach, SPKM,
which takes in to account several architectural details of CGRA and is therefore able to effectively
and efficiently map applications onto CGRAs. Our experiment demonstrate that SPKM can map 4.5X
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more synthetic applications than previous approach, and generates better results in 62% of cases, with
minimal (5%) mapping-time penalty. Results on benchmarks from Livermore loops, MultiMedia and
DSPStone also convey the same. Our future work is to extend the SPKM approach to include dynamic
reconfigurability.
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Appendix A
NEED FOR SOFT ERROR RESEARCH IN MOBILE SYSTEMS
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A.1 Need for Soft Error Research
We computed the SER, of mobile and general purpose computers (on standard loads), using available
SER estimates for outdated technology nodes. On extrapolating the SER values for modern processor
caches, we arrive at a maximum of 4 probable failures per month. We believe that the soft error rate for
modern and future mobile or general purpose processors, can be predicted to increase and is a cause for
concern. The reasons for this conclusion are:
1. The SER extracted here donot include the impact of soft errors on sequential elements and com-
binational logic circuits in the processor.
2. With technology scaling the Qcrit of a gate reduces, thereby increasing the probability of a SEU
and thereby translating to increased soft error failures.
3. Owing to the decrease in Qcrit , low energy neutron particles also cause soft errors in the system.
Processor Cache Size Failures Failures Failures
(technology) (Mbits) (in 109Hrs) (per week) (per year)
General Purpose Processors
Intel i7 (32nm) 64.5 103200 0.017 0.90
Intel i5 (32nm) 48.5 77600 0.013 0.68
Intel i3 (32nm) 24.5 39200 0.007 0.34
Mobile Processors
Intel i7 (32nm) 64.5 103200 0.017 0.90
Intel i5 (32nm) 24.5 39200 0.007 0.34
Intel i3 (32nm) 24.5 39200 0.007 0.34
Apple A4 (45nm) 5.5 8800 0.001 0.08
Table A.1: Extrapolated SER of general purpose and embedded processors.
A.2 Evaluations
To estimate the soft error rate (SER) of a system, we model the SER in FIT/Mbit (1 FIT = 1 failure per
1 billion hours of execution). For our estimates, we use the SER value (at sea level) for the cache in the
90nm technology; which is equal to 1.6K FIT/Mbit[68]. We obtain the cache sizes of the processors from
their corresponding specification documents, and extrapolate the SER of the processor caches at sea level
in Table A.1. From the soft error rates thus extracted, we observe that with each technology generation,
the number of cores and thus the size of cache in the processor increases along with an increase in the
total number of sequential elements in the processor; which contribute to an increase in the overall soft
error failure rate. Until recently, alpha-particles and high energy neutrons (of 100KeV∼ 1GeV from
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the cosmic background), have been known to cause soft errors in semiconductor devices [69]. With
technology scaling, even low energy neutron particles (of 10meV∼ 1eV) can cause soft errors in sub
45nm SRAM memory cells [96]. This is exacerbated by the fact that there are many more low-energy
neutrons, than those with higher energies [46]. Therefore, we can conclude that the SER values observed
here is likely to increase by atleast an order of magnitude, thus increasing the likelihood of attaining a
FIT of one failure per-day.
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Appendix B
POWER CONSUMPTION OF THE CPU IN A SMART PHONE
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On an average, from the experimental results from [18], we observe that the CPU consumes
around 12% ∼ 19% of the total power across common usage patterns. The proposed techniques in the
thesis proposal aim to reduce TLB power, which consumes 17% of on-chip power in the Intel Stron-
gARM processor. The proposed techniques achieve an overall power reduction (assuming the use-last
TLB architecture is implemented) of 56% if i-TLB power and 18% of d-TLB power. From a global
perspective, using the power consumption of the Intel StrongARM processor, the proposed techniques
can achieve around 9.52% reduction in power when the i-TLB method is implemented, and can achieve
around 3% when d-TLB techniques are implemented. Lacking availability of information that relates
CPU power consumption and battery life, we can assume that proportion of CPU power reduced is
directly proportional to the increase in battery life of an iPhone battery.
B.1 Experimental Deductions
Carroll et al. [18] in their work, present experimental results and thereby analyze the power consumption
of a modern smartphone. In this, a breakdown of the power distribution to the various blocks in a
smartphone is analyzed and validated (HTC Dream and Google Nexus One) over different usage patterns.
The results of the analysis are as follows:
• Next to the LCD display, the CPU is the major power consuming block in general usage modes of
the smartphone.
• In the suspended state (when the phone’s LCD display is turned off and the phone is not actively
used), the CPU consumes around 20% of the total power consumed. Since the CPU acts as the
controller for enabling signals through the GSM module, and polling hardware interrupts to wake
from the suspended state, the CPU performs tasks in the static mode. The static power consump-
tion of the phone contributes largely to the overall power consumption of the smartphone.
• In the idle state (when the LCD display is ON, but the phone is not actively used), more ap-
plications or programs are executed on the processor. These tasks thus contribute to a power
consumption of around 15%.
• During operations like audio playback and video playback, the control and execution of the re-
quired programs/data on the hardware audio and video accelerator blocks by the CPU. These tasks
of the CPU contribute to an average of around 30% power consumption in these modes.
• Over a series of daily usage patterns, we observe that the CPU consumes around 12% ∼ 19% of
the total power across the usage patterns. We observe that next to the graphics blocks and GSM
module, the CPU is major contributor to the overall power consumption in the smartphone.
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B.2 Observation
These measurements have been extracted over an older version of the smartphone, when no additional
applications are executed on the system. When the number of applications used increases, the CPU
becomes the only hardware block to manage, monitor, and schedule the applications on the smartphone.
Thus, it is only evident that the overall power consumption proportion of the CPU will increase with
increase in the functionality of the smartphone and an increase in the number of applications used. From
our analysis of the results, and observing the current trend of smartphone applications and their use, we
are justified in expecting the power consumption of the processor to be a significant contributor to the
battery life of the smartphone. Therefore, we can conclude by saying that hardware, software or hybrid
techniques developed to reduce the power consumption of mobile/embedded processors is valid and will
help increasing the battery life and thus the usability of modern mobile systems.
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